11
votes
Accepted
How does Putnam's twin earth thought experiment disprove functionalism?
The Twin Earth argument undercuts functionalism because it undercuts the identification of the mental with the functional. But the problem is not with creating "meanings", but with capturing them ...
6
votes
Accepted
What is the difference between properties and sets?
I suppose you are looking for reasons not to identify properties to sets.
(1) A set is a particular ( an abstract particular) , but properies are often considered as universals .
(2) A property is ...
6
votes
How does Putnam's twin earth thought experiment disprove functionalism?
I will focus here on the first part of the question, which pertains to Putnam's argument to the effect that "meanings ain't in the head". I take this (rather than functionalism) to be the main issue.
...
5
votes
Accepted
Intentionality and emergentism in Marxist theories?
Definitely the latter.
While Marx himself and subsequent Marxists often flamboyantly revile the "bourgeois class" in what seem to be attributions of conscious intent, this absolutely must be taken as ...
4
votes
Does the person in this example intentionally hit the bottle?
You're overthinking this. He wants to hit the bottle. He does some stuff. He hits the bottle. Yes, it's intentional. That's what intention means.
We don't care that the "some stuff" was aiming ...
3
votes
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
The definition of life is one of the most famously difficult definitions in all of philosophy. There are many definitions. For example, science has a descriptive definition for life:
Homeostasis: ...
3
votes
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
There is a distinction between being alive and being sentient and both categories have their own criteria. Modern philosophers, particularly in the analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy ...
3
votes
Accepted
Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
Short answer
You helpfully clarified in the comments that your question is about using the rhetorical strategy of cherry-picking. Since it involves the conscious use of an informal fallacy and leads ...
3
votes
Intentionality and emergentism in Marxist theories?
Simone Weil, whose philosophy was in part inflected by Marxism would have gone for the latter; in Oppression and Liberty, she writes:
The power which the bourgeoisie have to exploit and oppress the ...
3
votes
Accepted
Can there be intentionality without consciousness?
The inverse square law is about gravity, the triangle inequality is about triangles, "the grass is green" is about grass. They sure are. But what makes them being about? A brick wall has bricks in it, ...
3
votes
Can there be intentionality without consciousness?
You don't have to go so far down as the laws of physics. Most classes of life exhibit intentionality without consciousness (amoebas, viruses, plants, etc...).
Daniel Dennett talks about it in many ...
3
votes
In what ways is Merleau-Ponty following (late/unpublished) Husserl?
Good question, except that the answer is worth at least one or two doctoral theses. The question is way above my own amateur level, so perhaps this should just be a comment.
However, as far as I ...
2
votes
Is belief an intentional act?
Both "belief" and "intentional act" are ambiguous terms, so the answer may depend on specific meanings, even for the same author. Ordinary factual beliefs, as in Plato's "knowledge is justified true ...
2
votes
How does one perform phenomenological reduction?
The following account of Husserlian phenomenological reduction might make clearer what is involved in the reduction. Some of Husserl's characterisations of the reduction come close to examples; and in ...
2
votes
Accepted
What does Searle mean by "intentionality" and "causal processes"?
Short Answer
John Searle accepts the human brain is a computer of sorts, but rejects that it is like current digital computers. He believes there's something inherently different between the ...
1
vote
What are the "Acts" Discussed in Husserl's "Logical Investigations"?
All types of consciousness are intentional according to Husserl's phenomenology, in the sense that they aim toward or intend about something beyond themselves (non-closureness). These object-directed ...
1
vote
Intention and Means-End Reasoning in Epistemology
A related idea in epistemology is this. Suppose you want to believe that X is true. Is there any strategy that could guarantee that you would be rational to believe that X is true, regardless of what ...
1
vote
Meaning in use and naturalisation of intentionality
I see the two enterprises as approaching overlapping terrain from different directions. Those in the "naturalization of intentionality" camp want to build up to meaning (or intentional or ...
1
vote
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
I covered defining life & intelligence here. Drawing a hard line between life & non-life is not tenable, or useful. 'Thinking' is a bit of a weasel word, because it can contain a raft of ...
1
vote
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
First, there is no absolute definition of life. Any definition that you might find, might probably be applied to a rock, so a rock is a living entity.
For example, taking the concept from another ...
1
vote
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
It sounds like your reaction when the robot was pushed over was important in forming your question. Its importance is perhaps due to the activity of your mirror neurons (and other brain events) ...
1
vote
Philosophy and the question 'When is a robot considered alive and thinking?'
I believe it could be said to be alive, even if it isn't conscious, i.e. it is a zombie. John Searle discusses part of this in the Chinese Room argument. It is mentioned somewhere in Searle: ...
1
vote
Intentional Inexistence?
There is a familiar way to "salvage" intentionality of non-existing objects, as a real (metaphysical) relation. But first, let's briefly describe the core problem. Metaphysics is supposed to describe ...
1
vote
Is belief an intentional act?
In psychology, I learned in a class that there's a principle of choice that divides choice into two classes: conscious choices and subconscious choices.
In my Buddhist training, I was taught that ...
1
vote
Can there be intention without an intender?
No, there can not be intentionality without an intentionalistic agent, nor can there be intending without an intender.
Anthropomorphizing rain and snow does not support the notion that because there ...
1
vote
Can there be intention without an intender?
I'm not sure how you get to your neo-Cartesian proof of self from the fact that intention requires an intender, without begging the question. The word intention is used in our language to describe ...
1
vote
Accepted
How does self-deception differ from psychology's concept of "motivated reasoning"?
To answer the second part of your question about relating self-deception to Searles's example of the intentional/unintentional homicide. I think the problem would be that such a simplistic ...
1
vote
What's the difference between intentionality and meaning?
A first reference is SEP:
Concerning intentionality see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
Accordingly
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand ...
1
vote
Name for the "cut" between an agent and its environment
I don't know if there is a term for this "cut", but it seems to me that it doesn't have to be a "cut"; it could be simply the boundary of an object. I take the term "cut" to imply something more ...
1
vote
Name for the "cut" between an agent and its environment
A baby when growing up learns to make a cut between his body and his environment. In order to establish this cut it is of fundamental importance that the baby explores the world not only by seeing and ...
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