We changed our privacy policy. Read more.

Hot answers tagged

10

Plato has Socrates make the argument that punishment, when it is just anyway, actually improves the individual. So if you’ve done wrong you should want to be punished so you can improve. To say the least this doesn’t track with a common understanding of human nature — but nevertheless the theory of virtue has been very influential. For something more modern ...


7

There are 2 main justifications for punishment used in modern philosophy. Consequentialism The idea is that punishing criminals deters them and others from doing crimes in the future. One of the strongest proponents of this stance was the utilitarian Bentham, who did a lot for prison and legal reforms in his own society. Retributivism 'What goes around comes ...


6

One can make the case for the need to compensate the injustice of the wrong-doer having an advantageous position with respect to the victim of the harm if no punishment is applied. A possible justification rooted on human psychology can be based on the additional harm caused by the unsatisfied revenge feeling that can be assumed to bother the victims or ...


3

Equity (ἐπιείκεια, epikeia) is a virtue and part of justice by which one judges when it is bad to follow the law, and [when] it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. —as St. Thomas Aquinas describes it in his question on equity (Summa Theologica II-II q. 120), which cites Aristotle's ...


2

When we try to philosophically define a word like "knowledge," we're trying to capture the sense in which we already use it. But the sense in which we already use it may be vague and inconsistent, and may vary from person to person. So what we're really trying to do is find a definition that is clear and specific, while being close to how we ...


2

A reason? Implying, from outside of moral reasoning? Or like, using intersubjectivity reasoning, which resulted in the end of feudal bloodline/racist governance, ideas like universal citizenship, and adoption of catch phrases like "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? You can ...


2

You already have the reasons for punishment in the first place, to discourage repetition/imitation of a bad action. So what is the reason to have "fair and just" punishment? Because humans generally have a strong desire for fairness and justice, especially when it pertains to them personally, as well as desiring order and safety. So having laws, ...


2

I will present a not well-known but classical argument that is often ingrained into our current judicial systems. The argument is underdeveloped in Kant's philosophy of right and later fully developed by Fichte. Fichte argues in his Foundations of Natural Right that legal punishment is, in a sense, a fulfillment of the original intention of a rational ...


1

It's not right to call this "Thrasymachus's model." It's Socrates' model, which he gets Thrasymachus to agree with, in order to refute an earlier position by Thrasymachus. Earlier in this dialogue, Thrasymachus asserts that justice comes from a "noble simplicity and goodness of heart," and that injustice comes from "goodness of ...


1

We should take a view as if we were in the position of a dictator, able to give rules to all of society. What rules would we wish to impose, in order to produce a society that we judge best? Naturally, this judgment of "best" is subjective, but there are similarities between what different people want society to be like. Most people would like ...


1

The community applying punishment limits the potential for revenge. This indirectly implies the punishment is fair otherwise the aggrieved party would still want further revenge.


1

On the simplest level, punishment is a natural social desire for balance and empathy. If someone punches you in the arm, you punch them in the arm; if someone takes your shovel, you take it back. That way the other person immediately feels the pain and deprivation you felt, and (ostensibly) comes to understand your feelings as their own. There's a certain ...


1

Sounds interesting. Could bring out some good contrasts, about the nature of freedom, and the systems we find ourselves in. Camus is focused on the internal experience, the 'existential' encounter with meaning or lack of it. In The Rebel, this creates contact with transcendental values, not subject to corruption of ends-justifying-means. Marx focused on ...


1

"What is knowledge?" is not an empirical question. It's a conceptual question (i.e. about the meaning of the concept of knowledge). Empirical questions always presuppose answers to conceptual questions (e.g. scientific inquiry on the nature of consciousness requires an operationalized definition of "consciousness," which might be taken ...


1

It seems like you are puzzling over theories of truth - and yes, coherentism is one approach plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth As 'philo sophia', love-of-truth, determining what truth is, is clearly a core philosophical concern. We were discussing how philosophy is intrinsically 'meta', and meta concerns tend to become philosophical "Why ask why" ...


1

A major part of Rawls' argument here depends on a contrast with the sympathetic-spectator model of impartiality. Rawls goes to great lengths to point out the difficulty with resolving the question, "How would the spectator judge?" especially considering that we have much more real-life experience with a lack of knowledge than with the relative ...


1

Marx's views on enfranchisement, hence on disenfranchisement, fall within his attitude towards political emancipation - the achievement of such rights as the right to vote, to hold property, to express one's opinions, the right to follow one's own religion, the right to personal security, &c. In On the Jewish Question (1844) he dismissed such rights, ...


1

Some food for thought here: Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track (pages 184 & 185) Nietzsche, in an early and more widely known piece (the second untimely observation, "On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life"), already replaced the objectivity of historical knowledge with "justice" (section 6). But otherwise he was silent on the ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible