20

Speaking very generally, materialism has been waxing sharply, and idealism has been waning for a good long time. Berkeley studies have definitely suffered on account of this, but he would seem to be least among the "Idealist idols" also relegated to the "dustbin" of history by modern philosophy. In particular, a rancorous anti-Platonism has been one of the ...


13

It’s ironic that Locke’s commonsense approach to philosophy should have influenced Berkeley to formulate a philosophical position that at first seems so much at variance with common sense. He became the object of severe criticism and ridicule for denying what seemed most obvious to anyone. Berkeley had set out to deny the existence of matter. Since the ...


9

It's nearly impossible to decipher Hegel even with that sort of background without a teacher. While I think knowledge of Kant and Spinoza is helpful, you should also be read up on your Plato and Aristotle. I would recommend reading some secondary literature alongside it. I recommend Lauer's Hegel's idea of philosophy and Frederick Baser's Hegel. I would ...


7

Idealism does not necessarily assert mind as a fundamental entity, but it does assert the metaphysical priority of the ideal over the material. The view of reality as derivative from the mind is associated with a particular strain, so-called subjective idealism, the extreme form of which is solipsism, asserting that only a single mind exists, the subject's ...


6

There is a very good and well-sourced article on Kant's refutation of Idealism on SEP. As the answer in this question tried to say, it is essentially about an objective foundation of time. From the SEP article linked: George Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): I am conscious of my own ...


6

I think Kant would take exception to being called an ontological idealist or dualist. There is no dualism between appearances and things in themselves in the Cartesian sense of "dualism", the "supersensible substrate" of appearances is strictly unknowable. On ontology critical Kant remained strictly agnostic, no matter how much it seems he wanted to ...


6

Both Plato and Gödel were mathematical platonists. Both held that mathematical objects existed abstractly and outside of spacetime. This is what we would call mathematical realism. This position is different from just the Forms because even Plato in The Republic and other dialogues distinguishes between the type of being exhibited by the Forms and by the ...


6

There is no "synthesis" in Hegel, it is Fichte's term later adopted by Marx and Engels. Hegel specifically discards Fichte's thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad and replaces it with his own: abstract-negative-concrete. Sublation (not synthesis) is the concretization of the abstract through a successive pair of determinate negations, another of Hegel's special ...


5

I would challenge the claim that Berkeley has fallen out of favour; rather, he continues to be one of the most referenced philosophers of all time. I don't mean to say that the views as expressed in his classic works are wholly accepted these days; in general, he comes too close to empiricism to be fully acceptable, empiricism having been dealt crippling ...


5

Your question is complicated because you take the big bang as an example, which marks also the "beginning of time" and is thus more problematic. In fact, the first of Kant's famous antinomies is dedicated to it. However, always keep in mind that Kant was a transcendental idealist, not to be confused with an "esse est percipi"-idealism á la Berkeley. As to ...


5

What exactly is meant by transcendential idealism? Transcendental idealism, or critical idealism as Kant preferred to call it, is the view that our experience can only give us representations of things (i.e. how they appear to us; this is referred to as phenomenon), and that we can never know how these things are in themselves (this is what he referred to ...


5

I can't speak for other modern Platonists, but I can give you my perspective: When interpreting Plato, I find it a mistake to take him too literally. According to his view of the world, the capital T Truth wasn't something that could ever be completely captured in ordinary language. All of his writing should be viewed as primarily metaphorical, aimed at ...


5

Why does Chalmers' argument not entail some form of idealism? I just read the page, and there is certainly no hint of idealism involved. That would imply that Chalmer's idea involves mental ontology, a sort of rejection of physicalism. Rather, his theory is particularly physicalist; you will notice that he politely turns away from any spiritual, ...


5

The World Will, primordial, blind, and irrational, "holds the world together" in Schopenhauer's philosophy. It doesn't do a very good job of it, but then he was not called the father of pessimism for nothing. Schopenhauer's ethics was influenced by Oriental philosophy, in particular the Buddhist idea that the world is full of suffering, and the cause of ...


5

Berkeley populated the world with entities, ideas, which were in their essence perceptions. Berkeley's famous formula was "esse est percipi", to be is to be perceived. Those perceptions, the ideas, are things which are necessarily perceived by someone, by some perceiver. There are, on the other hand, no substantial things behind the perceptions, in Berkeley'...


5

The main thing happening here is a shift in the meaning of terms. Specifically, the word "realist" has had many many different uses over time. The basic idea is that a realist believes something is real, i.e. that such entities do in fact exist, that they are metaphysical objects in their own right (rather than existing as modalities on the mind). Realism ...


4

Alex, excellent question, here. I think Wigner's paper gives little defense to the Platonist case. It seems to me that he's merely saying "applying mathematics to physics is useful to us," but this doesn't quite lead us to believe that "mathematical entities are real," which is what the Platonists would want to say. This is why I think that: consider the ...


4

Peirce (note spelling) is not arguing for anything there. Rather, others are presenting an interpretation of Peirce's project. They are suggesting that while Peirce discusses "truth," he does not do what many other philosophers do who discuss truth. They try to define it, for instance as "correspondence to the way things are." This paragraph suggests that ...


4

I agree with @virmaior that finding a knowledgeable teacher, friend, or a class on "The Phenomenology" is really important in order to get the most out of the text. A basic understanding of Kant is absolutely necessary since Hegel is directly in conversation with the methodology of Kant in the work, particularly in the first half. Also, don't read the ...


4

The Platonic realm exists in the Platonic sense because it has been clearly conceived of as Platonic object, itself. "The realm of ideas" is just the idea of the collection of all ideas, which one automatically has if one has ideas and then expresses ideas about the nature of ideas. The question is whether the way that idea exists qualifies as existence. ...


4

There's no inconsistency between the reality of qualia and materialism unless one has an excessively reductive conception of "the physical" -- using things like Locke's inverted spectrum and "Is your red the same as my red?" to try and prove the mind has its own special reality (i.e, with its own special laws unrelated to the physical) is this kind of ...


4

They would not in so far as idealists are not realists. The no miracle argument is an argument for realism: it says that realism is the only (or best) explanation, so the argument works against any anti-realist position, including idealism. The idealist and the empiricist are in the same position and can use the same arguments to respond, such as the one you ...


4

1) According to SEP, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#TwoObjInt, two different interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism exist: The two-object interpretation focus on ontology: There are two kinds of objects: things-in-themselves and appearances. The two-aspects interpretation focus on epistemology: “On this view, transcendental idealism ...


4

You seem to be wanting to argue that Berkeley's argument isn't even valid. I don't think that's right. Berkeley's point could be made formal as so: There is an object o such that nobody conceives of it. (Premise) If (1) is true, then o is such that somebody conceives it. (Premise) o is such that somebody conceives it. (1, 2 modus ponens). Therefore, o is ...


4

The wording in your quote and the wording in the questions are a bit different, but I'll do my best to address both. First I'm going to extend the quoted bit a little and bring the language of one of your questions into the quotation: Hegel shows the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit "in time" by going back to the identity of the ...


4

I will present a possible explanation for why the fiercest defenders of natural sciences often ended up with the most idealistic metaphysics in the history of the philosophy of science: Science is incomplete without a metaphysical background, i.e. methodological and ontological reflections on its very possibility. Hellmuth Plessner delivers a nice argument ...


4

Mature Husserl is usually seen as a mild anti-realist, but this is largely due to the maxim that phenomenology should be neutral (agnostic) on metaphysical matters because it is the data it produces that is to be used to adjudicate them later. This means that Husserl's observations are typically easy to adapt to a realist perspective, after all even a ...


3

The thing is that Kant (I don't know enough about Fichte to be arguing his case) would not agree with your third premise, i.e. that "violating the law is just if and only if the law is unjust". Justice, as a term of rights [Recht] is established by the implementation of a legal situation. As not having one is worse that having a bad one, revolution is ...


3

Regarding the thing itself... I'm sure there are people who hold the thing in itself is the fundamental construct of matter (probably subatomic particles rather than atoms). In fact, isn't this the materialist position? However, if we look at the cup-in-itself as noumenon in the Kantian sense, then I don't think atoms qualify. Noumenon are unknowable. ...


3

I agree with all of the above. You could, of course, start with some Kant and Spinoza. But all philosophers are bottomless, and assuming you have only one lifetime, you might as well just jump into the "hermeneutic circle," in keeping with Hegel's own method. There is no ideal starting point. You will need secondary literature, but not necessarily a ...


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