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21

You are probably referring to the first two paragraphs of the first book of the Transcendental Dialectic (A312-13/B369). Here they are, in Guyer's translation: "In the great wealth of our languages, the thinking mind nevertheless often finds itself at a loss for an expression that exactly suits its concept, and lacking this it is able to make itself ...


16

Alasdair MacIntyre is a 20th/21st century philosopher writing in English. Immanuel Kant was an 18th century philosopher writing in German. G.W.F Hegel was a 19th century philosopher writing in German. Both were trained in theology at different points during their education. For this education, they had to learn biblical Greek. Adorno was a 20th century ...


13

It's not necessarily the language, but the edition you should keep an eye on. As I wrote here, translations of Kant are problematic in and of themselves, partly because even German native speakers might understand some key points quite differently. But in English, the Cambridge Editions are quite a good standard and unmatched so far. When it comes to ...


12

You're missing an important word. The second formulation of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork is: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. The key phrase here is "never simply." Kant has no problem with ...


11

Popper described his rejection of the Kantian a priori here. A reply from a Kantian perspective can be found in this student paper.


11

It occurs in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, here it is in context (from 4:418-19, p.29 in the Gregor's Cambridge translation): "He is not capable of any principle by which to determine with complete certainty what will make him truly happy, because for this omniscience would be required. One can not therefore act on determinate principles ...


10

the categorical imperative asks whether the maxim of your action could become one that everyone could act upon in similar circumstances. If the action could be universalized (i.e., everyone could do it), then it is morally acceptable Kant's principle only applies to the maxim of your action. Eating a potato in and of itself is not a maxim nor does it ...


10

I will answer this question with Kant's own words taken from (my personal favorite of his works) The Critique of the Power of Judgment. Specifically, I will be citing the Cambridge University Press 2nd Edition, edited by Paul Guyer and translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Please decide for yourself what you think Kant would think of Darwinian ...


10

Key text here may be On opinion, knowledge and belief, CPR B 848-859. There is conviction [Überzeugung]. It is the subjective part necessary for knowledge: Taking something to be true is an occurrence in our understanding that may rest on objective grounds, but that also requires subjective causes in the mind of him who judges. If it is valid for ...


10

It should be said that Husserl was philosophically averse to Kant's "creative" transcendental subject, perhaps due to the dominance of absolute idealist interpretations of him at the time, and preferred to derive his lineage from Hume, whom he credits as the principal forerunner of phenomenology. See Mall's Experience and Reason on their connection, which ...


10

I think (and I broadly agree here with Eckart Förster, whose book The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy will be quoted here for reference) that Hegel roughly follows Kant's understanding of science. Therefore, clarifying what Kant wrote about science may help to elucidate how this intertwines with the idea of a single principle. Kant himself on science Kant ...


10

See KRV, Transcendental Dialectic. Bk.I : Of Ideas in General : To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful [...].


9

Under the understanding of a prioricity at issue pre-Two Dogmas of Empiricism, a priori truths were largely conflated with necessary truths. So, if you could recognize the possibility of the failure of the parallel postulate, that would constitute a falsification of its necessity and thus (given the conflation) a falsification of the claim that it was a ...


9

This reminds me of the older question Was Wittgenstein anticipating Gödel? There is more to it in the case of Kant than there was in the case of Wittgenstein though, at least in spirit. One could say that Kant pioneered in epistemology the stratification into levels of discourse, which Gödel later applied to formal semantics. When the Gödel theorem ...


9

You're right to see some resonances between intuitionism and Kant. However, there's no uncontroversial sense in which you could blithely categorize Kant as an intuitionist. I'm not sure I've ever seen anyone do it, as a matter of sociological note. More instructive, I think, than trying to get Kant to fit the intuitionist picture is to explore the subtle ...


8

In some respects, you could say that Sartre is "borrowing from Kant." It will greatly depend on what you mean by borrowing. Iphigenie's comments are highlighting the differences, and those are definitely worth pointing out but a type of "rationalist" heritage is worth bringing up. What I would say is the common thread is an emphasis on "autonomy" and a ...


8

In The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant examines the question of how humans can act in a good way. For Kant, the basis for acting good is the good will. His criterion for the good will is acting from duty. Kant gives the example of a salesman, who serves his customers honestly and for fair prices. But one cannot see from the outside if the ...


8

His main impact may be through the notion of human dignity. I have recently talked to a professor that stated that this term is very vivid in Germany because of the strong kantian tradition, while almost never heard in the Netherlands regarding academic discussions about ethics (she has been a professor for applied ethics there for years). There, ...


8

TL;DR: No, he did not! To be precise, things-in-themselves may be objects of thought, i.e. abstract concepts of the realm of logic, and therefore concepts of transcendental philosophy as logically necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. But they cannot be objects of knowledge, i.e. things that are particular objects of experience subsumed ...


8

Mathematical logic, and the associated notion of the existential quantifier, were invented only after Kant's time. Kant used other, more traditional concepts. The ontological proof (or at least the version that Kant criticized) is related to the idea that God exists by necessity, that existence is an essential property of God. When Kant asserted that "...


8

For Kant, morality only applies to rational beings. At some points, he will use the word "humanity" as a synonym. Thus, if we look at the second group of formulations of the categorical imperative we find: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at ...


8

To begin with, Kant himself did not speak about courtesy of the heart [Höflichkeit des Herzens] in any of his texts. I made a full-text search in German on the Academy Edition over all 23 volumes - including all written works, lecture notes (also of his students), letters, and fragments and notes - with "des Herzens" (of the heart). The term did ...


8

There are no counterexamples to Kant's "argument" because it is not an argument. It is a view of predication under which being/existence is not a "real" predicate discussed in Transcendental Dialectic (Chapter III, Section 4): "Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of ...


7

This is probably a misunderstanding. In German, "transcendent" and "transcendental" are not the same. Kant's philosophy is transcendental, not transcendent. In German, this really makes a difference. Transcendent philosophy is what Kant criticises, i.e. empty talk about things we can't know because they're beyond our reason. His philosophy, on the other hand,...


7

In short, Kant's answer is that 'causality' isn't, contra Hume, merely constant perceived conjunction. If this is the case, then the problem of induction applies and it is not possible to infer that there is a necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Instead, Kant argues that causality is an a priori concept of the faculty of understanding. ...


7

Kant did directly address the Golden Rule at least one point in his philosophy. If I remember the gist correctly, he's highly critical for one reason: the golden rule depends largely on how you would feel about what was done to you. For Kant, what's lacking is a truly universal perspective. This is where the categorical imperative differs, it does not ...


7

First off, I want to say this is a really good question that reflects real thought on an interpretative issue in Kant studies. Second, I think you're grasping some major things but also thinking backwards (by which I mean imposing contemporary categories on what Kant is doing). In terms of your question, one major issue is going to be where in Kant you are ...


7

I think Kant would take exception to being called an ontological idealist or dualist. There is no dualism between appearances and things in themselves in the Cartesian sense of "dualism", the "supersensible substrate" of appearances is strictly unknowable. On ontology critical Kant remained strictly agnostic, no matter how much it seems he wanted to ...


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