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7

Let me clarify what is not entirely clear from the OP quote but is apparent from the context of the paper: it is not that Indo-Tibetan thinkers do not consider what is known as Gettier cases, it is that they give a different interpretation to them. The essence of the Gettier problem is summarized very lucidly by the author (Stolz): "As long as... ...


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At the time Nozick wrote Philosophical Explanations, the theories of conditionals advanced by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker were still fairly new. Lewis' book Counterfactuals was published in 1973 and Stalnaker's work was published in a series of papers from about 1968 onwards. Previously there hadn't been any generally accepted account of how ...


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As far as I know, Gettier examples have not caused scientsts to abandon theories on the basis that they were just JTB and not knowledge. I'm not actually sure what this kind of scenario would look like. A team of scientists would have to hold that their justified true belief was a result of a Gettier-style counterexample, and not actually knowledge. It will ...


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Here is a formalization in quantifier calculus with identity: Premise: GetJob(Jones) ∧ ∀x(GetJob(x) → x = Jones) ∧ HasCoins(Jones) Conclusion: ∀x(GetJob(x) → HasCoins(x)) By universal instantiation assume GetJob(a), by the second conjunct in the premise a=Jones, by the last conjunct and substitutivity of identity HasCoins(a). Since a was arbitrary the ...


2

The point of gettier counterexamples is not really one about deducing things from false premises. however, it is essential for a gettier counter-example that the premise be false. the gettier case is supposed to be a counter-example to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief. It is therefore constructed in such a way that the agent forms a belief ...


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We can refer to the "basic" of Aristotelian science : The notion of "valid argument" is as old as "formal logic" itself; see Aristotle's logic : A deduction is speech (logos) in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from those supposed results of necessity because of their being so [emphasis added]. (Prior Analytics I.2, 24b18-...


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Justified is the most contentious word in the JTB account of knowledge, usually it can be understood as if one has strong evidence about a proposition then one is justified to believe in it. Its wikipedea reference also says the same criterion as referenced here: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong ...


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What Gettier sets out to show is that someone does not have knowledge if it is only by chance that their justified true belief is true. I'd gently suggest that when we realise this, his examples are not and do not seem 'absurd and unconvincing'. But you are right to speak as you find. I am going to try to alter your perspective. By ordinary standards, Smith ...


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Welcome letha First pass Material is easily available online about the Gettier problem and associated Gettier cases. Such cases describe situations in which someone, S, believes that p, p is true, and S is justified in believing that p - but in which S does not know that p. Justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for belief, this is the claim ...


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Emil, welcome to PSE While Goldman's reliabilism can handle the original Gettier cases, other Gettier cases can be devised for which it appears not to work. Goldman's reliabilism ... consider Goldman's (1986) "relevant alternatives" version of reliabilism. It requires not only that a belief be produced by a reliable process (he refers to process ...


1

Geoffrey Thomas has explained it widely and precisely. https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/69166/43419 To sum up and to add some info: It is widely agreed that Gettier cases refute JTB conception of knowledge. Gettier's cases feature lucky guesses, more than what we'd usually call "knowledge". A Gettier case. Imagine that I take bus line 2, which I ...


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Gettier's argument is an attempt to prove that "justified true belief" is inadequate as a definition of knowledge. He shows that one can believe something, the belief can be true and justified, yet one still doesn't know it. Your problem is that the cases that Gettier brings of justified true belief are not truly "justified." That is, you ...


1

It's initially plausible that knowledge is something like justified true belief: if you believe that p on excellent grounds and p is the case you would seem to count as someone who knows that p. Now, you can think of Gettier cases as raising the following possibility: the grounds, excellent as they are, on which you believe that p might be perfectly ...


1

Let me complete Dave's answer by discussing whether JTB is necessary for knowledge. Obviously something cannot count as knowledge if it is false. Some kinds of "know-how" may not count as beliefs, but we're talking about propositional knowledge here and I doubt that one can know something to be true while not believing it (arguably the colloquial sense "I ...


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No, all of the examples in "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge" are examples of the form where the proposition is a JTB, but fail to be (commonly percieved as) cases where the person had knowledge. One way of interpreting this is that Gettier showed that naive JTB (or anything like it, i.e. the three definitions indicated at the start of the paper) is at ...


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