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There are several questions here and there are several different domains of philosophy involved. One major question is about ontology: is what we call 'free will' a 'real' experience and what's the difference between that and it being 'only a perception'? There's a broad range of thoughts on this, some of which veer into theology, but also things like "...


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Welcome, October ! Some contrasts between Marx and George are drawn out in an article by John Haynes Holmes. Holmes' plain and sometimes undiscerning lack of sympathy for Marx and extolling of George, and his over-use of exclamation marks, do not prevent some helpful points from being made: It is unlikely, had Karl Marx and Henry George ever met, or ...


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There are multiple approaches to emergence, and I consider this to be the most valid, also agrees with my personal research regarding systems and interaction: emergence is just a subjective appreciation granted by reason. To start, systems (the formal approach to things and objects) are just mental concepts. A constellation does not exist, the sky has only ...


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In my answer to the original question, I started with the observation that thoughts consist of nerve impulses. While it is true that the physiological processes that form nerve impulses involve electrical currents and chemistry, and that these in turn could be described by (deterministic) equations, the human brain consists of a staggeringly large number of ...


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Is materialism a philosophy accepted by the majority in western societies? If polling results are to be believed, no. I base that on at least one good litmus test for materialism, which is whether one believes in gods or spirits of some kind--which materialism would disallow. We do have polling data on that issue, which I take from the "Demographics of ...


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Here is the question: But to what extent do you or philosophers believe (or disbelieve) physicalism because of evidence from science, or is it more from philosophical "evidence" and/or a metaphysical assumption, perhaps influenced by the prevailing scientific zeitgeist and/or the beliefs of most (neuro)scientists that the brain is indeed the source of the ...


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The first thing that comes in my mind when I saw this question is the thought of Spinoza. Spinoza thought that everything follows a rule of causality including our behaviour and our desires. With our actual knowledge, you can apply this to our neurons. Free will is an illusion for Spinoza. The human brain have the possibility to evaluate different ...


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The issues hangs on what we mean by 'empirical'. You say, Given that no empirical evidence will truly disprove either side, it is a matter of probability. Here you are assuming that 'empirical' means 'sensory'. This accords with most dictionary definitions and is not a problem. But consciousness is not an empirical phenomenon and yet we know we are ...


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This question has a red herring in it. It assumes neuro reductionism, and causally closed physicalism. Neuro reductionism is considered a failed project in philosophy of mind: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/ But the problem remains whether one is a reductionist or not! Here is the actual central issue: If everything has a [...


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Free will arguably may reduce to physical phenomena. So may the redness of the flower we are looking at. So may the idea we have that democracy is the least bad system of government. So may our scientific ideas of nature. So may our idea of the physical world. If what I do is determined by my brain and my brain is a part of me, then what I do is determined ...


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When you have defined free will out of existence, people will still make decisions I have never understood the insistence that if no decisions are arbitrary (read: having no explanation besides "free will"), then that is proof that people have no free will. If I eat because I was hungry, and wanted to stop being hungry, and my body is arranged to be hungry ...


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It is not important to know anything that is fake. If my doctor's license is fake, I think it's important for me to know it. This statement isn't objectively true since "important" is subjective — it depends on what an individual values and considers important. Doesn't look like your conclusion holds. Therefore, we can never know everything. This is ...


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By this question he is trying to make you think about 'actual entity'. Here, he didn't make you explore 'existence'. So, by this question what he indirectly implies is that there is no actual entity; otherwise he wouldn't have asked you to examine a usual experience. When 'actual entity' becomes doubtful, the usage--'everything' would also become doubtful. ...


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While reading another user's question about pre-thetic, perceptual faith, I was struck with a possible solution to this problem of Phenomenology's relation to effort. When Land says that it grounds the experience of effort, he means that Phenomenology takes experience at face value — allows effort to be, rather than a necessary consequence of the biological ...


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Philosophical Buddhism has no belief in gods or of God. It's usually counter-posed to the Abrahamic religions as an atheistic religion. Nevertheless, it's not a materialist religion. It makes similar ethical claims to the main religious traditions of the West.


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