New answers tagged

0

If a person declares himself to be both, a theist and an atheist, then the person should first clarify his/her concepts. Both terms are contradictory. Hence the answer to the OP's question is "no".


0

Yes. Bertrand Russell admitted that the scientific stance is agnosticism, the existence of god/s has not been proved. But said he identified as atheist for clarity in debate, that he did not believe in deities so far specified. He pointed out that nearly all religious persons believing in a deity/ies is atheist with regard to the deity/iesof other faiths. ...


0

For an example of an atheistic theist there is Thomas Altizer (1927 - 2018), professor of Religious Studies at Stony Brook University 1968 - 1996. Illustrative of his prima facie contradictory stance is the title of one of his books: The Gospel of Christian Atheism 1966, updated 2003. Altizer has a nuanced view of God which is intrinsically bound up with ...


0

I can know that p without being certain that p if, for instance, I have evidence sufficient for knowledge that p but am uncertain whether the evidence is sufficient. No contradiction. I can also know that p without being certain that p if, for instance, I knew that p at time t1, I remember that p at time t2 but, at t2, am uncertain whether I am veridically ...


0

"To me the existence of God is metaphysical, ie it exists outside the realm of human measurement." Not really. It is quite possible that scientists observe events that contradict know laws of physics. And if god exists and decides to provide such an event then scientists can’t force him to repeat it. “Observable” would be needed, not “repeatability”...


1

I saw a video of a philosopher (Robert Audi) who said that common sense is the best response we can give to global skepticism. I would agree, but it's not clear to me what the nature of common sense is. Is it a set of intuitive beliefs? No, it is very rational. But in order to see it, we need to take a step back out of the epistemological haze; and maybe ...


1

I haven't read Audi, but I'll put this extended comment on 'common sense' out for consideration... All of philosophy begins at prima facie experience. We have prima facie experiences we attribute to the external world, usually derived from our physical senses; we have prima facie experiences we attribute to an internal, subjective world, such as thoughts, ...


5

If different times are involved, then there is no contradiction. S can be a theist at time t1 and an atheist at time t2. It is possible and quite common for a person not to realise the full implications of their beliefs. It is possible for S to believe b1, b2, b3 and also to believe b4, b5, b6, without realising that b1, b2, b3 imply theism and b4, b5, b6 ...


1

If someone has a dissociative identity disorder and at least one personality is theist and at least another one is atheist, it is possible.


-1

People who hold contradictory beliefs are sick. In psychology, this disease is called cognitive dissonance. In the field of psychology, cognitive dissonance occurs when a person holds two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values; or participates in an action that goes against one of these three, and experiences psychological stress because of that. --...


2

Many have contradictory beliefs, though they may not realize it. Some may even have contradictory beliefs, realize it, and hold them all the same. Being both a theist and atheist in the strong sense of each term would be a special case of this real phenomenon. There's another answer you might find of interest though, which allows one to be an atheist and a ...


1

The logical opposite of "I believe X is true" is not "i believe X is false" but "I do not believe X is true". While "X true" and "X false" are contradictory, and can't be both part of your beliefs without contradiction, not believe that X is either true or false is valid, and equivalent to "I don't know ...


0

In your example with coins in a jar, the law of the excluded middle requires that you accept the proposition "the number of coins in the jar is even or the number of coins in the jar is odd". It does not require that you believe or disbelieve either half of that proposition in isolation nor does it speak to the validity of either half of that ...


5

You seem to confuse belief (which is subjective) and the actual truth value of a proposition. The LEM only applies to the latter, not to the former. If you wish to stay inside a mathematical framework, one might view probabilities as being degrees of belief. This is the subjective probability interpretation, or the Bayesian view. In your example, we would ...


1

GE Moore, Moorean facts. “Here is one hand”. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand. There is a paper there in “External Links” you may want to read by Thomas Kelly.


0

Res Cognitans and Res Extensa when considered as two things creates the concept of duality. The cosmic energy and the earthly ingredients when conjugate life is the phenomenal outcome. But if we consider even the earth a result of cosmic consciousness this conceot of duality disappears. It is Res Cognitans only.


2

The bottom line is that, like knowledge [commonly defined as "warranted or justified true belief"], to be "interesting" [sticking to your lecturer's postmodern argot], skepticism must also be justified, be warranted [using the non-postmodern argot]. That is, my claim to know, or doubt [be skeptical about] claim C is justified/warranted, ...


0

You've pinpointed a very important but little understood aspect of the operation of the mind, not brain, (which serves as the data collection and storage mechanism and bodily functions management systems.) One thing, perhaps the only one which Spinoza and Berkeley agreed on is that all of our ideas have as their origin, either objects or events from the ...


1

It is advisable to distinguish two types of scepticism towards our knowledge, viz. the theory with which we describe the world: the world could be principally different (or not even exist) to any of our theories that ever describe it and thus we could be doomed to know nothing our (human) sensory and notional access to the world is so limited that it must ...


0

For Kant, intuitions do not mean only one thing. For instance, every sense-datum that is received by the faculty of sensation (Sinnlichkeit) is directly called an 'empirical intuition' (empirisichen Anschauung). In the form of empirical intuitions, they are not yet appearances, for in order there to be an appearance, empirical intuitions have to be 'molded' ...


1

I see you are reading the CPR and asking questions while you read it which is a great exercise in Philosphy. May I suggest Bird's commentary to accompany your reading? (The revolutionary Kant) To try and answer your question: Kant's argument in RoI is not dealing with noumena. The existence of external objects is the existence of a distinction between outer-...


0

The only answer I could muster after reading various positions on this is, that it is contested. There are two forms of interpretation - conceptualist and non-conceptualist. Former thinks Kant cannot establish that there do exist such intuitions, and therefore the difference between concepts and intuition is merely that of difference in the working of them....


0

The problem here is ignorance. We don’t know the proofs of some proofs at some point. Also in some cases the axiomatic response is correct. For example, there is no point in proving the equivalence of two identical things, as in them being fundamentally the same entity. A perfect example of the former case is the proofs of the various theories upon the ...


0

There are multiple levels in which concepts fall short in determining and embracing intuition. There are sensible representations that are unconscious, "obscure", no appercieved (this is inherited by leibniz's petite perception), yet they are given sensible representations. This is the strongest case of a sensible representation without a concept ...


0

I think your question arises from a misunderstanding of the conception of noumena in Kant. The noumenon (from nous, thought) is not an existing world out of reach. The thing in itself is a thought that has a methodological value, you could see it as a mental experiment, though this might be misleading. The whole idea is, as poorly as a few words can render ...


0

The trilemma has a fundamental premise, namely that all justifications are deductive in nature. This is problematic since the trilemma and its purported conclusion (the impossibility of proving any truth) is not itself deductively derived from any other statements. Albert himself claimed that the trilemma affected inductive, causal, transcendental and ...


-1

The big book of scientific knowledge is written in the language of mathematics. Four hundred years of work in this area as shown that regardless of what philosophers or physicists might think about this, it nonetheless is a fact that the use of mathematics to organize knowledge about the physical world is (to some) unreasonably effective. As such, the ...


1

To Carnap being a realist is no more than opting for the vocabulary/language of realism. According to Carnap's principle of tolerance there are no truth-relevant arguments in favour of realism and against a form of anti-realism. From his empiricist stance, whether one chooses a realist or an anti-realist vocabulary/language does not make any difference to ...


0

It comes down to intelligible intelligence. Which I suggest is a specific case of mutual intelligibility. As an experiment, people tried reverse diagnosing the function of a microchip; it was basically impossibly difficult. You need insight into how something occured, and how it fits within systems, to make sense of it. Language is like this too. An machine ...


0

The more inputs I test the more confidence I should have. But why? In the general all question, given a black box with infinite possible inputs and some output, and with unknown complexity, it is unclear what amount of testing will give what amount of confidence when predicting the next behavior of the black box. However when the complexity of the interior ...


0

I agree with @HWalters -- what could have possibly motivated you to post this here???:) Nevertheless, I happen to have been a software developer all my professional life, and also have an ms in physics, so maybe I can see a tenuous connection, as follows. Firstly, let's define a program as corresponding to a computable function f:N-->N, since any text string ...


0

Statements (as Kant suggests) have the form subject + predicate. Following the systems theory, this is essentially a semantic interrelation between two systems, which in this case are concepts: [Aristotle] <--> [Great] Statements have necessarily such structure. The rest of the elements of a sentence are just the syntactic and lexical auxiliaries. "...


-2

Strictly speaking it's an opinion and not a statement, unless there is some specific unambiguous definition of "great" that is all agreed on. Just like sentences such as "John is smart" or "Ann is pretty" are opinions and not statements, unless there are specific unambiguous standards of "smart" and "pretty", resp.


1

One might say that the argument is a very straightforward reason to believe, not that epistemology is meaningless, but that its concept (knowledge) is irreducible to other concepts. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses this, at least in the article on John Cook Wilson (I thought I could find a reference to Timothy Williamson's statement of the ...


0

Kantian intuition is a mental 3D-image of a particular object. Like that chair in the living room. After it made a few appearances from different sides, you can close your eyes and enjoy the view of its intuition suspended a few feet above the floor and slowly rotating counterclockwise. I'm sure Immanuel Aspergerovich would have explained it in his own ...


Top 50 recent answers are included