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11

Husserl is perhaps the last truly classical figure in epistemology, he still believed in objective content of knowledge, the same for "angels and centaurs" as for humans, and the possibility of "apodictic certainty" at the end of eidetic and phenomenological investigations. He believed that by suspending ("bracketing out") stereotypes and presuppositions, ...


10

It should be said that Husserl was philosophically averse to Kant's "creative" transcendental subject, perhaps due to the dominance of absolute idealist interpretations of him at the time, and preferred to derive his lineage from Hume, whom he credits as the principal forerunner of phenomenology. See Mall's Experience and Reason on their connection, which ...


7

Husserl, Edmund: The crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) has some paragraphs dealing explicitly with the transcendental philosophy of Kant: See §25 about Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy and §27 about Kant's philosophy. §26 makes clear that both did not have the same conception of "transcendental". Husserl ...


7

I suspect that Petitot is misremembering and interpolating. Husserl did generally consider (formal) metaphysics to be the doctrine of individuation. For example, in a 1918 letter to Weyl, thanking him for a copy of Das Kontinuum, he writes: "Finally a mathematician shows appreciation for the necessity of phenomenological modes of treatment in all ...


5

There is something to it, but things are more complicated. Sellars was not arguing against Husserl specifically, it is unlikely that he was even familiar with his phenomenology. He does draw on the continental tradition, unusually for an analytic philosopher, but mostly on Kant and Hegel. And his primary target were sense data theorists like his father, ...


5

Absolutely not. Heidegger's "essence of Dasein" is really a misnomer to make a point, by stating that Dasein's essence is existence he upends the traditional use of "essence" as form, idea, the opposite of existence. Heidegger questioned that essences can be the kinds of universal invariants that Husserl wanted them to be, and therefore that his "eidetic ...


5

Husserl's dissertation Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung (“Contributions to the Calculus of Variations”) has nothing philosophical in it. The work is based on the lectures by Kronecker and Weierstrass that Husserl attended as a student in Berlin and is entirely technical. Scrimieri has published extracts from it (Giorgio Scrimieri "Analitica matematica e ...


4

The broader question is answered under In what fundamental ways, if any, does Husserl break with Kant? As for the title question, the answer is that we can not. Husserl's "things themselves" are nothing like Kant's "things in themselves". Although the two philosophies are incommensurable, to the extent that we can compare them the "things themselves" are ...


4

I have in general had difficulties with the series your first book belongs to, if that's any consolation. You could try : Dermot Moran, 'Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology', London : Polity, 2005 (ISBN 10: 0745621228 / ISBN 13: 9780745621227). This has a chapter on the CM. Other chapters also throw light contextually. There's also Joel Smith, '...


4

Mature Husserl is usually seen as a mild anti-realist, but this is largely due to the maxim that phenomenology should be neutral (agnostic) on metaphysical matters because it is the data it produces that is to be used to adjudicate them later. This means that Husserl's observations are typically easy to adapt to a realist perspective, after all even a ...


3

Good question, except that the answer is worth at least one or two doctoral theses. The question is way above my own amateur level, so perhaps this should just be a comment. However, as far as I understand it, there is fairly good agreement on the ways in which Merleau-Ponty (and nearly all later phenomenologists) broke from many characteristic (and, in my ...


3

The method you're describing does not at least to me sound like the goal of Husserl's bracketing or Epoché. You state: 1) Notice the assumptions as they appear to oneself primordially 2)Suspend judgements derived from emotional/ natural attitudes 3) then proceed with some different types of "reduction" that go backward to reveal the essence of the object ...


2

The possibility of existence "inside the intention" borders on paradox. Suppose X does not exist. And then I intend X. And then X exists (inside the intention). So that the X that I intend (which now exists) is not the same as the X before the intention (which did not exist). So that then it seems that I do not intend what I intended to intend (pun intended)....


2

The question invokes Husserl, for whom intentionality means something very different from the colloquial sense of the word; if we are using his definition, the following answer applies. Husserl's "intentionality" is, roughly speaking, the capacity to represent. Saying that consciousness is intentional, therefore, only says that consciousness cannot be ...


2

Alp Uzman's answer is great, Robert Sokolowski's Introduction to Phenomenology is truly second to none resource for beginners. It describes nearly all Husserlian methods and terms. You should definitely start with that, Sokolowski is a great Husserl scholar. His introduction is a general introduction to Phenomenology from mainly Husserlian perspective. ...


2

The following account of Husserlian phenomenological reduction might make clearer what is involved in the reduction. Some of Husserl's characterisations of the reduction come close to examples; and in the References there are suggestions for further reading in which examples are to be found: We must begin by rehearsing, once again, Husserl's descriptions ...


2

Chalmers does not mean ordinary visual imagination (our faculty to create representations which faintly resemble real visual sense impressions). Instead he means something like forming a concept, though only incompletely. I. e. not grasping all details, all internal relations of a concept – of which some may turn out to be incoherent. Descartes famously ...


2

The observation of commonality is correct, but the influence goes the other way around, Husserl's entire lifeworld turn owes much to his interaction with Heidegger, originally his student. The concept of finitude itself has older roots, it is Kant's, but Heidegger put a spotlight on it in his 1927/8 lectures Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique ...


2

Your two questions are similar in nature and the your intuition seems more or less correct that most modern phenomenologists hold the position of some types of direct realism (naive, enactivism, critical, etc) when it comes to perception of objects even challenged by argument from hallucination, according to below 2 contemporary references on this matter. ...


2

From the concluding sentence of your same reference: Consequently evidence of the ex-pression is also a determining part of the idea of scientific truth, as predicative complexes that are, or can be, grounded absolutely. So Husserl seems to emphasize we need these pre-predicative judgements and evidences as a determining part to ground whole idea of ...


1

All types of consciousness are intentional according to Husserl's phenomenology, in the sense that they aim toward or intend about something beyond themselves (non-closureness). These object-directed intentional experiences necessarily comprise the ‘noema’ (the object as experienced) and the ‘noesis’ (the mental act that intends the object). Husserl ...


1

The 'I think' There is a version of the "Cogito" ['I think, therefore I exist': GT] that Kant is found endorsing, but not in the manner intended by Descartes. At B132 [of the Critique of Pure Reason] he says that, It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations, otherwise, something would be represented in me ...


1

Sartre's work in ontology, which is an attempt to categorize Being and Nothing adequately, claims that being is transphenomenal or irreducible and is distinct from phenomenal objects creating a duality, not of mind and body like Decartes who explores the division between the mental and material, but a phenomenological dualism such that both categories are ...


1

Prior to Husserl, Brentano discusses the immortality of the soul in the first chapter on "The Concept and Purpose of Psychology" of his 1874 book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Despite the fact that psychology would no longer be "the science of the soul" but rather "the science of mental phenomena", it would still be capable of addressing the idea ...


1

My humble suggestion would be Robert Sokolowski's Introduction to Phenomenology. I haven't read Moran's introduction, but a quick look at the contents suggests he chases names and texts. Sokolowski's introduction instead is light on names and the differences between flavors of phenomenology and surveys basic ideas and methods. In this regard Sokolowski's ...


1

the reality of an object is withdrawn and we have no access to it, Harman gets this from Kant (consciousness can never have access to real things, only mental representations), but it's not Heidegger's problem, who is more interested in getting Aristotle right. Heidegger does have a response to Kant, but it's: you're asking the wrong questions; albeit in ...


1

I take Phenomenology as a philosophical attitude that attempts to overcome the Descartian divide; a divide that Kant retains - the phenomenal world vs the noumenal world. Whereas and hence: for Husserl, it is to the things themselves ie to their essences Essences, here understood, at least in one aspect, in the onto-logic of Aristotle ie in his ...


1

Kant had forever hidden the ding-an-sich (things in themselves) behind the phenomenal veil; that Wittgenstein was obviously familiar with Kants philosophy is suggested by TLP 2.0251 Space, time and colour are the forms of objects which appears to allude to, whilst overturning, Kants notion how space and time are the forms by which objects can be ...


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