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7

The essay is : "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice”, in The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press (1977), page 320–on. Previously unpublished; lecure delivered at Furman University, 30 November 1973. See page 321-322: What, I ask to begin with, are the characteristics of a good scientific theory? Among a number of quite usual ...


5

To your final question: Rorty was happy to emphasize Kuhn's influence without needing to follow Kuhn. Search "forward to people who want to out-Kuhn Kuhn" to find a passage from Neil Gross's book Richard Rorty: the Making of an American Philosopher (p. 208) on this. As to the body of your post: Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is very nice ...


5

Regarding progress specifically, it might be useful to start with Peirce. Peirce proposed a pragmatist conception of truth as the limit point of the process of empirical investigation and critique — the scientific community gradually approaches a consensus, and Peirce either defines that consensus view as the truth (the standard reading) or suggests that ...


4

Yes, the reference is the right one. See : Thomas Kuhn, The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, Chicago UP (2000), Ch.1 : What Are Scientific Revolutions ? [see : Editor's Introduction, page 6 : "Essay I, "What are Scientific Revolutions?" (ca.1981), consists primarily ..."] Page 30 : What characterizes revolutions is, thus, change in ...


4

Option (2) is Rorty's unequivocal choice, and he pre-empts objections by declaring that truth and progress are themselves cultural artifacts without any overarching significance. There are only cultural practices undergoing metamorphoses for pragmatic/cultural reasons, and science is one among many. Interpreting texts (literary criticism) is on equal footing ...


4

See SEP's entry The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories : 2.3 Kuhn’s subsequent development of incommensurability : 2.3.1 Taxonomic incommensurability for discussion. The relevant loci are from : Thomas Kuhn, The Road since Structure : Philosophical Essays 1970-1993, Chicago UP, mainly from Ch.2 : Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability, page ...


3

We have to see : Ch.2 : Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability, of Thomas Kuhn, The Road since Structure : Philosophical Essays 1970-1993, Chicago UP, page 33-on. The issue is about the Incommensurability of Scientific Theories that, in turn, relates to Quine's view about meaning and the topics of Indeterminacy of Translation and Meaning holism : ...


3

I believe Kuhn 2000, p.276 refers to the quote by Kuhn himself: "But my objectives in this, throughout, were to make philosophy out of it. I mean, I was perfectly willing to do the history, I needed to prepare myself more. I wasn't going to go back and try to be a philosopher, learn to do philosophy; and if I had, I'd have never been able to write that ...


3

Sven Ove Hansson summarizes attempts to create a demarcation between science and pseudo-science after Thomas Kuhn's (1974) use of normal science as a means for demarcation. Under "Criteria based on scientific progress" Hansson notes attempts to formulate a demarcation by Thagard (1978), Roshbart (1990) and Reisch (1998). Others, some after Kuhn, have ...


3

Kuhn developed his 'no algorithm' argument [for theory choice : GT] most thoroughly in a 1977 essay entitled 'Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice'. In that essay, he identifies five criteria that provide 'the shared basis for theory choice', namely accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977a, p. 321). These ...


2

Strictly speaking, Popper wasn't concerned at all with how science progresses, only with the demarcation problem, that is how to tell the difference between science and pseudo-science. Kuhn on the other hand, was concerned with the history and progress of science, but ended up discussing the demarcation problem as a result of his investigations into the ...


2

As Kuhn keeps insisting, there is not that much difference between what Kuhn and Popper suggest for most science as we see it function. What Kuhn labels 'Normal science' includes most of what Popper identifies as science at all. Where they differ, is upon what happens at major theoretical shifting points. Take Darwinism as an example. Popper sees what ...


2

To my mind, Lakatos's approach does not resist Kuhn, or mediate between Kuhn and Popper. It fully accepts Kuhn, and just solves a problem in his framing (whether Lakatos himself saw it that way or not.) It allows for 'ongoing revolution'. One main problem with Kuhn for a lot of people is that neither strictly normal nor strictly revolutionary science ...


2

-Is Kuhn's view on the development of science historicist in the Hegelian/Marxist sense, or is it ahistorical? The Kuhnian dynamic is historicist, but it is important to distinguish it from the Hegelian or Marxist dynamics. Kuhn's teleology isn't actually guaranteed, explicitly, by the structure of paradigmatic science-- as long as we try to solve problems, ...


2

The opening is unfair to Kuhn. He characterizes most of science as 'normal science', which is constituted by 'puzzle solving', and is therefore a form of cumulative progress. And it is clear that the candiates in a revolution are only those that already address a majority of the solved puzzles adequately. The result cannot be anything other than ...


2

Kuhns book The Structure of Scientifoc Revolutions (1962) is a work from history of science which touches also philosophical issues. E.g. see the preface of the author. The concept of revolutions is a basic of Kuhn's book. In chapter XI Kuhn draws parallels between scientific and political revolutions. He writes: One aspect of the parallelism must ...


2

See T.Kuhn, “Reflections on my Critics”, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (editors), Cambridge University Press (1970). See page 268, with ref to Quine (1960) : Word and Object. And see also T.Kuhn, SSR (1962, 2nd ed. 1970) : Preface, page viii: "W.V.O. Quine opened for me the philosophical puzzles of the analytic-...


2

I think so. See the other volumes : Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (editors), Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics, North Holland (1967) Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (editors), Problems in the philosophy of science, North Holland (1968) Imre Lakatos (editor), The problem of inductive logic, North Holland (1968). On the debate, you can see : ...


1

Kuhn's theory is that the progress of science is not a smooth, linear process. Instead, it is a series of repeating phases. These alternate between periods of incremental, linear, data-driven progress within an existing conceptual structure (or paradigm) and periods of contentious, irregular, and sudden, socially-driven change between one conceptual ...


1

See Descartes and the Pineal Gland : In the Treatise of man, Descartes did not describe man, but a kind of conceptual models of man, namely creatures, created by God, which consist of two ingredients, a body and a soul. “These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body. First I must describe the body on its own; then the soul, again on its own; ...


1

I think Kuhn is concerned with incommensurability within science. He doesn't accept astrology as science but characterises it as pseudo-science because of the absence of the paradigm-dominated puzzle solving activity characteristic of what he calls normal science (Paul R. Thagard, 'Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience', PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting ...


1

The point here is not to take Einstein as an example, but to point out that even in the most conservative of shifts, there is always some new content that is not compatible with the old content. You cannot mark out Einstein as an absolute exception to incommensurability, just because it carries Newton forward as a special case. There is still something new ...


1

Thomas S. Kuhn, 'Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism', Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jul., 1976), pp. 179-199 : 191. Seen in this way, the problem of comparing theories becomes in part a problem of translation, and my attitude towards it may be briefly indicated by reference to the related position developed by ...


1

I'd question Kuhns assessment. Here's another assessment by Julian Barbour, a British Physicist who wrote in his book, The Discovery of Dynamics: In most accounts of the history of dynamics, Aristotle is regarded as having had a perverse effect and to have retarded the development of the subject. He is generally compared unfavourably with Plato and the ...


1

You'll find it in 1987, “What are Scientific Revolutions?”, in The Probabilistic Revolution edited by L. Krüger, L. Daston, and M. Heidelberger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 7-22. Reprinted in Kuhn, The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, 2000: 13–32. Source : https://plato.stanford.edu/...


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Quoting from Thomas Kuhn's 2000 book, "The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays. 1970-1993": V. KINDI: What about Masterman's twenty-one uses? ^24 M. Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London 1965, vol. 4, ed. I. Lakatos ...


1

Kuhn and Popper are clearly built upon Polanyi. This is part of what makes pure rationalizations of Popper, or reductions of Kuhn to a simple post-modernism disingenuous. For Kuhn, in particular, tacit knowledge is what validates candidates for paradigms, and what allows definitions to coalesce. The stated forms of these things are incommensurable, but we ...


1

Imre Lakatos' "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes" (1978) offers a deeply insightful middle ground between Kuhn and Popper by integrating the best parts of each.


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