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9 votes

From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?

The position of functionalists on AI is similar to the position of compatibilists on free will in two important respects. First, they distance themselves from the Cartesian idea that there is some ...
Conifold's user avatar
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8 votes

Why are Dan Dennett and his heterophenomenonology largely ignored by the Wikipedia and Stanford articles on phenomenology?

There is absolutely nothing which necessitates that Wikipedia articles are accurate, let alone balanced and/or comprehensive. It is a site that relies upon user input and moderator checks which the ...
Futilitarian's user avatar
  • 4,428
7 votes

Why are Dan Dennett and his heterophenomenonology largely ignored by the Wikipedia and Stanford articles on phenomenology?

I'm just going to affirm what's in the comments. Neither the IEP's article on Phenomenology nor the SEP's article on Phenomenology contain references to Dennett at all, and the reason is simple. ...
J D's user avatar
  • 27.7k
6 votes

How, in layman's terms, should this Conifold argument against illusionism be interpreted?

Conifold is a philosophically sophisticated thinker who runs laps around me, to be sure. I would agree that the term 'illusion' is meaningless, and Conifold is taking to task illusionism since it ...
J D's user avatar
  • 27.7k
5 votes

What does Daniel Dennett mean by "intentionality"?

The concept of intentionality is subtle and intrinsically difficult. In the philosophical literature, the term refers to a capacity to make a mental representation of something, a representation which ...
Ted Wrigley's user avatar
  • 20.2k
4 votes
Accepted

What does Daniel Dennett mean by "intentionality"?

For understanding some philosophers, it IS critical to get a precise definition of terms. That often isn't the case with Dennett, he generally uses words a bit imprecisely, more like a normal ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.4k
4 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

You say that the first para of the SEP article include the words "[Zombies] are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences". Clearly the 'but' implies that we ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 23.1k
4 votes

How, in layman's terms, should this Conifold argument against illusionism be interpreted?

Conifold's main argument could be framed as follows: Illusion means that something seems to be the case but actually is not ontological reality. Illusionism claims that mind, free will, and generally ...
Philip Klöcking's user avatar
  • 14.3k
4 votes

Has anyone ever claimed that if Daniel Dennett, or a like-minded person, did actually manage to explain consciousness, humans would be diminished?

As a preamble, the values concern about Dennett's delusionism is not the primary objection to it. Instead, most philosophers treat conscious experience as basic data, and a model of consciousness ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.4k
3 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

So my question is, does the philosophical zombies question/idea contain a hidden assumption and why (if/because it does) is this assumption (that normal humans are conscious and have qualia) not ...
J D's user avatar
  • 27.7k
3 votes

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

the issue is that materialists and physicalists presume a different question and answer that one instead. I feel like the two parties are talking across each other. They are all on the same page but ...
bodhihammer's user avatar
  • 1,106
3 votes

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

My 2 cents and then some. The "hard problem" is really hard, I would say insoluble only for a certain point of view. The point of view that accepts only a certain explanatory framework (eg ...
Nikos M.'s user avatar
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3 votes

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

The problem of subjective experience is best divided into two very different questions. First, whether subjective experience exists; and second, if it does, how to explain it in terms of something ...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
  • 8,138
2 votes

Why do compatibilists believe that whether we act freely is independent of whether or not determinism is true?

As I understand the principle — and I put it that way because the worldview is not one I share, for logical and philosophical reasons — the compatibalist position relocates 'choice' to be a property ...
Ted Wrigley's user avatar
  • 20.2k
2 votes

Is Dennett what Williamson calls a Judgement Skeptic?

Trying to answer, not having read the book in question. Yes, the description and definition actually appear to be customized to try to encompass Dennett's Delusionism, the Churchlands' Eliminative ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.4k
2 votes

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

I can recommend two relatively recent works on this issue. One is Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Kim discusses the last 60 years effort to try to fit consciousness into physicalism. His ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.4k
2 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

If actual humans are philosophical zombies, then none of them have the concept of qualia (if they have any concepts at all). There would be no point in asking a question about possible qualia-free ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
2 votes

How, in layman's terms, should this Conifold argument against illusionism be interpreted?

Conifold posted this: [I]llusionism (about consciousness) ... is designed to solve a metaphysical problem for physicalism, which is seen as struggling to accomodate qualia. [T]echnically, qualia are ...
SystemTheory's user avatar
  • 1,949
1 vote

Assuming philosophical zombies are possible, could one zombie have an inverted spectrum while the rest do not?

The p-zombie thought experiment explores the empiricist claim that consciousness is nothing more than its empirical footprint. To appear conscious is to be conscious. This idea was explored by the ...
Chris Sunami's user avatar
  • 30.2k
1 vote

Would the alleged nonexistence of qualia imply that it is meaningless to say that what I call "red" could be what you call "blue"?

No, regardless of what theories any philosopher might put forward to explain our sense impressions- whether you consider them to be illusions, hypotheses, qualia, incoherent concepts etc- the fact ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 23.1k
1 vote

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

The short answer is yes. The assumption, the default position, is that humans have consciousness. Even as a thought experiment, I find the definition of a p-zombie unsatisfactory. Suppose someone ...
Meanach's user avatar
  • 2,385
1 vote

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

Zombies - SEP The article in question (First published Mon Sep 8, 2003; substantive revision Sat Mar 25, 2023) explicitly states the usual assumption in the last paragraph of Section 1. https://plato....
SystemTheory's user avatar
  • 1,949
1 vote

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article called "Zombies" (...) makes no mention of an assumption (...) that normal human beings (...) have qualia and conciousness. The two sources ...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
  • 8,138
1 vote

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

"Why aren't we zombies?" There's the assumption that we aren't, but it's not acknowledged. You have to understand, the language-game 'Philosophical Zombies' is above all a thought ...
CriglCragl's user avatar
  • 22.1k
1 vote

Who first came up with heterophenomenology, and when?

Daniel Dennet first came up with the explicit construction of heterophenomenology in 1982 (Dennet, 1982). It's his analysis of the way in which consciousness can be studied in parallel to Husserlian ...
The Thought Detective's user avatar
1 vote

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

For monists and panpsychists, there is no division between matter and consciousness. Therefore, there is no hard problem. The fundamental stuff of the universe is matter-consciousness. Consciousness ...
Meanach's user avatar
  • 2,385
1 vote

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

Since Dennett doesn't believe in mind, it's not surprising that he thinks of humans as 'robots'. Personally, I think this is a good reason not to believe in Dennett: his solution is worse than the ...
Mozibur Ullah's user avatar
1 vote

Why do compatibilists believe that whether we act freely is independent of whether or not determinism is true?

Compatibilists assume the truth in some sense of determinism and the truth in some sense of freedom. Their view is not 'independent of whether or not determinism is true'. Compatibilism assumes the ...
Geoffrey Thomas's user avatar
  • 35.8k
1 vote

From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?

Consider the specific questions. Question 2: Has the question of agency been studied in philosophy of mind and philosophy of artificial intelligence? Regardless of what has been done, one can start ...
Frank Hubeny's user avatar
  • 19.5k

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