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Devil's advocate. From Dictionary.com: a person who advocates an opposing or unpopular cause for the sake of argument or to expose it to a thorough examination.


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Indeed you cannot raise the flagged variable inside the conditional proof if you intend it to occur outside that context. Rather, you must introduce it earlier, then reiterate into the subproof. 1.|_ ∃x Px Premise 2.| Pa Existential Instantiation 1, flag [a] 3.| |_ Q Assumption 4.| | Pa Reiteration 2 5.| Q -> ...


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I find it sad to see a question like this asked in this way. Are Plato & Aristotle 'outdated'? Of course. Are they important influences on the whole tradition after them? Also, of course. Adi Shankara was a properly great philosopher. You need a flourishing of open debate and valuing of ideas and commentary, to get progress. It's been patchy in India, ...


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I would say that almost anything (with notable exceptions mentioned below) taught by Advaita sages is available in a more rigorous and defined way (maybe not always perfectly rigorous, just more rigorous) by some modern school of philosophy. Whether it is neutral monism, consciousness monsim, or maybe occasionally even idealism, the monist ideas are ...


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It is outdated, but not because of the philosophers you mention. It is outdated because it was rooted in a false premise. They brought the idea of energy centers in the soul, but I believe that is all that was kept of the Vedic philosophers. As for Buddhism (which really transcends India), there's still a lot to hang onto, but outside the context of your ...


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Excellent dictionary definition... material logic logic that is valid within a certain universe of discourse or field of application because of certain peculiar properties of that universe or field https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/material%20logic And that applies immediately to the properties of our own universe. There is, however, only one ...


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No, at least not in the way you present in the body of your question. It seems there you are referring to the verification principle. The verification principle can be a definition for “meaningful” and contain no contradiction. One such example would be A statement which is not a truth of logic is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifiable. This ...


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The difference matters. Venn diagrams are intended for the representation of all logically possible relations, not merely actual ones. A subtle, but logically significant difference: The syllogism states that all mammals are animals, not that mammals constitute a subset of animals.


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Implications manipulating the similar variables to then disrupt the principal as a whole . Ex. T (the variable of truth + of greater value with verification of principle ) F ( the implication the - in the equation ment to give verification of principle ) So ..... T +F = ( Consept of verified truth . ) ( Sense ) ( THE CORRECT AMOUNT) (THE TRUTH) THE MAIN ...


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First, on ness and sufficient: If A, then B. This means that anytime you have A, you will have B. It does not say that anytime you have B, you will have A. There could be times with B but not A. If anytime you have A you have B, then B is necessary for having A. That’s because you can’t have A without B. A is sufficient for B (knowing we have A, that is ...


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Circular reasoning is merely an extend form of tautology. Instead of saying "A equals A because A equals A" (a simple tautology) we say "A equals B because B equals Q because Q equals 𝚵 because 𝚵 equals A". As long as all these things are actually equal, this reasoning is perfectly valid, if mindlessly trivial. There are two problems ...


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∃x(Dx ∧ (Dj ∧ ∀y (Dy → y=j)) ∧ x=y). I know this isn't correct, Indeed, it is not. You want the existence to be the antecedent of the conditional, with the consequent being the declaration that John is a detective and that if anybody is a detective then they are John. There is no need to attempt to link the existential' and the universal's variable. (∃x ...


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Just to add a gut-level answer to the rigorous ones: On a purely intuitive (borderline folk) level, I have always understood the difference to be that logical implication does not depend on the state of affairs, and material implication does. If in the actual world, everyone with an entirely green or entirely blue shirt has a blue hat, then (green shirt) ...


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Firstly, I would say that understanding validity in terms of possible worlds is only one way of doing so, and it wouldn't really be correct to say it is the usual way. There are about a dozen different ways of characterising validity: however that is a subject for another question. You are asking about how validity relates to 'actualism', which is the ...


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Concerning the first argument: If A is to be good, they must be just If B is to be good, they must be just Therefore, if C is to be good, they must be just This is not valid essentially because there is nothing in the argument making necessary that whatever applies to A or B also applies to C. Concerning the second argument (without the "all" in ...


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No, it is not. and 2) are premises. In a vacuum i cannot evaluate them, so i assume them to be true and correct. is a first conclusion; which does not follow. would be valid if "all that are good must be just" would be a (true) premise, which was not mentioned. Even if A and B are the only existing cases of whatever they are, the fact that both ...


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No. A good -> A just B good -> B just C good -> C just ? Non sequitur. C was not mentioned before C just -> C good ? Another non sequitur. This would be the converse of line 3, but an implication does not entail its converse.


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True, fundamental randomness is surely the antithesis to logic. It is a primitive and can't be understood any further. Now, if there is true, fundamental randomness, and thus quantum mechanics is complete, then I think one could argue we have a situation where we can analyze measurements logically/mathematically, but there is still an impenetrable randomness ...


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The notion of the logic of things may be understood either as (a) what we understand of how some thing works or (b) how the thing works irrespective of what we understand of it. It does not seem possible that a thing could exist if somehow it could not exist. However, it seems things can exist in ways which we cannot understand. In both cases, it seems false ...


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Discussion of assumptions One difficulty in verbally reasoning about extra-universe topics - like the modes it came into being - is that we have no insight whether any of the aspects involved in this reasoning bear any significance outside the context of the universe. When it comes to time in particular, our models of nature expressly describe (space)time as ...


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I haven't read through it but this book Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics (hopefully you can check it out online) has a lot of essays on holism, especially Ch. 3 by Tim Maudlin Part and Whole in Quantum Mechanics How Einstein presents the clearest view of a certain kind of reductionism in a letter, how Einstein presumably ...


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If you are trying to prove a conditional, a good strategy is to assume the antecedent, prove the consequent, then discharge the assumption by the rule of conditional proof. So, you want to assume ¬A → ¬(A → B) then prove A. Since ¬A → ¬(A → B) itself is a conditional, you can then assume ¬A and prove ¬(A → B). Which rules you are allowed to use depends on ...


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You have likely wrote the question incorrectly. The terminology is extremely important and you can’t use it Willy nilly. All categorical arguments MUST have three propositions whether you SEE THEM PHYSICALLY there or not. You were given “Flu vaccines are never completely effective. Therefore not every flu vaccine is completely effective”. None of these are ...


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Edit: If I understand you correctly now, the motivation for vacuousness is not your main issue with it, but by the time you wrote your clarification comment I had already written up this answer, perhaps it is of interest anyway: The motivation for why counterfactuals are permitted to be vacuously true is given in the original Lewis (1973) "...


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This comes with questioning whether logic can be used to prove some belief, as long as the person is willing to add additional assumptions to support their belief (taking the concept of "logic" for arguments - that is, concatenations of propositions - are valid, not if they are true). Logic can "rationalize" a belief. Much in the ...


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The rule of addition is correct in classical logic, which is presumably what you are learning. Classical logic is usually understood as the logic that is truth-preserving, i.e. for a valid argument it requires that if the premises of an argument are true then the conclusion follows by necessity, or that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the ...


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In formal logic, OR is an inclusive or -- it is true when either of the propositions is true. This is logic, not sense. Normal discussions do not contain statements such as are routinely used in logic, sentences having no connection except formal truth value.


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The problem with this dilemma is the set of conceptual definitions assumed to set the problem. If definitions are precise, the problem tends to get a solution per se. Given there is no strict and clear definition of good and God previous to a formal problem statement, therefore, every member in the discussion can enter into subtle details of the problem, ...


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Your question is related to the question: how can a deductively valid argument tell you something that you don't already know? Human beings are not logically omniscient, i.e. we do not know the logical consequence of everything we know. One of the purposes of a good proof is to take a potentially non-obvious logical consequence relation and express it as a ...


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Randomness alone does not provide free will. "In the present state of knowledge, it is certainly beyond our capabilities to understand the connection between the free decisions of particles and humans, but the free will of neither of these is accounted for by mere randomness." https://arxiv.org/pdf/0807.3286.pdf


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I would say, don't be afraid to read the major texts by the principal philosophers themselves. One of the reasons the great philosophers are considered great is that they are worth reading. That said, some are hard to understand. Some of the greats of the 'modern' era are Spinoza's Ethics, David Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature, and Kant's Critique of Pure ...


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"A created B; therefore A is strictly more powerful than B" is not justified reasoning. Humans create machines that are physically much more powerful than humans, such as trains. Humans create computers that are able to calculate much faster and more accurately than humans. Indeed, the purpose of making a tool is so that the tool can do something ...


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(1) Obviously, if x is necessary for y, then x is sometimes necessary for y. (2) Necessary conditions are not in general sufficient conditions (e.g. "there exists an animal" is necessary, but not sufficient, for "there exists a dog.") (3) Therefore, it can be right to say that "x is sometimes necessary but not sufficient for y to be ...


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Problem of consciousness and inexpressible Let's us first try to give definition of algorithmic mind. In a colloquial terms, algorithmic mind would be akin to a machine, it would perform certain strictly defined instructions according to a strictly defined rules. Starting from initial conditions (which in our case could be axioms) it would come to certain ...


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Suppose I say: I was a member of Shackleton's expedition on the Endurance so I can tell you from firsthand experience that Harry McNish was the carpenter on that expedition. The claim is that Harry McNish was the carpenter on the Endurance. This is factually true. However, my justification for this claim was fraudulent, because I was not a member of that ...


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