24 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

No thought problem provides a proof, as the thought problem has embedded assumptions which are not challenged by an actual test, where the assumptions might not hold. The explicit assumption that is ...
Dcleve's user avatar
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15 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

This appears to be a rephrasing of Chalmers' "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" (1996) paper. Given your 12.5K score on Philosophy Stack Exchange, I presume you are familiar with ...
nir's user avatar
  • 4,816
12 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

Neurons are examples of nanites themselves. They are tiny physical entities obeying the laws of physics. If the subject should report any weird sensations, you would have to conclude that your nanites ...
Niels Holst's user avatar
6 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

I've encountered this idea. I've also encountered its inverse. In essence, this is the same mistake as the philosopher zombie mistake; the result is assumed. However this time it is theoretically a ...
Joshua's user avatar
  • 782
5 votes

On a reductionist/functionalist account of consciousness, would we have ethical obligations toward robots?

This is easy to approach with the proper definitions. Morals are a set of rules which improve social interactions (for multiple goals, for example, survival: it is not moral to kill because it reduces ...
RodolfoAP's user avatar
  • 7,416
5 votes
Accepted

On a reductionist/functionalist account of consciousness, would we have ethical obligations toward robots?

If robots achieve (human-level) consciousness, we likely wouldn't have a good differentiating criteria between human and robot for ethical consideration. On a related note, vegans argue that we don't ...
NotThatGuy's user avatar
  • 9,779
4 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

First, I want to say that the thing you want to conclude is something I agree with, i.e. that consciousness is substrate-independent. However, the question isn't whether this is true but whether the ...
N. Virgo's user avatar
  • 661
2 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

I would say that the assumptions under which the experiment operates prevent it from proving independence of substrate, core to the experiment is the assumption that this: The nanites are close ...
Jack Aidley's user avatar
2 votes

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

Your assumptions are very strong and essentially affect the outcome. Thomas Breuer has shown that from the point of view of any observer, a system properly containing himself (such as his brain) does ...
Anixx's user avatar
  • 370
1 vote

Does the "gradual brain replacement" thought experiment prove consciousness is independent of substrate?

"If they even noticed they were fading out [and becoming a P-zombie], we would be able to detect those thoughts" seems incompatible with the other assumptions. Suppose: There is no extra-...
Kaia's user avatar
  • 130
1 vote

Are qualia state variables of the mind, or input variables to the mind?

Both of your options presume there is a difference between a conscious mind, and an unconscious mind. These options intrinsically reject a variety of mind models, such as reductive eliminativism, ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 13.9k
1 vote

Are qualia state variables of the mind, or input variables to the mind?

In philosophy of mind, qualia are defined as instances of subjective, conscious(!) experience. Neuroscience adds “being irreducible” to this definition. Hence by definition, a quale is a conscious ...
Jo Wehler's user avatar
  • 31.8k
1 vote

How plausible is it that every decohered entity has qualia, which merge into functional units?

I suspect your question is on the way to being closed, so I will try to type a hasty answer before the shutters come down. Leaving aside the fact that you would have to elaborate what you envisage ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 21.7k
1 vote

Way to find a middle ground between functionalism and "panpsychism"?

Short answer There is no intrinsic aspect of functionalism that prevents it from going all the way down to elementary particle state changes, and for consciousness to be associated with every single ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 13.9k
1 vote

What is a functional relationship?

A function in the sense you list is listed by Google as follows: an activity or purpose natural to or intended for a person or thing. In the example of any computational artifact, which is a machine ...
J D's user avatar
  • 26.6k
1 vote

Is there a mathematical grounding for functionalism?

The TLDR is Yes. There are mathematical models of minds that use functions. The paragraph covers them under the heading Machine State Functions and systems like the Turing Machine were modeled on the ...
J D's user avatar
  • 26.6k
1 vote

Anthropomorphism and AI

We don't have anything like a definitive answer. In one camp you have Google Engineer Claims AI Chatbot Is Sentient. On the other, some claim that due to qualia or embodied cognition AGI will not be ...
CriglCragl's user avatar
  • 21.7k
1 vote
Accepted

Anthropomorphism and AI

Updated Answer On this very subject I found a 19-page paper published by the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI). Artificial General Intelligence and the Human Mental Model, Roman V. ...
SystemTheory's user avatar
  • 1,711

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