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Welcome, October ! Some contrasts between Marx and George are drawn out in an article by John Haynes Holmes. Holmes' plain and sometimes undiscerning lack of sympathy for Marx and extolling of George, and his over-use of exclamation marks, do not prevent some helpful points from being made: It is unlikely, had Karl Marx and Henry George ever met, or ...


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The position is that of eliminative materialism, or of delusionism, relative to consciousness. The two are somewhat different. Qualia are often cited by non-physicalists as direct evidence against physicalism. Many physicalists try to accommodate qualia and physicalism, and argue that the reasoning from qualia to non-physicalism is in error. For a ...


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There are multiple approaches to emergence, and I consider this to be the most valid, also agrees with my personal research regarding systems and interaction: emergence is just a subjective appreciation granted by reason. To start, systems (the formal approach to things and objects) are just mental concepts. A constellation does not exist, the sky has only ...


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As the term 'idealism' is used in epistemology and metaphysics there is nothing common and distinctive to all forms of idealism except the claim that reality is non-physical. This accommodates Berkeleley's view that all that exist are immaterial minds and their ideas. It also fits with Plato's theory of Forms, where the Forms are pure essences (e.g. the Form ...


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The first thing that comes in my mind when I saw this question is the thought of Spinoza. Spinoza thought that everything follows a rule of causality including our behaviour and our desires. With our actual knowledge, you can apply this to our neurons. Free will is an illusion for Spinoza. The human brain have the possibility to evaluate different ...


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From Russia I am not aware of any English translation of Materialism and Empirio-criticism later than the Moscow: Progress Publishing, 1964; 4th revised edition, 1967. As to the accuracy of the translation I can make only two points. The first is that the general level of Progress Publishers translations is respectably scholarly; secondly, on a spot check ...


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A quick précis. Very generally it is a book orbiting around a fictional book — a common enough device, but in this case the fictional book is a secret, a lost book in philosophy; said to contain missing elements or volumes of the poetics, it harbors the secret of “levity” that philosophy had lost: a sort of bright ember that would flourish into the ...


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This question has a red herring in it. It assumes neuro reductionism, and causally closed physicalism. Neuro reductionism is considered a failed project in philosophy of mind: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/ But the problem remains whether one is a reductionist or not! Here is the actual central issue: If everything has a [...


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Free will arguably may reduce to physical phenomena. So may the redness of the flower we are looking at. So may the idea we have that democracy is the least bad system of government. So may our scientific ideas of nature. So may our idea of the physical world. If what I do is determined by my brain and my brain is a part of me, then what I do is determined ...


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When you have defined free will out of existence, people will still make decisions I have never understood the insistence that if no decisions are arbitrary (read: having no explanation besides "free will"), then that is proof that people have no free will. If I eat because I was hungry, and wanted to stop being hungry, and my body is arranged to be hungry ...


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