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Mechanist (or mechanical) philosophy, in the original sense, meant the rejection of "substantial forms", i.e. forms with causal powers, such as souls, postulated by scholastics (who drew on some vague passages from Aristotle's De Anima). For a detailed discussion of substantial forms see How can the soul be a form in Aristotle's metaphysics? From the modern ...


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He did not. Like the rest of scholastics, he reified geometric points, which, according to Euclid's "definition" (possibly, spurious), "has no part", and hence extension. As for the immateriality of (intellective) soul, he has an independent argument for that, namely that the material is necessarily/essentially individual, and hence can not hold a universal, ...


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I think that Ingram Bywater penetrates quite accurately the sense of Aristotle's remarks here. The reference is to Poetics, IV, 1148b4 ff. Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry generally was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (gennesai men holos) is atttributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two ...


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This is a subtle point, and I'm a bit surprised that Aristotle didn't spend more time explaining it. Perhaps it merely seemed obvious to him, or perhaps it was part of a larger dialog in Greek philosophy that hasn't survived the test of time. At any rate, Aristotle is suggesting that we all naturally engage in mimesis: the imitative representation of things ...


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Aristotle, the primary source of medieval epistemologists, is famously obscure on the subject. The well-known (Metaphysics 1011b25) sounds fairly modern in assigning truth to statements:"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". However, there are ...


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