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I'm far from any validated source of information, when it comes to any form of extensive research... Because honestly? Life is too short for all of that. I wouldn't be able to enjoy any of it if I allowed it to be consumed by finding the "real" answer. I'm always looking for THE answer. But the answer I'm searching for? Doesn't exist... It will ...


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You are asking about the validity of the permanence of existence. As in the case of existence, something must exist to know about non-existence also. Then, that also (what you called 'something') must be 'an' existence. You may ponder over it: "Would it ever be a non-existence?" I mean, whether the thing that knows the non-existence is a non-...


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Property dualism is a type of reductive materialism which accepts the existence of most mental states such as pain, touch, believe, desire, etc and claims mental state can be totally reduced to its corresponding neurobiological process. It essentially treats mental states as one informational aspect of a two-face coin with its another aspect as the ...


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MUH does sound exactly like what you're looking for in your OP. Regarding your remaining concern: Tegmark they didn't write anything about substances and abstract/concrete objects, his arguments are mostly from a scientific perspective. First of all MUH is entirely math based thus it describes anything from a fully scientific perspective, not even mostly. ...


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Tegmark really does go as far as claiming reality is ontologically only a set of abstract entities with relations between them. These entities have no intrinsic qualities. He believes physics and eventually biology and neuroscience will eventually have equivalent "baggageless" descriptions of reality and subjective experience that will live purely ...


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If you accept some radical Platonism such as Teg Mark's contemporary Mathematical universe hypothesis, then it implies that the classic necessary truth PSR (principle of sufficient reason, dependent origination/arising, etc) doesn't hold within our contingent (efficient) physical world. According to MUH: Tegmark's MUH is: Our external physical reality is a ...


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Not only is there, some philosophers and it seems most physicists say the original PSR is invalidated by quantum mechanics. Only a weaker version can be defended. One that says roughly "if there is no sufficient reason, there is a sufficient reason for why there is none". R. Kane A philosopher "Not every sub-atomic event has a sufficient, i.e.,...


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Non-reductive materialism is simply a combindation of substance monism and property dualism. There are two highest types of property, physical and mental (property dualism), inhering in one and the same type of substance, material (substance monism). Monisms (1), dualisms (2), nihilisms (0) and pluralisms (3+) generally have the unit that they count in their ...


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I would have just placed this in a comment, but the comments are spilling over. I am probably missing something here, but I just don't see the problem. Kant does seem to use "intuition," "understanding," and "concept" in evolving ways, but I don't think, for starters, "understanding" and "concept" are ...


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Here's a mad idea. If you had an unnatural number of eyes you might for example count earth 3 as alien 2. Then alien 2 x 9 is not the earth 2 x 9. I suppose, in other words that the truths about natural numbers would vary if the algorithm for counting varied and I suppose it could. But then you could say that the earth way of counting is the one your talking ...


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Reason provides us of a biased model of nature: knowledge, which helps survival. The model is biased because it is adapted to the purpose of the subject. So, eating bones is not healthy for me because it is healthy for hyenas. Scientific knowledge is just some kind of knowledge (obtained by the scientific method, etc.), which means it is still biased by the ...


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"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict ...


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The principle of sufficient reason demands that everything must have a reason. So what is the reason for the principle itself? There isn't one - it's simply stated as a brute fact. I'm consistently bewildered that such a gaping hole goes unremarked upon. The principle immediately fails when it's turned in upon itself. That doesn't mean it should be tossed ...


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I'm afraid that computers are much less magical then they appear to be. If it helps your case - computer can be made just from falling marbles https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BOvLL8ok8I&t=368s No modern computer can actually do more than the "marble computer" in the video above. I think that for any philosophical thought it's good to thing ...


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You computer software may be used to metaphorically illustrate modern philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett's intentional stance which is the 3rd higher-level abstraction of our brain (ie, conscious mind) for his philosophy of mind theory with intentionalism built-in. The general notion of a three level system was widespread in the late 1970s/...


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The analogy I generally use is that particles are like knots or purls in a fabric. If you think of an energy field as a smooth continuum (a three-dimensional equivalent of a two-dimensional sheet of fabric), and then imagine that somehow the fabric got snagged or tangled into a lump than, well... that lump seems like something different than the surrounding ...


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Accounts of impossible worlds come in many flavors, but none seems to require that natural numbers obey the same laws in all possible worlds unless these laws count as "logical" to some (required) extent. Or one might posit numbers as dwelling in their own world(s), wherefore the question of variation becomes the question of something like the set-...


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The way you asked the questions seems to imply that you subscribe to a substance metaphysics. But it seems to me that the way modern physics has progressed, it presents us with a manifestly process-based metaphysics. Thus, as a general rule of thumb, if you're asking really fundamental questions like "what is a particle" physicists will not be able ...


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Quantum entities completely break our intuition when we try to understand them (reason for which Feynman stated in a lecture that "if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics"). It is quite difficult to define what is a quantum entity. Like a sphere is something that is not the rest of the space delimited ...


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Nobody knows. We model them as wave-like perturbations of the appropriate zero-point field for the characteristics we are interested in. But a zero-point field is just a label to hang the basic mathematics on, we have no idea whether that makes any ontological sense either. And as I have been discovering on the Physics SE, there are many fundamental ...


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Quantum particles are modeled as excitations of the underlying quantum field. So an electron is an excitation of the electron field, a muon is an excitation of the muon field, and so on. This is called quantum field theory and is a well-developed branch of physics.


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This is a very good question. Thermodynamics, by its the second law, describes how energy is dispersed in a closed system. Although the energy in an open system cannot be described using the second law of thermodynamics, the behavior of its parts will be the same. This implies, by logic, that an open system with low entropy will tend to keep its integrity, ...


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There're several major schools of realism views towards math. Platonism long ago already believed math objects as real forms existing independently of our physical world. Modern Structuralism instead regard internal structures as real. Formalism and Constructivism (including Intuitionism) usually regard math as merely symbolic rules or subjective mental ...


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According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, any of the divine attributes is equivalent (or even identical) to the others (and to God as such). This is a difficult contention to maintain, granted, but it might be part of an argument somewhere that omnipotence entails omniscience. A partial, more direct argument might proceed: God can do anything, God can ...


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The Dirac belt trick is simply experimental evidence that our universe has three macroscopic spatial dimensions. If our universe had more than three macroscopic spatial dimension then the belt trick would not work (although there are more direct ways of demonstrating this e.g. seeing how the volume of a sphere is related to its radius). And the belt trick ...


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Reviving this because I'm interested. I know Rasmussen provides a (very short) argument for this conclusion on p. 146-147 of How Reason Can Lead to God. But this book was written well after Gellman's paper. Here’s the steps to his argument: The necessary cause has maximum power. (As shown by simplicity style reasoning) The power to know something is a ...


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Regarding your question: what is the realtionship beteween the substantial form of a bodily being and its act of existing, ie. its esse? It seems that Aquinas says that form produces/gives esse ( "...beacuse form causes existance in act,..."), but how can form give esse if the form already needs to exist in order to give something? From my POV, ...


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Firstly, the general branch in philosophy you're seeking is Ontology. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that explores the reality of things in the world. Now the specific type of ontology you describe here seems like some sort of a hierarchical critical/objective-idealism. For example, consider a Kantian framework where the things that exist depend on ...


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