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Lewis provides a lot of his overall philosophical picture in On the Plurality of Worlds, but it assumes a lot of knowledge of existing debates. I suggest looking at Daniel Nolan's "Lewis" for an overview, since Lewis was a systematic thinker. Nolan examines - among other things - the extent of Lewis's naturalism.


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Short Answer It depends on the nature of 'could'. How do we know anything could be? This is a central preoccupation in the epistemology of modality. Modality is the study of necessity and contingency in the truth of propositions, and is related to metaphysical presuppositions related to possible world semantics. Long Answer Ever since the linguistic turn, it ...


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The terms only comes up in a handful of SEP articles, but it looks like your strongest bet is to use those in SEP: The Epistemology of Modality. It is definitely jargon for a subset of philosophers interested in modal aspects of epistemology. Some of the names thrown around are van Inwagen, Yablo, and Chalmers, all of whom are of some contemporary ...


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To some extent, producing any proof depends on what rules you are allowed to use. Here is a sketch of a proof that you may be able to use as a basis. 1. ◇(A → □B) Assumption 2. □A Assumption 3. ◇(¬A V □B) 1, Impl. 4. ◇¬A V ◇□B 3, ◇-disjunction 5. ¬◇¬A 2,...


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We probably have to accept that it is possible that a maximally great being (MGB) exists, since we know of no fact that would make this impossible. It sounds even rather plausible. That is, the opposite possibility seems implausible even if itself possible. A MGB would have to be unique, if we don't equivocate on "maximally" and "great", ...


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This illustrates the limits of stipulative definition. On the one hand, possible worlds should have all possible entities in at least one of them. So if it is possible for a being to exist in all worlds, then it seems as if there must be a possible world that overlaps all other possible worlds. But this just shows that according to the "language game&...


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