11

The Twin Earth argument undercuts functionalism because it undercuts the identification of the mental with the functional. But the problem is not with creating "meanings", but with capturing them faithfully. It is worth recalling that Putnam was a champion of computational functionalism back in 1960s, before he wasn't. According to functionalism human mind ...


8

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, ...


8

Kripke is discussing section 193 of Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein draws a distinction between a machine as an idealized symbol of a rule-following or law-governed mechanism, and a machine as a real object whose behaviours and operations are subject to failure. Wittgenstein here was particularly concerned with trying to shed light on the ...


8

The position of functionalists on AI is similar to the position of compatibilists on free will in two important respects. First, they distance themselves from the Cartesian idea that there is some extra special "substance" or "essence" there, and dissociate what is so bundled into effects that can be modeled piecemeal causally and/or ...


6

I will focus here on the first part of the question, which pertains to Putnam's argument to the effect that "meanings ain't in the head". I take this (rather than functionalism) to be the main issue. Putnam says that while talking about indexicals ("I", "That", "now") - intention doesn't determine extension. It seems right, because when I say "I" and when ...


4

One way to view functionalism is as a response to the problems discovered with the mind-brain identity theory. The identity theory says (very roughly) that each mental state is identical to some brain state. There are well-known problems with this, notably Kripke-style counterexamples which employ a posteriori necessities. We can try to avoid the problems ...


4

The main difference is that functionalism is not an ontological doctrine, although it imposes some constraints on ontology, while property dualism is. The point of functionalism is to reduce consciousness to its manifestations in terms of its functional role in behavior, leading to the idea that it is implementation independent. This is compatible with most ...


4

Functionalism is the view that mental states are nothing but the mental functions being performed. That is, there is no underlying mental "substance," for the lack of a better term, other than the functions performed by a mind. Therefore, bearing that in mind, one can argue that AIs can actually have mental power, since there is no underlying mental "...


3

Kim's book is very good. There are other general intros to the mind/body problem like Jaworski or Heil. At some point you'd want to read some of the primary sources. This collection, also by Heil contains many seminal papers. The "contemporary debates" series is good for cutting edge discussion, but tends to be quite advanced.


3

Is "x" a religion can only be answered if we settle on a definition of a religion. There are a few options. If we rely on Ninian Smart's seven dimensions of religion then it might be possible to consider it a religion. Smart's dimensions are as follows: Doctrinal, Mythological, Ethical, Ritual, Experiential, Institutional, Material (Didn't have it ...


3

The crux of the apparent contradiction is the statement: "Thus the probability that the Turing machine finds itself in a moment with any counter value must be zero." This statement is false. The probability of "any state" is the sum of the probabilities for each state; this always sums to one; Mathematically, for any N number of states; the probability ...


2

This question has nothing to do with Turing machines, it's more about Measure Theory. It's well-known that it's not possible to define uniform finite measure on infinite countable sets such as integers. There are 2 common ways around it: First method: define a set of measures on a filter and take a limit. In your example fix N, assume probability 1/N for ...


2

Of course, sensations and other mental processes are not material. Electrochemical processes were unknown to Descartes. His characterization of res extensa derives from the restricted mechanical view of his time. But when repeated today, the argument is a bit outdated: Today we say that mental processes are a kind of information processing, i.e. the ...


2

I think that argument would have been very effective a few hundred years ago. However, science has been clawing away at Premise 3. It is no longer immediately obvious that sensations have no shape or location, due to modern neurology. In fact, one might even dare to argue that premise 3 is obviously false. Consider that they check newborn's hearing ...


2

There is a reason for qualia, i.e. it serves a critical purpose. Due to the significance of certain cognitive data, that data must be 'experienced.' It cannot be properly processed by blind non-conscious cognition. So the brain stops processing and invokes qualia. For example, pain serves an important function. Quite often, the brain is unable to ...


2

Identity is an ambiguous notion. (1) The Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical in the sense that they are one and the same object, namely the planet Venus. In contrast (2) two items coming off an assembly line can be identical in the sense that they are precisely similar. I should say that the freak accident person is not identical in sense 1 to ...


2

This is one of the most-discussed arguments in the philosophy of mind. The discussion encompasses almost every important topic in the discipline. As such, I won't touch on its implications and influence on the field. First let's start with putting the actual argument (for an easy summary, taken from Wikipedia): suppose that artificial intelligence ...


1

Does functionalism of the mind allow for free will? Guill said, "However, before I got up, I remembered that there was ice cream in the freezer, so when I got to the refrigerator, I got ice cream instead." It is probably the memory function of the mind that actually allows the capacity for free will, because it provides the basis for decision making. ...


1

I agree with functionalism and I agree with free will. The way that I rationalize this is with the analogy to quantum mechanics. You can measure the speed of a particle with precision, but not its position. You can also measure position with high precision, but not if you are measuring its velocity. With the mind you can break open the skull and look at ...


1

I think that we "get in trouble" when we think that some of these theories are "mutually exclusive" instead of thinking one is good at explaining a portion of our selves and another is good at explaining some other portion. Together, they can explain more than each individually! Let me give an actual example: It was a hot evening and as I was ...


1

Let me start by stating that all algorithms are "just software." There are two types of software: 1) Software that performs the same function over time, and 2) one who's function changes over time. For the first type, the programmer provides the "intelligence" for the function. For the second type, the programmer provides some basic functions and the ...


1

Seeing as Cognitive Science makes no mention of ontology until page 361, it is no wonder they present a confused account of consciousness and you are left wondering how to distinguish cognition and qualia. Qualia and quale are just plural and singular terms for first person subjective ontological states, i.e. what experiences are like, e.g. what it is ...


1

This is actually a paper and not a book, but one of the most influential in this area. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956) by Wilfrid Sellars


1

Regular earth guy is pointing at a glass of H20 Opposite earth lady points at a glass of XYZ They both say this is water. Let us shelve the question of if this is merely a naming issue for now, as well as the question of if things have the same (equal in all regards other than position) properties, they fall under the same class. Though I find these ...


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