We’re rewarding the question askers & reputations are being recalculated! Read more.
14

Logical positivism does not deny human emotion. It simply reassigns its role. Ethical, aesthetic or religious judgements, for example, fulfil the role of expressing or eliciting emotion - and not, emphatically not, of truth-bearing. Since ethical, aesthetic and religious judgements definitely occur and since, equally definitely for logical positivists, they ...


8

Logical Positivism did not fail because it denied human emotion. LP failed because it tried to reduce the concept of meaning to the process of verification, and it became increasingly clear that this was an impossible task (as the later Wittgenstein, among other, pointed out quite clearly). Logical Positivists would look at a scientific proposition — such as ...


6

Ambiguity does not rule out truth. An ambiguous statement is one with two meanings. You may not know which meaning to apply but whichever it is the statement, given either or both meanings, may be true. For example, 'She attends the small girls' school'. This is ambiguous between : She attends the school for small girls. & She attends the small ...


6

In standard philosophical parlance 'epistemology' and 'the theory of knowledge' are convertible, interchangeable. A crack of light might, however, develop between them. 'Epistemology' as practised in philosophy is concerned with questions such as 'how is knowledge of the external world possible ?', 'can we know other minds ?', 'is a priori knowledge possible?...


6

Everybody knows nowadays that logical positivism is dead. But nobody seems to suspect that there may be a question to be asked here—the question “Who is responsible?” or, rather, the question “Who has done it?”. (Passmore’s excellent historical article [note 110] does not raise this question.) I fear that I must admit responsibility. Yet I ...


6

Karl Popper refuted logical positivism in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (LScD). One problem with the logical positivist position was that the positivists wanted to get rid of metaphysics in favour of science, but their proposed way to distinguishing between them was useless. They wanted to say science consisted of verifiable statements, but an ...


5

In this piece which talks about similar questions about the nature of reality and his own quasi-mystical experiences, he mentions a number of pre-socratic philosophers (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras) along with Plato, Hume and Spinoza: The pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides taught that the only things that are real are things which ...


4

What's the point of working when all money will eventually perish? Why bother going to school when your brain is just a temporary storing unit that decays and will eventually perish too? Why do anything, knowing that nothing will be worth while and that eventually everything will be destroyed in the inevitable heatdeath of our universe? Thing is, you're ...


3

John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA) does not object to using computers as tools to simulate human understanding but to the claim that the simulating machines and the programs actually understand language and that this explains how humans understand language: Partisans of strong AI claim that in this question and answer sequence the machine is not ...


3

The main objection is that it is (or most forms of it are) incoherent, inconclusive, or ignorant regarding the difference and/or relation between causal/physical aspects of sensing and justificational/normative aspects of knowing which is central to indirect realism I think most philosophical objections are not against "indirect realism" (e.g. scientific ...


3

Well, mavavilj, definitions are easy - dictionaries are teeming with them. None of them is right or wrong, they're only more or less agreeable to whomever interprets them! However, 'knowledge' isn't a scientific term, it's a philosophical issue. Science is more concerned with evidence, theory and statistical analysis. Are you keeping in mind the ...


3

However, I see that in the english speaking philosophical world, certainty is so to say absent from discussions regarding language. I cannot see where certainty can be found in the standard definition of knowledge as true justified belief. How to explain this? I think that the theory of knowledge as justified true belief is typical of analytical philosophy, ...


3

The definition you're suggesting would be circular. So to define a tree, we are actually defining everything else as not a tree Of course, to define everything else as 'not a tree' you would first need to a have conception of 'tree'. Also, notice how you say "everything else", which presumably means "everything that's not a tree". So we define everything ...


3

[I]t is difficult to narrow down an exact definition of a tree because every tree is different. So to define a tree, we are actually defining everything else as not a tree, until we decide it fits into the tree category. Welcome to SE Philosophy! This is a very philosophical question, and one that hinges on the nature of definition. In your title you use ...


2

According to Kant, analytic propositions are logical truths ( or instances of abstract logical truths). For example: A OR not-A , or any of its instances , such as the soul is mortal OR the soul is non-mortal. So, your question amounts to asking what is the status of logic in Kant's epistemology. In the Preface of the second ...


2

I am not familiar with formulations of the non-existence of objective reality, but here's my stab at the question anyway: Suppose you have the hypothesis "All apples are red", and you see a green apple. If objective reality exists, then the hypothesis has been falsified by the observation. If objective reality does not exist, then the hypothesis was false ...


2

A comment on fallacy 'Our WANTING certainty – is irrelevant. Worse, it is an explicit fallacy!' Wanting something can't be a fallacy; only an argument can be a fallacy. The wanting may derive from or be defended by a fallacy. That is another matter. A standard objection I offer first a standard criticism of indirect realism : The causal processes of ...


2

There are multiple philosophies of what we cannot know. Perhaps the most famous and influential is Immanuel Kant's concept of noumena, things as they actually are, as opposed to how they appear to us. According to Kant, the former can never be truly known, but only assumed. It's a rebuke both to Hume's insistent empiricism, which seems to deny the ...


2

You are completely right about ambiguity, and that's probably a problem at many levels, mostly related to our subjectivity. I will address, as an example, thermodynamics. Thermodynamics describes the behavior of energy in a system. It means that a system (made of parts) has energy. Take note of this: a thing, made of smaller things, has energy. But that's ...


2

This isn't necessarily about death or the end of the universe (as other answers suggest). You may as well ask: What's the point of eating ice cream if the taste goes away shortly after? What's the point of going on a trip if it's going to end anyway? You could ask those questions even if we and the universe continued to exist forever. You seem to be ...


2

The collective memory of ants is not relevant to the CRA. The point of the CRA is to clarify the difference between functionalism and awareness, and the referenced article is just one more example of the function/mind equivocation that the CRA is designed to refute. Understanding and knowledge involve a component of awareness. The CR is able to do ...


2

The main skill of a philosopher, in my view, should be the ability to simplify. The complexity of most issues is an illusion caused by incomprehension. Comprehension requires simplification. KISS, or Keep it Simple Stupid, is the method. The philosopher has only a secondary interest in groupology or even particular instances. The first thing to do is ...


2

It is hard to correlate Kant and Popper, at least I find it so, since their enterprises were so different. Kant's major epistemological concern was with what might be termed psychological epistemology. The forms of intuition (our sense of space and time) and the categories of the understanding (causality, quantity, quality, plurality, limitation, ...


2

I think the OP misunderstood the guidebook. The OP said According to (12) it might seem that the distribution of prime numbers can only be a matter of knowledge, never of opinion. Obviously that is false. Is the distribution of prime numbers not fully understood and is that the reason why the quote says that one can only have an opinion? The ...


2

Several good answers here. As Geoffrey Thomas points out, LP doesn't "deny" human emotion. It simply tries to remove emotion ("emotion" is used here in the most general sense of the word - i.e. including questions of ethics, values, faith, etc...) from the process of elaborating philosophical statements and results. I would like to point out though, that ...


2

Footnote #2 by John Deely (✝2017) in his translation of the Tractatus de Signis pp. 44-45 by John of St. Thomas (✝1644) quotes the relevant passages of the 1597 Disputationes Metaphysicæ by Francisco Suárez, S.J. (✝1617)—a treatise in which Suárez sides with St. Thomas half the time and with Scotus the rest of the time. Disputationes Metaphysicæ, disp. 47, ...


2

you cannot really know because you [would] have to trust what that entity or your forgotten ego says which could be deceitful too. Seems to lead straight to Descartes: Latin: "Non posse à nobis dubitari, quin existamus dum dubitamus: atque hoc esse primum quod ordine philosophando cognoscimus." English: "That we cannot doubt of our existence ...


2

Welcome, Iva I think the best help will come from texts on critical thinking. I suggest any of the following: Colin Swatridge, Oxford Guide to Effective Argument and Critical Thinking (Oxford Guides). ISBN 10: 0199671729 / ISBN 13: 9780199671724. Kemp, Gary, Bowell, Tracey, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide. Published by Routledge, 2005. ISBN 10: ...


2

First, allow me to point out that critical thinking is not so much learned as it is developed. There's an analogy here to the physical body. Newborn infants have (more-or-less) the same muscular and skeletal components as full-grown adults, but the muscles and skeletons of adults have changed over time in response to all sorts of factors — diet, hormones, ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible