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One important distinction of this kind arises in statistics (and is closely related to measure theory, as mentioned in Sandejo's answer). Consider a random variable $X$ that's uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$; i.e., $X$ is equally likely to take the value of any real number between $0$ and $1$. The probability of $X$ taking on any specific number in that ...


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Well, There is no compulsion of the way of perceiving things. Every organism do have a unique perception of this world, which by no means be "felt" by the other in the same way. Now, Try defining the words "Real" or "Truth" which you mention in your context. From my point, I see that the truth you mention are the perceivable ...


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"I don't have speed" does not mean the same thing as "I have speed, but it's equal to zero." The latter means that your position does not change in time (i.e. that you don't move), while the former means that your position is not given by a differentiable function of time. Speed is defined as the magnitude of the derivative of position ...


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Is there any philosophical difference between "I have no horns" and "I have horns, but they have zero volume"? There is an enormous philosophical difference between these two statements but it has zero volume! One difference is that "I have no horns" has existential import whereas "I have horns, but they have zero volume&...


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This question takes some untangling, and the untangling I'm inclined to do will strike some people the wrong way, mostly for the wrong reasons. There's too much politics in science these days. But at any rate... First: 'Scientism' is a particular thing-in-itself that is only tangentially related to any particular philosophy of science. Scientism is a type of ...


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In a nutshell: ontology is the concern of theologians, not of philosophers who are interested in its prior, knowledge. Most of what remains of ancient Greek has been transmitted by theologically minded authors. Thus the illusion is created that ontology is somehow a fundamental philosophical question. It was Kant who rejected the theologian's view and ...


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I would not use the word 'dimension'. The problem with this word in this context is that it is used in a very precise mathematical way by physicists, and in this mathematical sense it would certainly not be the claim of sophisticated contemporary panpsychists that mind exists in a different dimension. The clearest contemporary panpsychist statement that I am ...


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I would like to offer a more radical proposal as possible answer. Argument can also be phrased as: I know I exist (cogito), therefore I must necessarily exist (sum). Think (cogito) in the argument is usually taken to be very human-centric, so in very narrow interpretations nor even other mammals can be aware of their existence. However in a broad sense of ...


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If one accepts imagination as a sufficient condition for something to exist, some counter-examples are needed to disprove it and if these examples can be formulated in such a way that they violate the laws of the universe, then we can say that imagination may involve physically impossible situation because of a contradiction. A Counter-example may be: (1) I ...


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Kant must define noumena as a thing that is thought but not sensed. He cannot give a positive definition of noumena without contradicting the position that we cannot know anything about noumena through speculative reason. Noumena is therefore an epistemological designation, not an ontological designation like thing-in-itself. Mathematical objects are things ...


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NB, I'm still looking for the relevant references, but basically all Nietzsche refers to in OP's quote is addressed in Spinoza's Ethics. Nietzsche sums it up pretty well: "he denies the freedom of the will" For Spinoza everything is caused by previous events in a strict determinism (Ethics book I), up to what he called "God or Nature", ...


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Personally, I wouldn't trust Nietzsche on any philosophical predecessors. I doubt very much that Spinoza would have endorsed Nietzsche, he's a very different thinker. Remember, Spinoza endorsed God. For example, in part I of his Ethics, concerning God, he writes: By that which is itself self-caused, I mean that of which it's essence involves it's existence, ...


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Nietzsche addresses this specifically in Section 15 of The Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morals. He says: This fact once Came insidiously into the mind of Spinoza (to the vexation of his interpreters, Kuno Fischer make a real effort to misunderstand him on this point), when one afternoon, teased by who knows what recollection, he mused on the question of ...


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I would read Kant's ethical work. This is because Kant makes some actual positive claims about things in-themselves (noumenal realities) such as god, freedom, immorality of the soul. While he denies in the critique of pure reason any meaning to these things from arguments of speculation (without reference to the world of possible experience those things are ...


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Science is not hardwired against recognizing love as a measurable force. If there were any empirical data in existence suggesting that it was a measurable force, you can bet there'd be a whole army of physicists studying it and taking those measurements because there'd be a Nobel prize waiting for the first one to prove that assertion true. By the way, ...


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