18

Thoughts consist of nerve impulses, and they most certainly can and do interact with matter- at least in the sense that nerve impulses can cause muscles to contract in the human body. But the context in which sensational claims are made for this (telekinesis, remote viewing, etc.) is something very different. Claims that the mind can directly move or ...


14

It is common nowadays to distinguish substance from property dualism. No major philosopher has advocated substance dualism since Descartes himself, but a large number of philosophers have advocated property dualism. This is a view which classifies the properties of objects as being of two kinds, physical and mental, while maintaining monism or quietism ...


13

It seems to me that this question is based upon two false assumptions. 1.) Feminism today seeks not to erase the differences between men and women, but to change the perception of everything feminine as being inherently lesser than everything masculine. It is from this aim to normalize and appreciate "femininity" that the lines between strictly gendered ...


10

My friend, you stopped where things get really interesting. The result of the process you described is a human consciousness whose substratum is a computer program instead of a bodily organ. Much more importantly, you did the transformation in a way that preserved what I call the continuity of consciousness. Let's assume that this computer program is ...


10

The human colour vision is bound to the cones. We have three types of cones with maximum of absorption in the wavelength domain respectively violet green yellow. The subjective impression of colour results from the neuronal processing by these types of cones by additive mixture of colours. The theory of Young, Helmholz and Maxwell from the 19th century ...


9

Your question enters the field of psychology of religion. We know that patients with psychosis hear voices and feel the presence of other persons who pursue them. In addition they speak to these imaginary people. This observation shows that certain people feel the presence of other persons even when there are no other persons around. These observations ...


8

I can think of a few alternatives: One could argue for a case where a human mind grade AI is theoretically producible, but the universe lacks sufficient resources to do so. This would be a practicality argument, not a theoretical possibility argument. Idealism can claim strong-AI is impossible, without being dualistic. Not all finite sized physical ...


8

Believe it or not, but the biggest challenge to dualism does not come from neuroscience or physiology, and in fact is shared with materialism, it is the threat of epiphenomenlism. Whether mental is ideal or material it is clearly something successfully used in empirical reasoning. Neuroscience and physiology at this point are in the early preliminary stages ...


8

The position of functionalists on AI is similar to the position of compatibilists on free will in two important respects. First, they distance themselves from the Cartesian idea that there is some extra special "substance" or "essence" there, and dissociate what is so bundled into effects that can be modeled piecemeal causally and/or computationally. Second, ...


7

There is an enormous philosophical literature on the question of identity, and the canonical thought experiment is the Ship of Theseus. Suffice it to say that you'll find a wide range of opinions on this matter over the past couple millenia of philosophical thought, but you'll find very few people willing to argue that you are exactly the same as you were a ...


7

The area of philosophy you are referring to does not typically use the term "paranormal". It falls under the category of metaphysics, the general field being Philosophy of Mind and the specific issue is known as the mind–body problem. The issue at hand is: what is the composition of the universe (and thereby, ourselves)? At first glance one might claim, "...


7

Arthur Eddington's "The Nature of the Physical World" as reprinted and edited in "Quantum Physics and Ultimate Reality; Mystical Writings of Great Physicists" editor Michael Green and "What is Life?: with 'Mind and Matter'" by Erwin Schroedinger


7

Idealism does not necessarily assert mind as a fundamental entity, but it does assert the metaphysical priority of the ideal over the material. The view of reality as derivative from the mind is associated with a particular strain, so-called subjective idealism, the extreme form of which is solipsism, asserting that only a single mind exists, the subject's ...


7

1st premise : No body can have a force contrary to inertia. Based on [Engl.transl.,page 2] analysis of "current" (still quite incomplete) understanding of matter and bodies and of knowledge of only a few of their properties. The first property that comes to mind is extension; all philosophers recognize it as a property of body, and Cartesians consider it ...


7

"19th century philosophers are not necessary to understand contemporary debates" is largely true because modern debates regurgitate ideas and arguments explored at length since Kant. Here is an example of Searle arguably replaying an argument already discussed by Kant, see What are the problems with the argument for the mind-body dualism from immateriality ...


6

The question is based on a flawed premise, namely that thinking is an immaterial activity. In fact, thinking is a product of electrochemical activity in the brain that requires energy. In fact brain activity consumes 20% of the calories burned by the body. http://www.pnas.org/content/99/16/10237.full This SciAm article quotes the same figure: It is ...


6

The "gradient of evolution" does not exist, biological evolution neither has to be monotone in "complexity", nor does it have to be continuous. "The idea... is based at least partly on the presumption that evolution" requires some sort of purposeful direction towards "increasing complexity". Modern evolutionary theory, beginning with Darwin at least, poses ...


6

Four assumptions: You assume such a mapping is possible to construct using empirical evidence. (it's not known if the human brain is quiescent enough to permit mapping) You assume the resulting map will be tractable, allowing for predictions to be made using it (we've mapped the genome... it's still taking decades to figure out that spaghetti code, Modeling ...


6

First, the constructive part. Crick, who is as physicalist on neuroscience as one can wish for, in Astonishing Hypothesis discusses "the processing postulate": "It suggests that we may be using the words conscious and unconscious for two many somewhat different activities. They may have to be replaced by some phrase like "processing unit", or, in some ...


6

Bertrand Russell discusses this question in Mysticism and Logic and A Free Man's Worship. Russell, being a hardened materialist himself, ultimately dismisses mystical feelings as illusions, but doesn't simply dismiss them offhand the way many atheists do, and he does consider them to be important aspects of our psyche and culture. Wittgenstein was a ...


5

Identical twins are clones of each other that started off in an identical state (as they both result from the division of a fertilized egg). Identical twins do not consider themselves as being a single "I", but instead have two distinct identities. The reason for this is that their sense of self is to a large extent the result of observing a correlation ...


5

I don't think the thought experiment proves what you think it proves. We'll work primarily from this section: The exact same "I" in the original body, if it is caused by the body, would show up in both clones. However, I can only ever be conscious of being in one of the two. There are several problematic phrases: The exact same "I" caused by the body ...


5

I can smell peach-flavored oolong tea and tell you what it is; a machine cannot (not yet, anyway). This has nothing to do with mind-body duality. We simply haven't built chemosensors as diverse and sensitive as those in our noses. Auras are, logically, just like the smell of peach-flavored oolong tea (except for not having good evidence that they actually ...


5

Your neurons are constantly turning over their component molecules, changing synapses in response to input patterns, and so on. You are, at a neuronal level, not exactly yourself after a matter of minutes, much less decades. Given that you postulate an exact algorithmic copy implemented in a different way, and therefore that computer-you is more like real-...


5

To complete Cort Amon's answer, I would say that there is a difference between reproducing physical phenomena and computing them. Even if all physical systems can be reproduced using some physical material (say you reproduce the structure of a living cell from similar molecular components), that doesn't mean you can compute them. You only make physical ...


5

In these accounts, the mind body problem arises because the mind seems to be so fundamentally different from any physical substance, yet it is obviously correlated with the body. This is the main problem. The question is how certain physical properties - say, certain brain cells firing in a particular order - can give rise to certain phenomenal properties, ...


5

Options (A) and (B) exhaust the possibilities for question 1: Either every living thing has a dual nature (A), or only a proper subset of living things have a dual nature (B). you could even generalize "living things" to "things" and you'd still have the same pair of possibilities. For question 3 panpsychism seems compatible, the various creatures in ...


5

A monad is a mathematical construct. Generally speaking, it is not typical to assume humans are mathematical constructs. However, it may be valid to argue that you are "well modeled as a monad." This would be to say that a great deal of explanatory value can come from modeling yourself as a monad. Later, if you decide you are "perfectly modeled as a ...


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