10

This issue is addressed in Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, especially 145 and 148, and there is some disagreement as to what the nature of his argument is. Some take it to be an argument by analogy: we see bodies and behaviors similar to our own out there, and infer that there is a mind behind it. Others point out that the ...


9

It's nearly impossible to decipher Hegel even with that sort of background without a teacher. While I think knowledge of Kant and Spinoza is helpful, you should also be read up on your Plato and Aristotle. I would recommend reading some secondary literature alongside it. I recommend Lauer's Hegel's idea of philosophy and Frederick Baser's Hegel. I would ...


9

Idealism does not necessarily assert mind as a fundamental entity, but it does assert the metaphysical priority of the ideal over the material. The view of reality as derivative from the mind is associated with a particular strain, so-called subjective idealism, the extreme form of which is solipsism, asserting that only a single mind exists, the subject's ...


9

The question refers to ontology. The classification matter or mind is a strong simplification. Popper advocated a tripartition with world 1: physical objects and events world 2: mental objects and events world 3: objective knowledge and ideas created by the human mind. Popper describes his three worlds e.g., in Chapter P2, of Popper, Karl; Eccles, John: ...


8

First, correspondence theories of truth are generally associated with realism, not idealism. The point of a correspondence theory is that there is a correspondence between mental or linguistic representations and reality. Linguistic content is not necessarily mental (not for externalists) and in any case, having a correspondence implies that there is ...


8

I think Kant would take exception to being called an ontological idealist or dualist. There is no dualism between appearances and things in themselves in the Cartesian sense of "dualism", the "supersensible substrate" of appearances is strictly unknowable. On ontology critical Kant remained strictly agnostic, no matter how much it seems he wanted to ...


7

Both Plato and Gödel were mathematical platonists. Both held that mathematical objects existed abstractly and outside of spacetime. This is what we would call mathematical realism. This position is different from just the Forms because even Plato in The Republic and other dialogues distinguishes between the type of being exhibited by the Forms and by the ...


6

There is a very good and well-sourced article on Kant's refutation of Idealism on SEP. As the answer in this question tried to say, it is essentially about an objective foundation of time. From the SEP article linked: George Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): I am conscious of my own existence in ...


6

There is no "synthesis" in Hegel, it is Fichte's term later adopted by Marx and Engels. Hegel specifically discards Fichte's thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad and replaces it with his own: abstract-negative-concrete. Sublation (not synthesis) is the concretization of the abstract through a successive pair of determinate negations, another of Hegel'...


6

If all we perceive is the sensible world, how can we ensure that something like matter exists? Even if we could make sure that matter exists, what would it be? I take the example of the matrix film, they live in a virtual world, where stimuli are controlled by machines, that is, true reality exists but all the stimuli that come to us of "real objects&...


5

I am not much of a Berkeley scholar so my answer will primarily be an attempt to explain Kant with reference to the things you state in your question. I think we need to be very careful about what exactly we mean by it is meaningless to speak of things-in-themselves that are not subject to human evaluation. This sentence can have several different ...


5

First, one has to make clear which of the many gods is meant. Because theistic people in different religions speak about many different gods: The Olympic gods from the time of Homer, the Egyptian gods, the Vedic gods, the Hinduistic gods, the monotheistic Jewish and Christian god named Jahwe, and many more. Secondly, in Christian theology the attempt to ...


5

I can't speak for other modern Platonists, but I can give you my perspective: When interpreting Plato, I find it a mistake to take him too literally. According to his view of the world, the capital T Truth wasn't something that could ever be completely captured in ordinary language. All of his writing should be viewed as primarily metaphorical, aimed at ...


5

1) According to SEP, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#TwoObjInt, two different interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism exist: The two-object interpretation focus on ontology: There are two kinds of objects: things-in-themselves and appearances. The two-aspects interpretation focus on epistemology: “On this view, transcendental idealism ...


5

It is very popular among philosophers to "overcome" the divide between idealism and materialism by dissolving the distinction, i.e. "embedding" both ideality and matter into something more fundamental, which they are then reconstructed as extreme cases of (equally popular is dissolving the distinction between subject and object). The idea is not to put a ...


5

The World Will, primordial, blind, and irrational, "holds the world together" in Schopenhauer's philosophy. It doesn't do a very good job of it, but then he was not called the father of pessimism for nothing. Schopenhauer's ethics was influenced by Oriental philosophy, in particular the Buddhist idea that the world is full of suffering, and the cause of ...


5

Berkeley populated the world with entities, ideas, which were in their essence perceptions. Berkeley's famous formula was "esse est percipi", to be is to be perceived. Those perceptions, the ideas, are things which are necessarily perceived by someone, by some perceiver. There are, on the other hand, no substantial things behind the perceptions, in Berkeley'...


5

The main thing happening here is a shift in the meaning of terms. Specifically, the word "realist" has had many many different uses over time. The basic idea is that a realist believes something is real, i.e. that such entities do in fact exist, that they are metaphysical objects in their own right (rather than existing as modalities on the mind). Realism ...


4

Peirce (note spelling) is not arguing for anything there. Rather, others are presenting an interpretation of Peirce's project. They are suggesting that while Peirce discusses "truth," he does not do what many other philosophers do who discuss truth. They try to define it, for instance as "correspondence to the way things are." This paragraph suggests that ...


4

There's no inconsistency between the reality of qualia and materialism unless one has an excessively reductive conception of "the physical" -- using things like Locke's inverted spectrum and "Is your red the same as my red?" to try and prove the mind has its own special reality (i.e, with its own special laws unrelated to the physical) is this kind of ...


4

I agree with @virmaior that finding a knowledgeable teacher, friend, or a class on "The Phenomenology" is really important in order to get the most out of the text. A basic understanding of Kant is absolutely necessary since Hegel is directly in conversation with the methodology of Kant in the work, particularly in the first half. Also, don't read the ...


4

They would not in so far as idealists are not realists. The no miracle argument is an argument for realism: it says that realism is the only (or best) explanation, so the argument works against any anti-realist position, including idealism. The idealist and the empiricist are in the same position and can use the same arguments to respond, such as the one you ...


4

The wording in your quote and the wording in the questions are a bit different, but I'll do my best to address both. First I'm going to extend the quoted bit a little and bring the language of one of your questions into the quotation: Hegel shows the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit "in time" by going back to the identity of the ...


4

I will present a possible explanation for why the fiercest defenders of natural sciences often ended up with the most idealistic metaphysics in the history of the philosophy of science: Science is incomplete without a metaphysical background, i.e. methodological and ontological reflections on its very possibility. Hellmuth Plessner delivers a nice argument ...


4

Mature Husserl is usually seen as a mild anti-realist, but this is largely due to the maxim that phenomenology should be neutral (agnostic) on metaphysical matters because it is the data it produces that is to be used to adjudicate them later. This means that Husserl's observations are typically easy to adapt to a realist perspective, after all even a ...


4

TL;DR It hinges at what we understand under "mind" and "independent". Since spirit can only become as instantiated in individual objects apprehended by minds - coming back into itself in a spiral, dialectical movement as illustrated in the figure below - a reality completely independent from subjects seems nonsensical. On the other hand, ...


4

Assuming you believe that perception requires a material substrate (just how we think perceiving requires the brain, or a computer), then you can reason as in Descartes and say that the fact you perceive something (or appear to) is proof that there is something doing the perceiving. If you don't believe that perception requires some material substrate, then ...


4

Berkeley's immaterialist arguments are quite interesting. And since philosophy does not defer entirely to experimental "proof," metaphysical arguments can't be flat out "proven" or "disproven" in that sense. One must examine the coherence and assumptions in the argument. First, Berkeley is not arguing for a Matrix-type ...


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