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12

The issue in the example seems to be that the word "dominate" is used in two different senses. When this is done in an argument (it is not clear that this is so here) the fallacy is called equivocation. However, some language in the post suggests a different type of reasoning, namely inferring from the mere fact of (statistical) domination of men in the CEO ...


11

The Twin Earth argument undercuts functionalism because it undercuts the identification of the mental with the functional. But the problem is not with creating "meanings", but with capturing them faithfully. It is worth recalling that Putnam was a champion of computational functionalism back in 1960s, before he wasn't. According to functionalism human mind ...


11

Yes and no. They both criticize a certain approach to semantic theory that can be called realism about meaning. Roughly, realists see meanings as some kind of entities, although there is a wide range of opinions as to their nature. For Plato and Frege they are ideal forms occupying a separate realm, for Aristotle and Russell they are invariances of sensible ...


8

Well, if someone makes the assertion that "blueism is true," what they're generally claiming is that the those statements asserted by the blueist body of theory are, individually, true. Most people tacitly accept the notion of an individual, objective truth, and most ideologues believe that their view of reality is in accord with that objective truth. You ...


8

The question is based on a common misunderstanding of Derrida's work-- one he addresses repeatedly. For example, in "Toward an Ethics of Discussion", he writes: "[L]et it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the user or abuse of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which ...


8

Your view is similar to that of late Wittgenstein, after the so-called "linguistic turn". In Philosophical Investigations published in 1953 he writes “For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language”. He describes linguistic activity as a ...


8

In many situations there is. Strictly speaking, a definition can never be "wrong", unless it is incoherent or contains a contradiction, like "dry wetness". But it can be awkward, cumbersome, confusing, fruitless, and all other sorts of undesirable. This is why people often talk about misnomers and what definitions "ought" to be. Here is Quine:"Any word worth ...


8

There is nothing without prefiguration in philosophy; and the dead usually rise from their graves. So, to follow Mauro's lead: According to the standard textbook account, verificationism is a doctrine that was popular back in the days of logical positivism. The positivists promised us a 'verifiability criterion of meaningfulness' which would help ...


6

I'll try to provide a partial answer as I do think this is an interesting question about philosophy. Reasons Philosophy is Hard to Understand First, I would say that you might be losing something in describing the works of philosophers as "opinions". On a certain trivial level, they are opinions, but on this trivial level so is C The Programming ...


6

I will focus here on the first part of the question, which pertains to Putnam's argument to the effect that "meanings ain't in the head". I take this (rather than functionalism) to be the main issue. Putnam says that while talking about indexicals ("I", "That", "now") - intention doesn't determine extension. It seems right, because when I say "I" and when ...


6

The whole discussion whether life is trivial or meaningful seems to me to be based on the wrong assumption that significance or insignificance is a property inherent to life, that life qua life is meaningful or meaningless. The correct use of the word meaningful is meaningful for someone. The life of a certain individual from the human species or from any ...


6

My interpretation is that the original statements are not necessarily fallacious, but rather a question of the semantics carried by the word "dominate." To dominate can mean colloquially that one group or section of people has become a predominant portion of that group. But you are correct that dominate usually implies having force or power, rather than a ...


6

It's called shifting the burden of proof. burden of proof You said that the burden of proof lies not with the person making the claim, but with someone else to disprove. - yourlogicalfallacyis.com It's related to an argument from ignorance, but is slightly different in emphasis. Instead of claiming that a proposition is true because it hasn't been ...


6

Isn't every natural language an infinite language in the sense that it can generate infinitely many sentences and infinitely many word-tokens ? This is the case even if most of these sentences are never uttered and most of the word-tokens do not occur. A language which employed only infinitely long sentences could not be understood by any realistically ...


5

The main point in saying that a position is true or false is that there's some kind of (compelling) evidence for or against the claims entailed by that position. In your case the position of blueism entails at least two claims: everything in life can be expressed in blues songs everything in life should be expressed in blues songs So, blueism is true iff ...


5

Consider the following example: There is no apple on the table. You are pretending that there is an apple on the table. You choose to call this apple "foobar" I am not aware that you are pretending that there is an apple on the table, nor that you have decided to call your fictional apple "foobar" If you say to me: "The apple on the table is green", ...


4

In Frege's logical perfect language (Begriffsschrift) every well-formed expression must have a reference (Bedeutung). The Bedeutung of an expression is the actual thing corresponding to it. The Sinn of an expression, however, is the “mode of presentation” or cognitive content associated with the expression in virtue of which the Bedeutung is picked out. ...


4

I believe Einstein said this in response to criticism on his theories of special and general relativity. This criticism was a result of the fact that common sense did not seem to agree with Einstein's new theories. The simple assertion that the speed of a flash of light is always c in any inertial frame leads to consequences that defy common sense. When ...


4

Not exactly. Peirce himself considered it a distillation of "common sense", but he offered it as an alternative to the then dominant Cartesian foundationalism. Many disputed the pragmatic maxim, and its supporters concede that while it is "morally right" in the form given by Peirce it is difficult to interpret. The reason for disputing ...


4

I do not think that there is any issue with viewing signification as an activity, in fact this is how pragmatists view it since Peirce. In modern terms, pragmatism asserts semantic and epistemological priority of knowledge how over knowledge that, so representation is viewed as a special kind of performance. The problem begins when we look into the status of ...


4

I think that any comprehensive account of meaning must include an account of intentionality, but the real challenge is to give an account of both meaning and intentionality in non-intentional terms. Otherwise, we risk spinning in a little circle. Here is Brandom in Between Saying and Doing: "If one is allowed to use the full resources of semantic ...


4

Holism is an epistemological position, and externalism is a semantic one. Of course, some degree of interaction is to be expected, but not only is it possible to hold them together, it is not particularly challenging. The appearance of incompatibility comes from the misleading use of the word "meaning". In the holism, especially Quine's and Davidson's, "...


4

To answer the title question: Can purpose be attributed to events without grounding in agency? Yes. There are several examples: Daniel Dennett in several of his lectures explains how nature frequently exhibits purpose without agency, which he calls "free floating rationales". Trees and plants grow in certain directions with purpose (to avoid obstacles,...


4

'Meaning of life' questions are exceptionally difficult, at any rate I find them so. I'm inclined to say that life is not meaningless merely because (or if) you believe it to have meaning. If, for instance, you believe that your life has meaning by virtue of your relation to a supernatural realm or being, then if there is no such realm or being it does not ...


4

The answer by Geoffrey Thomas is helpful, but a point made in the text deserves amplification. It could reasonably be said that verificationism lives on. But only because the question of "meaningfulness" has been mostly divorced from it: None of these philosophers believes in the 'criterion of meaningfulness' that the positivists hankered after. Science ...


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