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There's a grammar issue here that's confusing the issue. the question of whether knowledge can or cannot be used makes it appear as though usefulness/usability are properties of particular knowledge objects, rather than a function of human interaction with knowledge. I mean, does a rock have use in and of itself? I'd say no, but then again, if I needed to ...


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Amogh Kulkarni, & welcome to PSE. Usabiliity is not intrinsic or definitional to the concept of knowledge. 'X is an item of knowledge but X has no conceivable use' is not a contradiction. So, logically at least, "If a knowledge cannot be used; it loses its property of being knowledge in a fundamental way" is false. A pragmatist would disagree but ...


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Emil, welcome to PSE While Goldman's reliabilism can handle the original Gettier cases, other Gettier cases can be devised for which it appears not to work. Goldman's reliabilism ... consider Goldman's (1986) "relevant alternatives" version of reliabilism. It requires not only that a belief be produced by a reliable process (he refers to process ...


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Per your own links, the answer is a definitive "no". Here is a crucial selection from your link on Reliabilist Epistemology: A reliable inferential process, for example, confers justification on an output belief only if the input beliefs (premises) are themselves justified. How could their justifiedness have arisen? Presumably, by having been caused by ...


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The Greek original meaning was 'manifestation' and in Jewish biblical studies is the distinction between divine revelation directly from God himself (to Moses) as opposed to a rabbinic based interpretation of oral law.


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