6

This is slightly tricky as not everyone uttering that may have the same conception of truth, but generally speaking I think the definition only makes sense for some external/correspondence notion of truth. As a prototypical example (although modern philosophical epistemology has mostly abandoned this viewpoint), in "standard" epistemic logic an ...


4

To expand slightly on what Conifold mentioned, according to IEP the "modest foundationalism" has Alvin Platinga as a prime exponent; Wikipedia mostly covers that under "reformed epistemology" although it does say under "modest foundationalism" that: Reformed epistemology is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious ...


3

It might be easier to think about this in terms of the meaning of the word ‘know’. In that case, the ‘true’ part of JTB amounts to the following claim: If S knows that p, then p For example, if I tell you that Ann knows that today is Sunday, you can deduce that today is Sunday. Why isn't justified belief enough for knowledge? Suppose that Bob is about to ...


3

Note that we know this well enough that entire industries depend upon it, and they are considered safe. RSA Public Key Cryptography is an international standard that backs SSL and other internet security. We do security audits of institutions dependent upon that technology and find them secure. We may know it better than we know how to build safe bridges. So,...


2

As Fizz correctly points out, this is an expression of the correspondence theory - and external realism - at the base of the JTB theory of knowledge: When we say that we do know something about the world, we essentially claim that it is actually true that this is the case in the world, not merely that we are justified in thinking that this is probably the ...


2

"Justified" and "belief" already hinted our knowledge innately dooms to have some nuanced subjective nature. Thus without the only remaining "true" requirement, there won't be any common objective ground to form our intersubjective sharable knowledge. After all, no matter what definition knowledge becomes, it's meant to be quite ...


2

First of all, Lisa can't do much to "expose John's statement as being false". It's not falsifiable. It might be true, for all she knows. You are right to say that the probability of her having aquired through other means is higher, but that doesn't help in "exposing as false". Imagine that instead he claims Fred told him, and there are ...


2

This one is right in the WP article on Alvin Plantinga: Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, ...


1

There exists a subset of language expressions that are necessarily true and impossibly false. This subset has a completely different character than all other expressions of language. If we define knowledge as a fully justified true belief such the the justification necessitates its truth then a foundation of analytic knowledge might be derived. Self-evidence ...


1

Evidence applies to the propositional attitude of belief or knowledge (claimed). Here, a propositional attitude report is a statement such as, "I believe/think/hope/pray/wish/want/intend/etc. that X be Y," something that takes a that-clause for the operator (so to say). But now as Christianity loves to explain (this is a good point in that ...


1

I think it is important to make a distinction — with the caveat that few people make this distinction, to everyone's detriment — between the politics of knowledge and the pragmatics of knowledge. Pragmatically, when we say we know something (following Wittgenstein), what we mean is that we have recognized a pattern in the world and can make fruitful ...


1

Justified True Belief as a criteria for knowledge sets two conditions which are not satisfiable for the vast majority of what we know. Empiricism operates off an indirect realism assumption, in which we can arrive at most likely working hypotheses about reality, but can never have certainty for any of them. This means we do not have access to "truth" for ...


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