14

Logical positivism does not deny human emotion. It simply reassigns its role. Ethical, aesthetic or religious judgements, for example, fulfil the role of expressing or eliciting emotion - and not, emphatically not, of truth-bearing. Since ethical, aesthetic and religious judgements definitely occur and since, equally definitely for logical positivists, they ...


14

Err... The phrase 'ignorance is bliss' is sarcastic. 'Ignorance is bliss' in the sense that one actually believes that the ravenous bug-blatter beast of traal will not eat us if we put a towel over our heads. The phrase is invariably used as a way of chiding someone for being willfully, stupidly, or naïvely ignorant of the way the world actually works, such ...


9

Logical Positivism did not fail because it denied human emotion. LP failed because it tried to reduce the concept of meaning to the process of verification, and it became increasingly clear that this was an impossible task (as the later Wittgenstein, among other, pointed out quite clearly). Logical Positivists would look at a scientific proposition — such as ...


8

I have a different opinion. The maxim ignorance is bliss can be used in a sarcastic vein, but it's actually very truthful. Your question overlaps philosophy and psychology. Look up "cognitive dissonance," for example. Do doctors and government always tell people the truth? Of course not. Politicians often lie for sleazy reasons, but there are situations ...


7

Everybody knows nowadays that logical positivism is dead. But nobody seems to suspect that there may be a question to be asked here—the question “Who is responsible?” or, rather, the question “Who has done it?”. (Passmore’s excellent historical article [note 110] does not raise this question.) I fear that I must admit responsibility. Yet I ...


7

Karl Popper refuted logical positivism in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (LScD). One problem with the logical positivist position was that the positivists wanted to get rid of metaphysics in favour of science, but their proposed way to distinguishing between them was useless. They wanted to say science consisted of verifiable statements, but an ...


6

In this piece which talks about similar questions about the nature of reality and his own quasi-mystical experiences, he mentions a number of pre-socratic philosophers (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras) along with Plato, Hume and Spinoza: The pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides taught that the only things that are real are things which ...


5

I might know that the sun is more than 100,000 miles from the earth, and the statement 'The sun is more than 100,000 miles from the earth' is true. It is not itself knowledge, however. Knowledge is a state of the knower; a statement is not a state of anything. I am not foreclosing on the nature of a knower; a knower might be a person, an individual mind, ...


4

What's the point of working when all money will eventually perish? Why bother going to school when your brain is just a temporary storing unit that decays and will eventually perish too? Why do anything, knowing that nothing will be worth while and that eventually everything will be destroyed in the inevitable heatdeath of our universe? Thing is, you're ...


4

Several good answers here. As Geoffrey Thomas points out, LP doesn't "deny" human emotion. It simply tries to remove emotion ("emotion" is used here in the most general sense of the word - i.e. including questions of ethics, values, faith, etc...) from the process of elaborating philosophical statements and results. I would like to point out though, that ...


3

Footnote #2 by John Deely (✝2017) in his translation of the Tractatus de Signis pp. 44-45 by John of St. Thomas (✝1644) quotes the relevant passages of the 1597 Disputationes Metaphysicæ by Francisco Suárez, S.J. (✝1617)—a treatise in which Suárez sides with St. Thomas half the time and with Scotus the rest of the time. Disputationes Metaphysicæ, disp. 47, ...


3

However, I see that in the english speaking philosophical world, certainty is so to say absent from discussions regarding language. I cannot see where certainty can be found in the standard definition of knowledge as true justified belief. How to explain this? I think that the theory of knowledge as justified true belief is typical of analytical philosophy, ...


3

Well, mavavilj, definitions are easy - dictionaries are teeming with them. None of them is right or wrong, they're only more or less agreeable to whomever interprets them! However, 'knowledge' isn't a scientific term, it's a philosophical issue. Science is more concerned with evidence, theory and statistical analysis. Are you keeping in mind the ...


3

The definition you're suggesting would be circular. So to define a tree, we are actually defining everything else as not a tree Of course, to define everything else as 'not a tree' you would first need to a have conception of 'tree'. Also, notice how you say "everything else", which presumably means "everything that's not a tree". So we define everything ...


3

[I]t is difficult to narrow down an exact definition of a tree because every tree is different. So to define a tree, we are actually defining everything else as not a tree, until we decide it fits into the tree category. Welcome to SE Philosophy! This is a very philosophical question, and one that hinges on the nature of definition. In your title you use ...


3

Reference is to On Certainty. The context is about "justification" of our knowledge: justification cannot go on forever, in search for an absolute ground. It must stop somewhere (compare with The Problem of Induction, and OC, 135). See: 105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this ...


2

According to Kant, analytic propositions are logical truths ( or instances of abstract logical truths). For example: A OR not-A , or any of its instances , such as the soul is mortal OR the soul is non-mortal. So, your question amounts to asking what is the status of logic in Kant's epistemology. In the Preface of the second ...


2

I am not familiar with formulations of the non-existence of objective reality, but here's my stab at the question anyway: Suppose you have the hypothesis "All apples are red", and you see a green apple. If objective reality exists, then the hypothesis has been falsified by the observation. If objective reality does not exist, then the hypothesis was false ...


2

It is hard to correlate Kant and Popper, at least I find it so, since their enterprises were so different. Kant's major epistemological concern was with what might be termed psychological epistemology. The forms of intuition (our sense of space and time) and the categories of the understanding (causality, quantity, quality, plurality, limitation, ...


2

This isn't necessarily about death or the end of the universe (as other answers suggest). You may as well ask: What's the point of eating ice cream if the taste goes away shortly after? What's the point of going on a trip if it's going to end anyway? You could ask those questions even if we and the universe continued to exist forever. You seem to be ...


2

Logical positivism was an approach to philosophy with aspirations to new heights of strictness and rigor. Most famously, it initially endorsed the "verification principle," which states that all meaningful statements must be either based on empirical evidence, or be "truths of logic" (or a combination of the two). However, the verification principle itself ...


2

you cannot really know because you [would] have to trust what that entity or your forgotten ego says which could be deceitful too. Seems to lead straight to Descartes: Latin: "Non posse à nobis dubitari, quin existamus dum dubitamus: atque hoc esse primum quod ordine philosophando cognoscimus." English: "That we cannot doubt of our existence ...


2

Welcome, Iva I think the best help will come from texts on critical thinking. I suggest any of the following: Colin Swatridge, Oxford Guide to Effective Argument and Critical Thinking (Oxford Guides). ISBN 10: 0199671729 / ISBN 13: 9780199671724. Kemp, Gary, Bowell, Tracey, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide. Published by Routledge, 2005. ISBN 10: ...


2

First, allow me to point out that critical thinking is not so much learned as it is developed. There's an analogy here to the physical body. Newborn infants have (more-or-less) the same muscular and skeletal components as full-grown adults, but the muscles and skeletons of adults have changed over time in response to all sorts of factors — diet, hormones, ...


2

Can knowledge exist without structure? The answer to this question is no, and it relates to the definitions of knowledge and structure. Knowledge is often taken by epistemologists to be some sort of verified belief, and the process of verification whether it be establishment of adequate justification and truth or otherwise (thanks to the Gettier problem) ...


2

Generally the answer has to be NO, which is the main reason why radical skepticism is bound to fail since it questions the very structures which the meaningfulness of the position and of expressivity itself rely on. For a Putnamian (analytical) argument for this see Tim Buttons, Limits of Reality. But, with Russell, we have to keep knowledge how (knowledge ...


2

I think what's confusing you is the distinction between syntax and semantics. Logic is entirely concerned with syntax: with the rules governing the structure and transformation of symbols. Semantics - the meaning of symbols, and the relationship of symbols to the external world — is a separate matter, one that lies outside of logic properly put. 'Truth' is a ...


2

SHORT ANSWER According to the SEP article on epistemology, the relationship between knowledge and memory is that memory is one of five main sources of knowledge, the other four being perception, reason, introspection, and testimony. But, to fully understand the relationship between knowledge and memory, one has to have a definition of knowledge, and this is ...


2

Amogh Kulkarni, & welcome to PSE. Usabiliity is not intrinsic or definitional to the concept of knowledge. 'X is an item of knowledge but X has no conceivable use' is not a contradiction. So, logically at least, "If a knowledge cannot be used; it loses its property of being knowledge in a fundamental way" is false. A pragmatist would disagree but ...


2

There's a grammar issue here that's confusing the issue. the question of whether knowledge can or cannot be used makes it appear as though usefulness/usability are properties of particular knowledge objects, rather than a function of human interaction with knowledge. I mean, does a rock have use in and of itself? I'd say no, but then again, if I needed to ...


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