New answers tagged

1

Dignity, if argued for as a foundational value for morality, is commonly considered to be an intrinsic and essential property. If taken in this sense, the concept falls prey to a plethora of valid criticisms and should be discarded philosophically. Even more troubling may be that the empirical evidence for moral pluralism is overwhelming (citation see ...


2

I think the proper way to approach this question is to turn it around to the contrapositive. Think for a moment about the worst, most despicable, evilest, and most unworthy person imaginable: a serial killer, a genocidal dictator, an ideological tyrant, or whatever bogieman you happen to favor. What can we do to such a person that we could not do to someone ...


4

I think this question raises genuine difficulties about dignity as a foundational value. The term, 'dignity', is entrenched in moral and political theoretical discourse but is hardly used outside it. Its sense is, I take it, linked to the idea of instrinsic value or intrinsic worth. This at any rate is how I will take it. It seems clear that a person or ...


Top 50 recent answers are included