No, the Cogito cannot possibly be proved wrong, even though many philosophers throughout history argued exactly that. However, most philosophers got the Cogito wrong.
There are two main ways philosophers got it wrong in their interpretation of the Cogito, usually to arrive at the irrelevant conclusion that it was not a valid argument.
The first way to ...
I never heard of that https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/DIKW_pyramid before, but given your profile "My background is discrete math and computer science", I'd conjecture that you'd find https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_theory a much, much (, much...) better and more rigorous formal representation of knowledge.
And then you can construct domains with or ...
Regarding the physical support of information (and of knowledge), bits are implemented as two-state systems, two physical states - a finite amount - of something "finite", but information does not have a lower bound: you may send a signal of pure white noise, with no information at all.
The first and main point to understand about the trilemma is that it is an argument. As such, its function is to convince other human beings, at least to the extent that they are rational.
The trilemma is an argument about knowledge and for this reason is often misunderstood as proving the impossibility of any knowledge.
This, however, is a logical ...
You have misunderstood the point of the Munchausen Trilemma. It plays a key role in the process of philosophy showing that none of our beliefs are justified knowledge, per the standards of "reasoning".
Most people hold that they have knowledge and beliefs based on justified reasons, and that beliefs SHOULD be justified, and knowledge isn't knowledge unless ...
We know it's a trilemma because the argument is founded on logic and proofs, and all proofs will end in either circular logic, infinite regression, or a foundational assumption.
You can always break a proof into parts. Those parts get simpler and simpler. Keep breaking them up long enough, and all parts will eventually ...
The trilemma is about justification of a given proposition. Any justification, so the story goes, takes ultimately one of these forms if faced with skepticism.
Therefore, the third option is about people who answer to the question "But how do you know that x really is true" dogmatically, e.g. with "Because it is", "Because I say so", etc.
Ultimately, the ...
You’re assuming that simulation is a philosophically coherent category. It’s not. Few philosophers have taken up Bostroms notion of a simulation as a philosophically coherent thought. It’s science-fiction dressed up as philosophy, and for we know, that’s where Bostrom got the idea from.
The problem Gettier points out is not with "truth", but with the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. After his paper it has become common to say that this analysis is traditional. It is perceptive of you to see the oddness in the story according to which Gettier undermined the traditional understanding of knowledge. Julien Dutant calls this story ...
Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy (NY: H.Holt & Co., 1912), p.131
If a man believes that the late Prime Minister’s name begins with the
letter B, he believes what is true, since the late Prime Minister was
Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. But if he believes [we can add: for good
reason] that Mr. Balfour was the late Prime Minister, he will ...
At the root of all these asymmetries is the fact that not all relations are commutative/symmetric.
Here are some non-commutative/asymmetric relations involved in numbers
1: Factors ⇒ Product
2,3,6: Premises ⇒ Conclusion
4: Plaintext message ⇒ Encrypted message (even in symmetric cryptography)
5: Matter ⇒ Form
7: Logic ⇒ Math ⇒ Physics ⇒ Morality ⇒ ...
However, I see that in the english speaking philosophical world, certainty is so to say absent from discussions regarding language. I cannot see where certainty can be found in the standard definition of knowledge as true justified belief. How to explain this?
I think that the theory of knowledge as justified true belief is typical of analytical philosophy, ...
The question is
Is a proposition a priori if the premises require empirical evidence?
Jason S. Baehr describes a priori and a posteriori as "ways of knowing", but they can also be applied to propositions and arguments:
The a priori/a posteriori distinction is sometimes applied to things other than ways of knowing, for instance, to propositions and ...