New answers tagged

1

'It seems to me that if everyone refused to say when a monogamous relationship was over, refused to tell someone of their affairs, and so on, then no monogamous relationships could exist.' I don't see that the conclusion follows, because it takes no account of monogamous relationships that persist and are not over. 'If relationships of these sorts were never ...


0

I'm not a Kant scholar, but he clearly had a strong position in favor of monogamous marriage and against sexual license, which doesn't leave much room to justify infidelity. Here's a textbook chapter which explains: He objects to casual sex (by which he means sex outside of marriage), however consensual, on the grounds that it is degrading and objectifying ...


0

You've pinpointed a very important but little understood aspect of the operation of the mind, not brain, (which serves as the data collection and storage mechanism and bodily functions management systems.) One thing, perhaps the only one which Spinoza and Berkeley agreed on is that all of our ideas have as their origin, either objects or events from the ...


0

For Kant, intuitions do not mean only one thing. For instance, every sense-datum that is received by the faculty of sensation (Sinnlichkeit) is directly called an 'empirical intuition' (empirisichen Anschauung). In the form of empirical intuitions, they are not yet appearances, for in order there to be an appearance, empirical intuitions have to be 'molded' ...


1

I see you are reading the CPR and asking questions while you read it which is a great exercise in Philosphy. May I suggest Bird's commentary to accompany your reading? (The revolutionary Kant) To try and answer your question: Kant's argument in RoI is not dealing with noumena. The existence of external objects is the existence of a distinction between outer-...


0

The only answer I could muster after reading various positions on this is, that it is contested. There are two forms of interpretation - conceptualist and non-conceptualist. Former thinks Kant cannot establish that there do exist such intuitions, and therefore the difference between concepts and intuition is merely that of difference in the working of them....


0

There are multiple levels in which concepts fall short in determining and embracing intuition. There are sensible representations that are unconscious, "obscure", no appercieved (this is inherited by leibniz's petite perception), yet they are given sensible representations. This is the strongest case of a sensible representation without a concept ...


0

I think your question arises from a misunderstanding of the conception of noumena in Kant. The noumenon (from nous, thought) is not an existing world out of reach. The thing in itself is a thought that has a methodological value, you could see it as a mental experiment, though this might be misleading. The whole idea is, as poorly as a few words can render ...


0

Note that Kant clearly says that e.g. the moon exists when we are not directly looking at it (this is part of the very point of the Third Analogy of Experience). This "taking away" that he mentions in the passage you cite is very abstract: imagine a physical object with no possible concrete relationship with us, not even an intelligible relation with our ...


0

Kantian intuition is a mental 3D-image of a particular object. Like that chair in the living room. After it made a few appearances from different sides, you can close your eyes and enjoy the view of its intuition suspended a few feet above the floor and slowly rotating counterclockwise. I'm sure Immanuel Aspergerovich would have explained it in his own ...


Top 50 recent answers are included