8

I understand your argument as follows: A maximally great being possibly exists. If a maximally great being possibly exists then it necessarily exists. If a maximally great being necessarily exists then it actually exists Therefore, a maximally great being actually exists. Here is a reconstruction using modal logic: ◊∃xGx ◊∃xGx → □∃xGx ...


7

Preliminaries Priest's presentation of variable domain modal logic in An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic does utilize a free logic base. Check out ch. 15 if you can get your hands on a copy. You ask if there is a flaw in your reasoning: Then I suppose you can use Existential Instantiation at that world such that there is some constant a such that □...


6

I think why you're not seeing the problem is in what you're eliding with "superior Being". The (traditional) "problem of evil" only arises if we describe a being that is omniscient, omnipotent, and good. (See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/#RelConGod -- added due to Swami's comment) Without omnipotence, this being would not necessarily be capable of ...


6

The proof does not work, I think. Your problems are premises 1 and 2. My main problem is with premise 1: it is possible for a maximally great being to exist. Why should we accept this? There is the tempting notion, mentioned in Eliran's (considerably better) answer, that anything we can imagine must be possible; but there is a great deal to be said about ...


6

This looks like a "lame terms" redux of Plantinga's "victorious" ontological argument from The Nature of Necessity. Here is Plantinga's explanation of why if a maximally great being exists in some possible world it exists in every possible world. He attributes the idea to Findlay (p. 214): "Those who worship God do not think of him as a being that happens ...


5

This might be helpful: The distinctive feature of the [ontological] arguments ‒ at least according to the traditional Kantian method of classification ‒ is that they proceed from premises which at least some defenders of the arguments allege can all be known a priori. Consequently, it would be most appropriate to call these arguments 'a priori arguments ...


5

Mathematical logic, and the associated notion of the existential quantifier, were invented only after Kant's time. Kant used other, more traditional concepts. The ontological proof (or at least the version that Kant criticized) is related to the idea that God exists by necessity, that existence is an essential property of God. When Kant asserted that "...


5

After a quick reading of the paper, this is what I have been able to make of it. As far as attempts to link mathematics and theology go, it at least presents some nuanced ideas (that no object accessible to us is perfect, for instance); but it does not seem to me that this paper either proves the existence of god, or even makes any sort of strong argument ...


5

By predicate, I think he means a "property" of the entity, for example, the predicate of being tall. This is the meaning that I'm aware of and which is the meaning we use in mathematical logic. Exactly; in mathematical logic "existence" is a quantifier acting on a predicate; we read: ∃xPx as: "there is an object having property P". The existence of ...


5

Hare is echoing Kant's "we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept". The point of Premise 2 is that if we can conceive of God existing, but he doesn't exist, then we can conceive of a thing just ...


5

The proof fails in the very first step. You try to justify this step in your initial explanation, but let's just put this explanation as part of the proof. Nobody has successfully disproven the possibility of a maximally great being. It's possible that a maximally great being exists. You are basically fallaciously playing with the word "...


4

Here is Plantinga's reconstruction of Anselm's ontological argument: "(1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (assumption for reductio) (2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (premise) (3) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (premise) ...


4

Predicates Predicates express properties. First order predicates express properties of objects. For example, tall expresses the property of being tall, which is property of objects. So tall is a first order predicate (e.g. "John is tall"). Second order predicates express properties of properties. For example, a positive quality expresses the property of ...


4

In a "round-about way" you are saying the same thing (using circular logic). Let me rephrase: 1. It is possible that God Exists, (an assumption) 4. Therefore, God exists. (an unfounded assertion). In other words, just because something is possible, does not necessarily make it so!


4

Any conclusion logically drawn from a premise you may not agree with will fall flat. I had studied this work and wrote it as more of a "logical trap" and played with the idea of it proving logic to be an imperfect system. That first claim you need to be open to is his definition of a God as a supreme being, not anything regarding existence in reality. ...


4

The classification of arguments for God's existence into ontological, cosmological and teleological is due to Kant, and Kant had to group together arguments rather coarsely to fit the broad variety of them suggested by his time. Within each group multiple versions are distinguished today, and it is also not surprising that some arguments do not neatly fit ...


4

You defined natural and supernatural in an absolute sense: can or cannot. You said life arising from nonliving matter has never been observed, which does not rule out that it cannot arise in such a way. Therefore, no, the observation does not imply life has supernatural origins by your own definition.


3

Historically, there hasn't been, it seems, any significant objections to the ontological argument on behalf of the trinity. The trinity-being is almost never mentioned, in accounts of the ontological argument. See for example the section on the ontological argument in the Catholic Encyclopedia where the trinity is not mentioned. The ontological argument has ...


3

Has my paraphrasing somehow distorted Anselm's argument? I'm afraid it might have. Your "assumption A" seems incoherent. Assumption A: By being part of "UniversePlus", "ModelGod_One" becomes the mental model of something greater (in itself!). Let's call that "ModelGod_Two". How can an element change it itself, just by being, or nor being, a part of some ...


3

It is interesting, though hard to declare logical. The primary issue is that you have not stated what system of logic you are using. Because it is the lowest-common-denominator, I will compare it to First Order Logic (FOL): "'no truth' is a truth" is not a well formed statement. For FOL, the statement needs to be in the form of a predicate. I believe ...


2

I think I had already seen this formulation before and worked a little bit on it. If I remember correctly: px=[∃y(y=x) ∧ Mx] Seems to me, avoding the converse Barcan should not be an issue ( I think Plantinga accepts it ), but, when worked by natural deduction, it would seem it allows the Buridan Formula ( which Plantinga rejects and for good reasons), as ...


2

The problem is that your formula ∃x□∃y(y=x) doesn't actually capture the idea of necessary existence. What you've said there is that there is something x such that necessarily there is something y such that *it_x* is identical with *it_y*. In order to say `There is something that exists necessarily' you are going to need to treat existence as a property and ...


2

Set theories need not postulate the a priori existence of any objects or structures. ZFC does, however, postulate the existence the empty set (it's zero) and a kind of successor function based on the empty set as a starting point. The resulting set could have infinitely many junk terms that need to selected out using the Separation (Subset) Axiom, leaving ...


2

Mystical spiritual minds and traditions would say that both good and evil are merely elements of the cosmic drama, and each has something to teach the evolving soul in its journey toward perfection. Western minds and traditions tend not to look so philosophically on life. What leads us to refer to something as "evil" ? Because it causes shock and pain ? ...


2

There are multiple truths. There's the truth that there is a head on my neck, that there is a shoe on my foot, and so on. If this strikes you as vacuous, then the natural question is this: How are you defining truth? Once you do that, then maybe you've got something. You'd still need to work out how more than one truth implies an infinity of them (...


2

Kant's title "the ontological argument" does reflect a specific use, among philosophers, of the term 'ontology'. Etymologically, ontology pertains to being, existence. As Kant (and many other philosophers) use this term, ontology does not pertain to questions of the form: what exists, but to questions of the form: what is existence, what are special ...


2

The main attacks on Gödel's ontological argument are not found necessarily in attacking the logical structure of his argument, more so it is done by rejecting the axioms he provides. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on ontological arguments: Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptability of the ...


2

The fact that X does not come into being by being defined to exist implies that there is a force or being external to logic preventing it from existing. No, this does not seem to be implied. Consider the following analogy. I try to open my flat door, not by using a key, but by chanting "Open Sesame". Surprisingly, the door does not open! Does this imply ...


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