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You should really remove "Covid vaccination" from this, because there are plenty of people who strongly but absolutely wrongly believe that covid vaccination will hurt you, and if that's what you believe, then convincing someone to get vaccinated seems clearly unethical. Ask instead "is it ethical to convince someone to do something that is ...


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If a person... Has identified a particular goal (Eg: the maximisation of a community's wellbeing) as ethical, and Has identified an action they sincerely believe will contribute towards the achieving of that goal (Eg: convincing people to get vaccinated/refuse vaccination), ...then performing that action is ethical, regardless of whether or not they are ...


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According to Chinese history, from 2500 BC, ancient humans began to explore how to use silk to spin clothes. Before clothes were invented. People used foliage to block. Wearing clothes may be an instinct for people to protect themselves


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Ethics won't give you the answer on its own, because ethics judge our deeds on the basis on their consequences on us and other people. And judging those consequences depends on other sciences. Is it morally acceptable to refuse vaccination because of personal beliefs, or force vaccination on others despite their personal beliefs? It all depends, what does it ...


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When something has a label on it, it will influence how we think about it, even if the thing isn't what the label says. So I think it's important to define the terms in depth. Suppose a pharmaceutical product labeled "vaccine" possesses the following characteristics (and ignoring cost): Probability of seriously harming the recipient, for example ...


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You approach the problem from the position that everyone knows & agrees on the safety & efficacy of the vaccine. But people don't refuse it because they wish to declare that they are selfish & uninterested in wider community wellbeing. Common reasons people give for refusing the covid vaccine, are that this RNA style is a new type of vaccine that ...


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Two points... First, there is nothing immoral about trying to convince someone of some point. Political society in Liberal democratic nations depends of the ability of different people within the population to communicate and convince each other. Even in non-liberal societies, convincing others to agree is a central principle, though non-liberal systems ...


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John Rawls discusses this subject, albeit briefly, in A Theory of Justice. The context is the issue of public goods, for example in light of the free-rider problem. The section is #42 (pg. 237 of the 1999 edition). Another aspect of the public goods situation is that of externality. When goods are public and indivisible, their production will cause benefits ...


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The answers are as numerous as are the particular ethics people follow. For example, in a given religion, there may be a religious edict forbidding negotiations with terrorists whose particular brand of terrorism goes against the religion. To enumerate them all would be impossible. However, I find the most typical arguments regarding negotiating with ...


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If we promised to keep a secret we ought not to break it. This is another example of the categorical imperative. Therefore, we should not lie to the torturer but explain to the torturer that 'I vowed to keep a secret and this is a promise I cannot break'. In terms of the universalizability test (using hypothetical imperative), it would be 'to imagine a ...


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There is a common misconception that Kant prohibits using other people as means. This isn't true. Kant, in general, only prohibits using people as merely means to an end. If Kant meant that you could not treat other people as means at all, then his maxim would fail his universalizability test. Namely, one wouldn't be able to imagine constructing a ...


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Kantian moral constructivism, especially as espoused by C. Korsgaard or O. O'Neil, is meant to be the third option between moral realism and moral relativism. From Constructivism in Metaethics: Both Rawls and O’Neill present Kantian constructivism as a third option between realism and relativism And: [Christine] Korsgaard points to an assumption she ...


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The use of probability — i.e., invoking 'likely results' and assessment of odds — hides the deeper philosophical issue at stake. This issue boils down to the following: Are all acts ethical if one isn't caught committing them? This is a commonly-held position in the practical world, one that ethicists and theologians have fought against for as far back as ...


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There is indeed a lot of theory and literature around this topic, but it's just as often critical as affirming. The center of is an old debate in the Black American community, perhaps best traced back to Booker T. Washington and Frederick Douglass. Washington and Douglass were both born enslaved, and both became prominent speakers, philanthropists, activists ...


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Short Answer In regards to the question of freedom of speech (SEP), limits are almost universally accepted by social institutions responsible for maintaining order through the use of the law. What those limits are very greatly from culture to culture depending on the consensus on what constitutes 'law', 'speech', and 'morality'. It's not possible here to ...


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The situation of killing a goblin and deeming it evil is analogous to justifying killing predators such as lions, or other vicious predators (i.e. weasels) on the account of their 'evil' nature. It used to be the case in history that animals were trialled and executed just like humans. This is clearly wrongheaded. As in, can they be rational enough to ...


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I think what it shows is that people don't use philosophy to solve moral problems. Given responsibility over some set of human lives they are not overly attached to they recognize that sacrifices may have to be made for "the greater good" and will pull a lever and wear a poppy once a year. When asked to murder someone in order to achieve that "...


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Virtuous courage makes sense when there is something that must be done "for the greater good" but doing it incurs much risk or loss. A coward, doesn't do the thing due to fear of the loss, but incurs the consequences of not doing the necessary thing. Society as a whole loses out and the coward incurs its disappointment. A courageous person does the ...


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Personally I think so, because I am basically a virtue ethicist. On raw utilitarianism one should really consider equally all people who can be happy or suffer equally (though I am sure that there are versions arguing out of this conclusion); equally as a Kantian I would think one should treat all rational free beings as equal foci of ethical concern (though ...


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On the non-cognitivist account it is neither morally justifiable, nor non-justifiable. If you were to favour people which have no emotional connections to yourself, then you express your whim to do so. "Hurray, friend! Boo, stranger!" or "Hurray, stranger! Boo, friend!". That's that, nothing more to it. On the grounds of cognitivism, say, ...


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No, I don't think so; or at least I don't think the sources you've cited in your questions show this. I don't think that Socrates claims that he knows nothing at all; on close reading, the claim that he makes is a more limited claim, and that claim that he does make seem to be compatible with discussing many topics intelligently and in-depth. So here's why I ...


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Short Answer There are theories that accommodate the assignment of ethical or moral value to the inanimate. One way to defend this is the axiological presupposition that claims of value can be an expression of emotion instead of logical content. One such theory is held by a position called emotivism often identified with A. J. Ayer. Long Answer Consider a ...


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There isn't any moral difference between simulating one brain, or simulating a thousand copies of one brain in perfect lockstep. We can view the second as a special case of the first, or the first as a special case of the second. This is because there is a direct correspondence between the first case and the second. A simulation of one brain is also a ...


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I fail to see the utility of such a hypothetical question. It seems to be nothing more than abstract reflection on an imagined circumstance. Is it a heuristic meant to refine our moral sensibility or test our mental agility? Maybe it has a significance not apparent to me. I fear this is a rather flat-footed and perhaps inappropriate response, but I am ...


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Your problem setup implies that the humans at risk can be duplicated which significantly reduces the stakes and implies that the switcher has no free will. But I don't think it really changes anything about the problem. You could choose to measure the ethics by looking at the consequences, "Is one of the victims a future Hitler?" or from the ...


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The moral concepts of 'good' and 'evil' are rooted in the intention of the actor, not in the objective action itself. Thus they both require a moral agent: someone capable of forming intentions. Consider the following cases: A mountain lion kills a hiker in the woods A thief kills someone during a robbery A soldier kills an enemy soldier during a war A ...


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"Say, there's a dangerous object that can do harm under the right condition. Can this object be considered innately evil or bad" In plain terms, yes. Flamethrowers, gas weapons, bayonets with a triangular blade etc are considered 'bad' by their very nature and we have conventions to prohibit their use. More poetically, it would not be unusual to ...


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To read the full article, you'd need JSTOR access. But if you search "deontology without free will" (on Google), you get a quote from the article's interior: ... there are also varieties of deontology and virtue ethics that do not require appeals to free will. It is probably obvious that utilitarians need not appeal ... I assume that the latter ...


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Modulo some specific assumptions, you can resolve this question pretty easily. Now in philosophy, we never just specify our assumptions, but we go on to question those, and so on. Even so, here's the resolution: Person A ought to B. Person C ought to D. Ought-implies-can [this is the specific assumption that does the job*]. Therefore, if persons A and C ...


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Can my moral obligations conflict with yours? In short, yes. Now, there are various ways to approach this. The first explanation is the logical positivist claim that moral claims have no propositional value, so we only ever express some preference or emotional state. On this account the problem is sorted, yes, you can disagree, but you are neither ever right ...


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It depends greatly on your ethical system, your metaethical system, and to some extent, on how you define the terms "good" and "evil" when they are used to describe objects (most ethical systems focus on defining those terms with respect to actions, and not objects or people). For example, under a consequentialist framework, we analyze ...


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Some of these particular claims could be 'debunked', I suppose, to the extent that they are really more in this line of aphorisms than fully developed philosophical positions. For instance °2 is merely a moral assertion, not a moral argument, and °4 seems to be a sincerity challenge. These argumentation tactics are both useful, with their own particular ...


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I love this question. Is it philosophy less than mathematics, or equal to it here? I don't know for sure. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on infinity has a subsection on something called "God's lottery", for example. At worst, your reasoning illustrates the inadequacy of the utility aggregation scheme generally, maybe. Not a bad ...


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I think you are looking for an exchange of ideas on how to make cryptocurrency ethical. This is a crucial time for such a discussion, before the least ethical cryptocurrency becomes the mainstay. I do not consider Bitcoin ethical at all. Those that have the money to build mining operations will become wealthy for nothing other than making money. Ethereum ...


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Any moral obligation is a conviction: something that one has become convinced of. The nature of a conviction is that it must be passed from person to person. One must first be convinced, and once convinced one will naturally wish to convince others for their own benefit. If the moral obligations of Person A conflict with the moral obligations of Person B, ...


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Part of the problem here is that this question conflates two different senses of the term 'value': The econometric sense, which uses 'value' as a noun to indicate (an often normalized) comparative worth e.g., "Clean energy programs produce value that recovers all their initial research costs" The philosophical sense, which uses 'value' as a noun ...


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