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This is an interesting question (or cluster of related questions), because it highlights the complexity of understanding both what ethics is and how different approaches to ethics "work." First off, there aren't really "three branches of ethics". There's three main ways that some people have categorized approaches to ethics -- but it's ...


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Many people make a mistake when they think about ethics: they believe ethics is a simple rule system for evaluating what is right and wrong in any given context, when ethics is actually a system of reasoning about questions that can be applied to different contexts. For instance, in your example you start by asserting that this is a question of self-interest ...


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OB-RE: If p ↔ q is a theorem, then so is OBp ↔ OBq. In other words, if p and q have the same truth value in each world, and each model, then they're basically the same proposition, and so one is obligatory iff the other is. This holds in classical systems and almost characterizes them. Classical systems correspond to minimal models, those where what is ...


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The issue arises if we consider imperatives, i.e. statements in the form : "Clean your room". In this case, the standard truth-functional accounts of connectives, that licenses inference patterns like disjunction introduction, seems at odds with natural language practice. This conclusion is consistent with the standard assumption of mathematical logic that ...


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This may superficially seem like a question of ethics --a moral commitment against racism as opposed to the practical value of profiling --but I think that both overstates the practicality of profiling, and understates the practical value of minimizing racial biases. If the suspects --or the guitars! --were arguments, what you are talking about would be the ...


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There is an article by Marcia Baron in which she rejects the view that 'consequentialism, virtue ethics, and Kantian ethics form three distinct and competing ethical theories'. While this does not imply that they are mutually reducible, it goes a long way to reconciling them. I am naturally unable to say whether this is the article to which you refer but it ...


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Freedom is a transcendental condition for the Categorical Imperative to be real. And the four different formulations mean exactly the same for him. I will argue how for Kant, the possibility of the experience of a categorical imperative presupposes freedom as necessary in his mature ethical system. Before that, the systematic relation between freedom and ...


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As Isaacson points out, Kant's moral system is very complex and, as such, focusing on a few aspects can lead us to lose sight of some other important aspects of his system. But your questions themselves can be answered straightforwardly. Your first question is how Kant can be consistent when he says that morality requires free will yet morally worthy act ...


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I am not really sure how selfishness is relevant. Helping him is unethical because it is cheating, and for the utilitarianism you brought up has much farther reaching implications than someone is happy because they passed a test. Since you describe the exam as "life changing", I would assume the exam is "important". Perhaps it lets a person enter a career ...


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One of the under-appreciated aspects of moral theory is that morality is rarely (if ever) determined by the specific outcome of an event. Morality is determined by the relationship between the participants. Consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics, and pragmatism focus on different aspects of that relationship, but the relationship is always key. In other ...


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I'd say, yes, it would. If the maxim of this action were turned into a universal law — that is, if everybody started doing tours of countries with poor human rights records — the human rights records of those countries would likely improve.


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It is a common misconception that Kant's ethics are detached from human desires. A better summary, for your investigation, might be that Kant places an extra step between the "will" and the action (that step being the compliance with duty) and that in doing so he believes he has arrived a a small set of actions which must always be avoided regardless of the "...


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My understanding is that Kant would see the exercise of reason as an end in itself, and he would identify the exercise of reason as proof of one's autonomy - so Kant's morality is built on the idea that the exercise of reason should be protected, and people's capacity for the exercise of reason should be recognised, because in so doing what we are protecting ...


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There's several reasons to believe Kant would not include a duty to prevent another person's unethical actions OR consider preventing the action of another person in general moral First let's start with the distinction between these categories. Type 1 is whether this would fall under the required duties that arise out of the categorical imperative. While ...


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Essentially your argument relies of a definition of free will which is quite deterministic. Despite his objections to it in metaphysics, Kant's ethics have a distinctly dualist feel with regards to free will. Kant distinctly changes his views on free will throughout his works ending up in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone basically just saying we ...


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I don't think your suggestion resolves the paradox. If you allow that do(x) entails do(x) or do(y), there remains the problem of explaining why you are not left with the option to do y. In ordinary English if Alice says to Bob, "Pay up or leave", we would understand this to mean that it is Bob's choice as to which he does. There does not seem to be any ...


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As a starting point, a system of AI morality would have to be deontological, because for it to be something you can implement as a program, it would have to be a clear cut set of rules, as opposed to a utility measure. Utilitarian ethics, even when applied to human situations, run into the difficulty of how to practically measure the utility of each ...


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Perhaps taking a Kantian angle on the golden rule would help. Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative has often been likened to a formalization of the golden rule. On a Kantian deontology, your deliberation would look something like this. I will act on the maxim that, when I know of a crime committed by a friend, I will not report that crime. Now ...


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Technically, “deontological ethics” is just a meta-ethical classification for ethical theories that evaluate the morality of an action according to a general rule/rules. (Though it is often used to refer to Kantian ethics, in particular.) If “follow these rules” is one of the rules of the theory, then following the rules would be a moral duty. More ...


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I'm thinking you've made something akin to the Four Term Fallacy here. The problem is that you've used the terms 'ought to' and 'is permissible to' as though they are logical synonyms, when in fact (in common usage) they are not. Consider: can there be a case in which it is permissible to say something which ought not to be said? For example, it would be ...


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Your axiom eliminates the distinction between what is permissible and what is obligatory, because it states that what is not obligatory is impermissible. The distinction between obligatory and permissible only exists as long as some things are permissible but not obligatory, but your axiom rules out such cases. Thus you get the result that the obligatory and ...


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The act- and rule-utiitarian distinction It does not follow, because Richard Brandt first formulated the distinction, that therefore utilitarian philosophers had not recognised a distinction long before. Their recognition can be shown by their general discussion of ethical matters. Such is precisely the case with John Stuart Mill. He very evidently possessed ...


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I highly recommend the Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. It provides an introduction to standard formalisms, conceptual distinctions, outstanding problems, and putative solutions, written by a variety of deontic logic specialists. I'd consider it a natural next step after working through Sider's text.


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Other responses claim that moral rightness depends on foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences, rather than actual ones. -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's Entry on Consequentialism, Section 4: Which Consequences? Actual vs. Expected Consequentialisms Your philosophy has traditionally been categorized as Consequentialist. If you want, you ...


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When deontologists apply the categorical imperative, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.", in layman terms "What would happen if everybody did the same ?", it might look like a consequentialist approach, but it is not. Note how it does not focus on the real ...


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Welcome Guilherme Penteado Normative ethics These ethical theories set out what (in their view) one ought to do or how one ought to be. I should say that very broadly there are three types of such ethics : Ethical theories that focus on results, on states of affairs to be achieved. The stress is on the best outcome, however assessed. Such theories are ...


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James Fieser divides the study of ethics into three subject areas: The field of ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Metaethics investigates ...


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Paul McNamara addresses Ross's paradox in deontic logic where there is an obligation operator, OB. His exposition may help explain why Ross's paradox appears paradoxical to some people even without that operator. Consider the example provided by the OP: Clean your room. Therefore, clean your room or burn your house down. McNamara used a similar ...


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Marcia Baron takes a deontological line, similar to Kant's but also critical of it, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE. By MARCIA W. BARON, PHILIP PETTIT, and MICHAEL SLOTE. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Pp. vi, 285. Baron's own : Marcia W. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology ISBN 10: 0801486041 / ISBN 13: 9780801486043 may be useful - she only ...


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