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17

Disclaimer: None of the ontological positions detailed is my own. 1. Neurosciences and the category mistake: a first take As Peter Reynaert puts it in Reynaert, P. (2015): "Neuroscientific Dystopia: Does Naturalism Commit a Category Mistake?" In: Neuroscience and Critique (pp. 70-86). Routledge (this is a synopsis of his): My claim that naturalism ...


14

It is common nowadays to distinguish substance from property dualism. No major philosopher has advocated substance dualism since Descartes himself, but a large number of philosophers have advocated property dualism. This is a view which classifies the properties of objects as being of two kinds, physical and mental, while maintaining monism or quietism ...


14

From what I have read so, atheism and materialism/physicalism are considered to be the same thing. This is incorrect. Atheism is a view about the existence of God. Materialism is a metaphysical view about the kinds of substance that exist. Specifically, atheism is the claim that there does not exist a God, or Gods, in the style of the major religions. ...


14

There are other arguments for mind-body dualism on the "Mind-body dualism" Wikipedia page, but the question is about a specific argument against it coming from neuroscience: In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Furthermore, subjective experiences and ...


9

Being an atheist does not imply a materialistic worldview, it simply means one does not believe in (a) God. Having said that, I think an atheist would likely have a materialist worldview simply because the same thing that caused an atheist to deny the existence of God (lack of evidence for this thing existing in another realm) would lead to a denial of ...


9

The question refers to ontology. The classification matter or mind is a strong simplification. Popper advocated a tripartition with world 1: physical objects and events world 2: mental objects and events world 3: objective knowledge and ideas created by the human mind. Popper describes his three worlds e.g., in Chapter P2, of Popper, Karl; Eccles, John: ...


8

Believe it or not, but the biggest challenge to dualism does not come from neuroscience or physiology, and in fact is shared with materialism, it is the threat of epiphenomenlism. Whether mental is ideal or material it is clearly something successfully used in empirical reasoning. Neuroscience and physiology at this point are in the early preliminary stages ...


8

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, ...


8

A prolific modern Leibnizian, Mike Hockney, might be somewhat like what you are looking for, see e.g. his Mathematical Universe and Smith's review of it, but do not expect the caliber of Badiou or Deleuze. Hockney, following Leibniz, interprets the phenomenal world as derivative from the primary ontology of dimensionless minds, monads (which Leibniz tells ...


7

Penrose's idea fell afoul of well-verified contradictory information. First, the mechanisms for functioning of neurons are quite well worked out, and do not require microtubules for signaling (only for structural properties, which change meaningfully on time scales longer than a choice that we percieve). Second, microtubules in cells are at relatively high ...


6

The question is based on a flawed premise, namely that thinking is an immaterial activity. In fact, thinking is a product of electrochemical activity in the brain that requires energy. In fact brain activity consumes 20% of the calories burned by the body. http://www.pnas.org/content/99/16/10237.full This SciAm article quotes the same figure: It is ...


6

Yes, of course. You can *scientifically prove** things deemed supernatural. But once you do, they are no longer supernatural. They are "natural," as demonstrated by the methods of the natural sciences. However, you are probably wasting your time on the various hobgoblins and eerie powers you list. We do not see such phenomena, werewolves, resurrections, ...


5

Why does Chalmers' argument not entail some form of idealism? I just read the page, and there is certainly no hint of idealism involved. That would imply that Chalmer's idea involves mental ontology, a sort of rejection of physicalism. Rather, his theory is particularly physicalist; you will notice that he politely turns away from any spiritual, ...


5

The line is typically drawn slightly differently, mostly because the word "explain" is not precise enough for a hard-edged debate on the topic. As given in the introduction to Phyiscalism on wikipedia: A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are physical in the ordinary sense. It is common ...


5

There seem to be several questions packed into this post. From the philosophy of mind point of view, please refer to the extensive literature on Dualism vs Materialism. Musolino isn't the first to delve into this question. Note that I am conflating the position that souls exist with substance dualism, even though strictly speaking they are not the same. ...


4

According to wikipedia, physicalism is now-a-days the preferred term to materialism in order to better include physical phenomenon which might be considered immaterial, e.g., fields or space itself. I'm not sure how important this distinction is, but it does help to emphasize: That the physical world contains many complex phenomenon that are not, at least ...


4

Its a matter of definitions. Whether it is possible to be an atheist and not be a materialist/physicalist depends on how you define atheist and materialist. Generally speaking, they are different words because people have found them to not define the same thing. Your challenge as an athiestic substance dualist will be accounting for how your freewill ...


4

According to my observation it is rather seldom that dualists actually explain the interaction of the mind and body. Often they restrict themselves to criticizing the monist position, hereby calling on our introspection: We experience that we can trigger our actions on the basis of rational decisions. There is one well-known exception from the 20th century: ...


4

The main difference is that functionalism is not an ontological doctrine, although it imposes some constraints on ontology, while property dualism is. The point of functionalism is to reduce consciousness to its manifestations in terms of its functional role in behavior, leading to the idea that it is implementation independent. This is compatible with most ...


4

I haven't read Richard Schmitt which makes me hesitant to answer the question as to what he means, but I can address the quote and what Kierkegaard means. First, the idea is not singular to Kierkegaard. It, in fact, traces back to Aristotle. For Aristotle, we are animals -- but we are animals who join to being animals some form of rationality. Being ...


4

Thanks for the referred video. I cannot agree more with l_ruth on the interpretation of what Dreyfus was saying. I post this answer since I do not think l_ruth's response is sufficient to answer the question by Ameet Sharma. The question that needs an answer is this: According to Heidegger, physics can't explain Dasein. Doesn't that make Heidegger a ...


4

This is an important question, and one that interactive dualists are generally poor at even admitting exists. Most of the other physicalist attacks on interactive dualism are based on reasoning or science errors (asserting different types of things cannot interact is -- simply untrue; asserting science has shown energy conservation and causal closure of the ...


4

I think the actual beliefs of philosophers are more open to dualism than the "discredited" quote implies. The philosophical survey shows a majority of philosophers to be physicalists (56.5%), but with 27.1% non-physicalist, and 16.4% other -- there is certainly a lot of room for dualism and idealism among contemporary philosophy. http://consc.net/papers/...


3

W.D. Hart's Engines of the Soul (1980) gives a book-length defense for the indivisibility of mind and its substantial distinction from matter (as opposed to more modern property dualism). Unlike many works which merely analyze dualism Hart develops a full proposal for how minds/souls can be distinct from matter and how psycho-physical causation can work. He ...


3

As far as I understand, in Emperor's New Mind, Roger Penrose puts forward the idea that certain elements of the laws of physics, yet unknown, might be deterministic but not computable. Deterministic in the sense that future is uniquely determined by present. Non-computable in the sense that no computer can calculate the future. Penrose suggests that ...


3

It seems the most usual solution to the problem these days is to simply eliminate the concept of a mind separate from a body. Therefore our thoughts are something of an illusion that arise from complex operations of the brain, nervous system and hormone secreting glands. Assuming this conception of the mind is acceptable to a thinker, the solution ...


3

I'm positive that culture plays some influence, but it's wrong to ascribe dualism to Western thought, since Eastern philosophies from Taoism to Zoroastrianism also are filled with dualistic thinking. Intuitively, I think the likely answer is that dualism is easy. No one perspective is likely to perfectly capture anything of sufficient complexity, and the ...


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