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'I am curious about lines of thinking which look at epistemology through ontological lenses specifically.' Proposition 5 from Spinoza's "Ethics" Part 2, (below) needs a bit of transliterating, but does predate by over 300 years your assumption that your 'list' includes every ponderable concerning the origin and nature of epistemology in ontology. Spinoza's ...


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I answer with the authority of being a native German speaker and having graduated in philosophy ;) Back-world is a bad translation here. Presumably, the translator has mistaken the term "Hinterweltler" as being a misspelling and semantically identical to the word "Hinterwäldler", which means backwoodsmen or hillbillies. The German original "Hinterwelt" ...


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1.Is this argument misconceived or is this inference correct, or are there other contributing lines of inquiry to the ontological foundations of epistemology? For instance, is the philosophy of language really distinct from the philosophy of psychology to an extent that it should be on a list? If ontology means the existence rather than the knowing it'...


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Welcome, James 1. Parfit and the non-reductionist view of personal identity Parfit rejects the idea that personal identity - continuity and survival over time - involves the continued existence of any irreducible persistent entity such as the Cartesian Ego. On the contrary, personal identity is reducible to continuities - similarities between Derek Parfit ...


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Descartes implies all this, broadly speaking, with his "unlimited doubt." The question of what illusion means is crucial here. Illusion implies something false or less real. A face in a shadowy reflection rather than in direct light is less real if reality is the directly observed thing. The discussion in Plato's Theaetetus is the classical statement of the ...


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Welcome, Joedean7. You ask a a question about other philosophers in the heading, then switch to your own argument. I have made a choice and addressed the latter. I offer a counter-argument. If physical phenomena are illusory than presumably the relevant illusions occur to a non-physical phenomenon, whatever that might be. Something has to have - to ...


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Because, to my absolute surprise, no one has asked this question before, I would like to elaborate a bit and summarize the most well-known versions* of idealism, as well as popular protagonists of different views, for reference to other questions that may come. *David Chalmers, in one of his famous articles "Idealism and the mind-body problem", divides the ...


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Surely, Ideas=Thoughts, Ideas are part of Consciousness. In the world we live in, and in our normal state, Consciousness is composed of: 1-perceptions 2-thoughts 3- feelings. Hence, Ideas are part of Consciousness. Look: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness We can generate Consciousness, i.e: we can generate thoughs, feelings, or may thoughts, ...


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To be clear, sometimes people see 'experience' as a synonym for 'history', which is likely a result of 'experience' being used metaphorically for 'history'. For example, "what did that boat experience at sea? She looks sad!" This is a form of anthropomorphism, and as such is not literal, but poetic. If you believe in spacetime, all things have a history. But ...


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The Ontological Argument St Anselm formulated the Ontological Argument. It is an argument for the existence of God. It is a striking instance of an idea that compels being. I'll let you read it for yourself. I'll just say that for the thousand years following, philosophers rebutted it. That so many have tried suggests it is controversial That so many ...


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I think this question is conflating a few different levels of analysis. 'Being' in the sense of sein or dasein, which is usually taken to mean the peculiar nature of life (or human life in the latter case): i.e., very roughly equivalent to conscious experience. 'Being' in the ontological sense of material existence: i.e., it has physical form, therefore it ...


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Welcome to SE Philosophy! From (SEP: Existence): We can trace the issue of whether existence is a property to a disagreement between the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle and some of his medieval followers over the relationship between an individual's essence and its existence. The question you pose goes back to at least Aristotle, and is metaphysical ...


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Philosophical galvanism (as opposed to the empirical study of electricity in animal tissues) was a peculiar form of vitalism. While vitalism in general was quite popular and influential in the late 18th-19th century, this particular variation was not. Galvani himself soon abandoned references to élan vital, and after Volta's pile vitalists mostly did not ...


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It is quite possible that connections between Hegel's Absolute Idealism and (some sense of) realism can be drawn out. But there is a fundamental divide between the two in the or a standard sense of 'realism'. It develops as follows. Realism in most forms assumes the existence of a mind-independent world of which we can have knowledge. So for realism, mind ...


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'Idealism' is a porous term and I don't think any hard and fast correct answer is possible to your question. Highly provisionally I offer the following response. Objective idealism Take 'idealism' to be the view that ultimate reality is non-physical. It is generally assumed, though I have reservations, that this implies that it is mental. Subjective ...


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According to WP, Hegel is a proponent of absolute idealism. To wit: It is Hegel's account of how being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an identity of ...


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I'll mention a criticism which derives from Leibniz. There is not total disagreement between Spinoza and Leibniz on necessitarianism but their views irreducibly diverge as we cut deeper. In my view Leibniz's critique amounts to a major and sound criticism. Spinoza One of the supporting pillars of Spinozas system is the idea that the world does not ...


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The question is to decide if the following two descriptions refer to objects or not: The second usage of things, as in, each thing has usually a defined usage, but sometimes people use things in a second way which is not exactly the intended purpose of the creation of that thing, e.g. bending a piece of paper and using it as a funnel. The contents of ...


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Whatever we call a Universe as Universe or as God manifesting as Universe, and whatever we propose a universe of matter composed of Atoms or One Metaphysical Conscious Entity called GOD, whatever, all of these still Things. There's no (Thing) Infinite. Any Thing to be a Thing must be Finite. So, there can't be Infinite Multiverse. But, may there be ...


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In George Orwell's novel 1984, Winston Smith discovers proof in an old newspaper clipping that the reality he lives in is fabricated. In the end he accepts that 2 + 2 = 5. However, Winston did expect the annihilation of the Party (and the hyperreality): Although he destroys this piece of evidence, Winston is excited by his discovery: he believes a ...


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Yes, of course, every comprehensive philosophy is a set of such answers, but agreement is not a valid criterion to choose among them. Consensus is relevant in science because of the scientific methods, where repeatability of an experiment produces a scientific consensus. Philosophy does not have the same luxury of a well structured epistemic framework (and ...


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Here are the questions: So what's the difference between a second-order relation and a relation between objects? Is it related to second-order logic and could you explain so that a layman can understand? A first-order logic has a domain, such as the natural numbers. Relations of first-order logic relate one or more objects of this domain. If there is ...


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Positivism will get you really far, and we have not tapped some of its most powerful insights. Modernism is full of people who consider all of metaphysics either decided or irrelevant. My favorite one of these alive right now is Daniel Dennett. He thinks that we need to take science and apply it to our philosophy, deconstructing problems we don't realize ...


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Metaphysics does its job perfectly well but you have to realise there are different approaches to it, by one of which it is useless. Are there philosophers who have defended metaphysics and in what fashion have they attempted to this? There are many. I would be one. Briefly, the situation is this. Metaphysics proves that all positive metaphysical ...


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Whenever we talk about metaphysics, we have to be careful of scope. There's an unfortunate tendency to define metaphysics in indiscriminate and subjective terms — treating metaphysics as a dumping ground for any question one doesn't happen to like — that obscures a lot of good reasoning. For example, consider Durkheim's concept of 'social facts'. Émile ...


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There are well-endorsed answers for all these questions but you will not find them in the academic philosophy of our universities, as is indicated by the answers and comments here. The question of whether there are any widely agreed answers is easily answerable by pointing to the widespread agreement on their answers in the Perennial tradition. Regrettably, ...


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This will be more of a "meta" answer towards the class of questions, of which this is one, that try to find what "progress" philosophy has made, most often in comparison to science. The challenge is generally put in the form: "Ever since the ancient Greeks, topics such as "what is moral", "what kinds of things exist", "can we have knowledge" ete have been ...


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Now, can anyone tell which, if any, of these question has found an answer (meaning an answer agreed by [almost] everyone) and who was the author? "Almost everyone" is a very ambiguous term. It's tough to see explicit agreement on metaphysical principles because many people never consider them, but go about their business thinking without thinking about ...


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The Wikipedia article on ontology that the OP cites notes that answers have been provided but they may not have been accepted by others: Various philosophers have provided different answers to these questions. This should be enough to answer the main question: Now, can anyone tell which, if any, of these question has found an answer (meaning an answer ...


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Edward Feser, speaking in the context of the philosophy of mind regarding arguments between dualism and materialism, claims that the "positivist" view that the OP presents is common and is indeed a misunderstanding of philosophical argumentation. (page 234) A related misunderstanding - and this time, one that even many philosophers are prone to - is to ...


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Whether or not a subset is considered an element of the superset is a metaphysical presupposition in your set theory. In naive set theory, the relationship between sets as elements is not clear, because often the context treats elements and sets as objects and containers through conceptual metaphor. As such, certain implications arise from having containers ...


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We have the concept "car" : an abstract (an universal), and we have individual cars : the objects (the particulars). Individual cars fall under the general car concept. If we assume the existence of the set of all cars (an abstract : the extension of the concept), an individual car is an element of the set of all cars. The concept car is subsumed into ...


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IMO one should not play off one against the other, i.e. geometry against arithmetic or vice versa. At the time of Poincaré both disciplines were separated. At the base of Grothendieck‘s revolutionary view onto Algebraic Geometry lies the concept of the spectrum: Introducing the spectrum Spec R of a commutative ring R means to consider the algebraic object ...


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In the world of mathematics, there are postulates and theorems which with time have been settled i.e., rigorously proven to be true or discarded as false. Those known mathematical facts then furnish the basis for further mathematical reasoning; in this sense, mathematics has been incrementally built up over time via the accumulation of such knowledge. In ...


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Philosophy and science should not be confused. In philosophy something may be proven or demonstrated. As Edward Feser puts it (page 235), philosophical arguments are more like (though of course not exactly like) the proofs of geometry than they are like the probabilistic hypotheses put forward in empirical science. One could, of course, try to show that ...


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In all modern references the terms are synonymous except in music. Discordant harmony in music refers to a harmony created by discordant notes - notes which do not fall in the same chord. This is also called dissonance. Frank L. Huntley discusses Dr. Johnson's lexical ambiguity in the The Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 2, in an ...


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You're a little confused about what is meant by natural motion here. It means motion without the presence of any forces, including gravity. It's easy enough to see that there are three possible natural motions of an object in a straight line, because which direction should it choose to move in? In a wave, because it moves in all directions at once ...


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There is no single and clear definition of God. But typically we can say that every concept of God agrees that God is a power with intelligence and decision making ability to influence any event in the universe. I would suggest that we can further divide above definition in clear separate points: 1. Power 2. Intelligence 3. Influence any event that will ...


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Bradley did not advocate an infinite regress but gave us a way to avoid one. He denied the fundamental reality of the distinctions that lead us into this problem. As sequitor indicates above, there is no other known solution. I have yet to see a successful argument to justify the use in philosophy of a paraconsistent logic and feel Priest is muddled on ...


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The short answer is: no, there's no generally accepted solution of this 'problem' (if it is one). Some simply reject Bradley's argument(s) since they reject some of its (their) assumptions, for instance, that particulars are bundels of qualities or that qualities are tropes (e.g. Russell). Those that accept Bradley's assumptions have responded in various ...


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