44

First, because they are "inconsequential". Nothing hangs on it for you, there is no need to act on them and accept the consequences also, it is a "cheap", easily swayable "acceptance". But this still leaves the question as to why accept rather than reject, as easily, perhaps at random. Which brings us to the second because: they are not accepted without ...


34

These are simple conclusions from inductive reasoning. I don't like it when I hit my thumb with a hammer. I don't like it when I bit my head on something. Even though I haven't been hit on the head with a hammer, I can assume it would hurt just as much if not more than the other things I've hit my head on. From personal experience and pop culture I know ...


19

Welcome to the demarcation problem of science. What is this thing called science? In lower levels of education, one is often given the impression that 'science', whatever that may be, exists as a monolithic entity. There is no sufficiency and necessity definition of what science is. It's better to say 'sciences' or 'scientific' when speculating as to this ...


17

I recently answered a similar question on physics.SE here. What is special about the probabilities of quantum mechanics is that the randomness cannot be explained by a theory of nature that is both local and realist, while classical probabilities can. Quoting myself: A "local hidden variable" theory is basically the classical idea of how the world ...


12

Maybe not so much a philosophical / logic-based argument, but in science there is a very helpful principle that most reasonable people (not only scientists) seem to have internalized: Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. (or, to flip it around, not much evidence is needed to support a very mundane claim) This snappy quote is attributed ...


8

What is Science? The Popperian view of science is that a claim is "scientific" if it can be falsified. Science cannot prove that a hypothesis is true, only that it is manifestly false. If economics can make falsifiable claims, then I think it is justified to say such claims are "scientific", at least on some level (the degree of repeatability is certainly ...


7

It can. Ramsey put it nicely in his "last papers" written around 1929 under the influence of Peirce's pragmatism (quoted from Marion, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and British Pragmatism): "We want our beliefs to be consistent not only with one another but also with the facts: nor is it even clear that consistency is always advantageous; it may well be better to ...


7

When Kant tells us that in an analytic statement the predicate is contained in the subject, he intends a quite different sense of 'subject' from what you have in mind. 'A triangle has three sides and three internal angles' is analytic because having three sides and three internal angles - possessing these predicates - is inherent in the subject of the ...


6

You seem to confuse belief (which is subjective) and the actual truth value of a proposition. The LEM only applies to the latter, not to the former. If you wish to stay inside a mathematical framework, one might view probabilities as being degrees of belief. This is the subjective probability interpretation, or the Bayesian view. In your example, we would ...


6

If different times are involved, then there is no contradiction. S can be a theist at time t1 and an atheist at time t2. It is possible and quite common for a person not to realise the full implications of their beliefs. It is possible for S to believe b1, b2, b3 and also to believe b4, b5, b6, without realising that b1, b2, b3 imply theism and b4, b5, b6 ...


6

The "classical" form of quantum mechanics (no hidden variables or "pilot waves") maintains that a state exists as a superposition of all possibilities until the act of measuring that state causes the associated wavefunction to collapse. The collapse of the wavefunction then follows the probabilities for each possible state (for example, ...


6

The key characteristic of a quantum superposition is that all superposed states are equally real (or potentially real) at the physical level. This is quite different from a classical probability, which assumes that one state is real and the probability reflects our ignorance of the true state of affairs. That, basically, is it. We know this to be true ...


5

I might know that the sun is more than 100,000 miles from the earth, and the statement 'The sun is more than 100,000 miles from the earth' is true. It is not itself knowledge, however. Knowledge is a state of the knower; a statement is not a state of anything. I am not foreclosing on the nature of a knower; a knower might be a person, an individual mind, ...


5

The obvious answer for this is that we don't require specific evidence because we use reason based on a normative understanding of the world. In other words: "Most people don't like to be hit on the head with a hammer." As a matter of experience, people generally do not like to be hit on any part of their body with any hard object. Simple deduction yields ...


4

EDIT: it may be worthwhile for those interested in answering this question to familiarize themselves with the OP's earlier posts throughout the stackexchange site - e.g. here (now deleted), here, or here - under this and related usernames. I did not check the username ahead of time, or I would not have answered; that said, I've decided to leave this answer ...


4

Wikipedia says Natural science is concerned with the description, prediction, and understanding of natural phenomena based on empirical evidence from observation and experimentation. It can be divided into two main branches: life science (or biological science) and physical science. Social science is concerned with society and the relationships among ...


4

You speak of AI as if it requires human-level intelligence to raise epistemological questions when the current technology level of robots and machine learning has already raised them. Some philosophers have already embraced seeing the current state of technology as having epistemological implications. In their article Epistemology and artificial intelligence,...


4

The concept of the colonization of knowledge (technically, the colonization of the lifeworld) comes out of Jurgen Habermas' 1992 "Faktizität und Geltung" ("Between Facts and Norms"). It's an interesting work, but heavy reading. The basic idea rests on a distinction between the kind of language and communication used in the 'lifeworld' — the rich, organic, ...


4

Empiricism and reason 'Empiricism' has as many meanings as there are empiricists. But if we take empiricism as the view that all knowledge derives ultimately from sense experience, which has some claims to be the standard view, there is no inconsistency in recognising a role for reason. We can reason about what we derive from experience. For instance, ...


4

The skeptics would argue that you accept these because you eventually have to. A common argument is the Münchhausen trilemma it is focused on the idea of "proving" statements via rational means, and argues that all rational arguments must eventually end in one of: A circular argument (I know X is true because X is true) A regressive argument (I can prove ...


4

As I see it — and keeping in the Wittgensteinian vein — The difficulty we have here is that the term 'knowledge' is vaguely defined across a number of language games, and it's rarely clear which language game we're playing when we invoke it. That causes confusion. So allow me to go ahead and deconstruct this topic, to see where we end up. When we talk about ...


4

This is discussed at length in "The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis" by Julien Dutant (Philosophical Perspectives 26(1)). He writes at one point (bolded mine): In 1960, Gilbert Ryle still ascribes the infallible mental state view to the tradition in his “Epistemology” entry for Urmson’s Concise Encyclopedia. Seven years later, in the “...


4

Nozick does not evade such examples, he bites the bullet on their consequences. Since the tracking/sensitivity conditions (the last two bullets of the OP) are fulfilled the brain in a vat (BIV) does know who won the World Series. He does know it despite not knowing that he is a brain in a vat. This is an example of what DeRose dubbed "abominable conjunctions"...


4

This is essentially the same as ACuriousMind's answer but a little more practical, which I find helps in considering philosophy. The key difference is that quantum mechanics includes, more or less, negative probabilities, such that you can superimpose situations that both allow for some phenomenon P and this combination disallows P. To quote Scott Aaronson, ...


4

I would say definitely not, just the opposite. In the idea of "ineffable language" and concepts "which are indeed felt," this appears to show Kant in his "sentimentalist" phase, when he was influenced by Hutchinson and Shaftesbury, et al. He made a radical turn after reading Hume, once translated into German in maybe the late ...


4

(Edit note: From the comments I’ve received, it seems that the paragraph beginning with “On the other hand” was not clear enough and can be misunderstood, so I add some clarifying sentences at the end of the paragraph – they are the italic sentences after (5).) Q (the original question): Which aspects of consciousness are philosophically most important? A: ...


4

Descartes doesn't actually reason that nothing is knowable. In Meditation I he merely practises what is generally called methodological doubt. In constructing the foundations of knowledge he will not accept any belief if beliefs of that kind could be false. So he will not accept sense-based beliefs because the senses can deceive us. He will not believe that ...


4

The terms only comes up in a handful of SEP articles, but it looks like your strongest bet is to use those in SEP: The Epistemology of Modality. It is definitely jargon for a subset of philosophers interested in modal aspects of epistemology. Some of the names thrown around are van Inwagen, Yablo, and Chalmers, all of whom are of some contemporary ...


3

Absolute time and space Relativity theory radically re-conceptualised space and time, a concept of both philosophical and scientific interest. Newton held an 'absolute' theory of time: 'Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external'. Most 18th and 19th century philosophers who ...


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