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2 votes

Is Russell's Paradox a semantic paradox or a syntactic paradox?

I don't see the necessity of writing out a formal argument. This is a philosophy site and not a formal logic site. You might find Math.SE more jospitable to your style of thinking. As for your ...
Mozibur Ullah's user avatar
1 vote

Is Russell's Paradox a semantic paradox or a syntactic paradox?

Is Russell's Paradox a semantic paradox or a syntactic paradox? A sentence has no meaning in itself. It means whatever we decide that it does. Paradoxes are an interesting case in this context. ...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
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6 votes
Accepted

Is Russell's Paradox a semantic paradox or a syntactic paradox?

The original distiction between logical and epistemological contradictions was introduced by Ramsey (1926) (but it had already been hinted at by Peano in 1906): "While logical contradictions ...
Mauro ALLEGRANZA's user avatar
8 votes

Is Russell's Paradox a semantic paradox or a syntactic paradox?

It is a set-theoretic paradox. Syntactic paradox would imply it follows from certain syntactical rules. Assuming you treat the axioms of naïve set theory as syntactic, then Russell's paradox is a ...
zzz's user avatar
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2 votes

Is this a paradox or a mistake?

@n@ is an expression which Godel number is n. @n@ --> P is a different expression, so its Godel number is different. Therefore, there is no such n for which the equation n = #@n@ --> P# may hold....
user58697's user avatar
  • 121
0 votes

Is there a paradox in the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem?

Wittgenstein's criticism can be summed up as "it is not true that Goedel's proof is purely syntactic, in fact it cannot be". Wittgenstein was indeed very critical to the whole Aristotelian, ...
Julio Di Egidio - inactive's user avatar
2 votes
Accepted

Is this belief about other people's beliefs paradoxical?

If you have separate beliefs which happen to be false, then you are a satisfier of the meaning of "people who happen to have some false beliefs." So your one belief, here, is made true, by ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
0 votes

Is this belief about other people's beliefs paradoxical?

You say "I believe that there are some people who believe in falsities". If you really believe it then it's true (that you believe it). If you don't then you are lying. I don't see a paradox....
Ioannis Paizis's user avatar
3 votes

Is there a paradox in the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem?

In an appendix to Part I of Remarks on The Foundations Of Mathematics, Wittgenstein criticized the following argument: I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (...
benrg's user avatar
  • 1,241
31 votes

Is there a paradox in the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem?

Gödel was right. O'Connor 2005 meets every known objection: it is constructive and finite, indeed it runs on commodity hardware in reasonable time; it includes Rosser's trick, it is not relative to ...
Corbin's user avatar
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22 votes

Is there a paradox in the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem?

You do not understand the incompleteness theorem. It does not require "coding", and it does not depend on "actual infinity", and it does not "hide" any paradox. You ...
user21820's user avatar
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0 votes

Has there ever been a successful, philosophically defensible refutation of the Epicurean Paradox?

From the human pov, it's absurd to conclude that things that happen to us are evil. If ordained by a God(logos/providence/nature), it is for the better hence it is fair to say it is how we perceive it ...
Rosha.'s user avatar
  • 1
4 votes

Is Frege's axiom of unrestricted comprehension actually true after all?

There is a problem with representing the comprehension principle as a single axiom. It is more accurately read as an axiom scheme. So the specific formula that gives rise to the Russell set is an ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
7 votes

Is Frege's axiom of unrestricted comprehension actually true after all?

∀F∃y ∀x[x ∈ y iff F(x)] [OSC1] ∀F∃y [α ∈ y iff F(α)] [UI] ∃y [α ∈ y iff α ∉ α] [UI] α ∈ x1 iff α ∉ α [EI] Step 2 is not how universal instantiation works. It only lets you remove the outermost ∀, but ...
causative's user avatar
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0 votes

What formal logical systems "resolve" the Liar Paradox?

The best formal logical system that can represent, and be robust against the liar's paradox is the propositional calculus, with statements interpreted using temporal binary logic. Definitions A ...
lee pappas's user avatar
  • 1,110

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