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12

Such inferences are neither deductive (which assumes application of a valid inference rule) nor inductive (which assumes a generalization from a pattern of cases). This type of inference is called abductive, or "inference to the best explanation", see abductive reasoning. "Clearly" indicates that the explanation inferred is the best ...


10

Descartes was the modern founder of what is called foundationalism about knowledge, the idea that we must find a secure self-evident ground from which all the rest of our knowledge can be justified. Many classical philosophers (e.g. Plato, Kant, Frege, Husserl) shared this belief, and some continue to share it. The alternative, they believe, is universal ...


8

If the question is raised in an intro to philosophy course (like critical thinking or scientific reasoning), the answer should be that the above inference is an example of inductive logic. There are two kinds of inductive reasoning. One is generalization, as Conifold suggests. But there is also an inductive inference of John Stuart Mill whose purpose is to ...


6

The unit of knowledge-that is proposition, expressed linguistically in declarative sentences, the unit of knowledge-how is skill. The use of "knowledge" here refers to non-propositional uses like "know how to ride a bike", which are often passed over in the traditional position, which Ryle called intellectualism when he introduced the distinction between ...


6

I think you need to distinguish between "concepts" in general and the specific type of concept you raise here, models. Models are useful simplification of mechanisms. They are not "false," they just simply don't tell the whole story. Good models tell enough of the story, where what we mean by enough depends on the specific practical problem at hand. There's ...


5

Peirce' Theory of Signs is complex and - unfortunately - there are no complete treatises dedicated to semiotics by Peirce himself : Across the course of his intellectual life, Peirce continually returned to and developed his ideas about signs and semiotic and there are three broadly delineable accounts: a concise Early Account from the 1860s; a complete and ...


5

This is an important question and you make a number of points worth thinking about more deeply. I offer the following not as an answer, but as a formal prelude to more worthy answers. We start with relations:                          &...


4

Not exactly. Peirce himself considered it a distillation of "common sense", but he offered it as an alternative to the then dominant Cartesian foundationalism. Many disputed the pragmatic maxim, and its supporters concede that while it is "morally right" in the form given by Peirce it is difficult to interpret. The reason for disputing ...


4

For the first part : (P ∨ ¬ P) ⊢ [((P→Q)→P)→P] we can prove it using the following axiom system for (propositional) Intuitionistic logic and modus ponens. Proof 1) P --- assumed 2) ((P→Q)→P)→P --- from axiom A → (B → A), with P in place of A and ((P→Q)→P) as B, and 1), by modus ponens 3) P → [((P→Q)→P)→P] --- from 1) and 2) by Deduction Theorem (or →-...


4

Peirce (note spelling) is not arguing for anything there. Rather, others are presenting an interpretation of Peirce's project. They are suggesting that while Peirce discusses "truth," he does not do what many other philosophers do who discuss truth. They try to define it, for instance as "correspondence to the way things are." This paragraph suggests that ...


4

Interpretation of Peirce's realism which grew out of combining Kantian epistemology with scholastic ontology of Duns Scotus (Peirce calls himself "a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe") is indeed difficult. What makes it even more difficult is that Peirce went through several major reworkings of his "architectonic" without ...


3

Peirce himself notes that this is hardly "axiomatical", i.e. self-evident. But it helps to convert implications into derivations. Then (P→Q)→P becomes P→Q ⊢ P, which is obviously invalid because it is circular, we can not derive P from something that assumes P as a premise. On the other hand, (P→Q)→P ⊢ P assumes that P does come out of P→Q, which we know to ...


3

Here is one way to show this using modus tollens (MT), contradiction introduction (⊥I), explosion (X), conditional introduction (→I) and indirect proof (IP). For context, what you are trying to show is Peirce's Law. References Kevin Klement's JavaScript/PHP Fitch-style natural deduction proof editor and checker http://proofs.openlogicproject.org/ P. D. ...


2

James and Dewey were students of Peirce. Peirce opposed their pragmatism to such a degree that he thought it necessary to term his original pragmatism "pragmaticism," distinguishing it from their simple positivist pragmatism, which is compatible with nominalism, as superior to it in three ways: …first, its retention of a purified philosophy; secondly, its ...


2

Peirce invented the so-called "existential graphs". A good description of this is found in §4.7 "The geometry of thought: Existential graphs" (pp. 69-72) of Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. More in-depth studies are: Don D. Roberts, The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce (The Hague: Mouton, 1973) J. Jay Zeman, “The Graphical ...


2

Is what self-evident about this pragmatic maxim? For example, is it self-evident that it has a flaw? For instance, consider the difference between these two presentations: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our ...


2

Should we keep on questioning until nothing is left to question or is there a point on which we need to stand (which we often tend to do). Descartes used 'I think' as this fixed point, there may be others. But what is a rational way to find one, if any? How is this question addressed in modern philosophy? Your first sentence ought to end with a question ...


1

As far as I can make out, Peirce is saying that necessary and sufficient condition is doubly tautological. Firstly because condition implies that it's required and doesn't just follow on i.e. isn't just concomitant. Secondly because, if something is sufficient then that implies necessity. In both cases I think he's mistaken. Just because something is ...


1

Peirce seems to be saying is that the phrase "indecomposable element" seems redundant because an element by definition is something that is "indecomposible" (at least in some respect).* Similarly with "Necessary and sufficient condition": It seems redundant because it seems sufficient implies necessary. (Peirce himself uses the phrase "necessary and ...


1

Yes, we should question everything. Just not all at once. That, according to a central strand in modern philosophy, for which Descartes himself has been a guiding example. Descartes's so called fixed point was a point that he reached through the questioning process. It's not as if he decided on a fixed point before he started questioning. On the contrary, he ...


1

It's not the Charles Key Ogden & Ivor Armstrong Richards diagram, that uses the terms Symbol, Thought or Reference and Referent and there is no indication of Semiosis. I think I may have located the source. It seems to be the article from which the original image link I posted came - at least the post on this weblog (http://bpdp.blogspot.co.uk/2012/...


1

I work in the field of fine art shipping, and clients often ask me how much it will cost to ship a certain artwork and then give me two dimensions. I try to suggest as gently as possible that, logically, shipping an artwork with two dimensions cannot be done, in the hopes of getting them to tell me the depth. Does the three dimensionality of space count as a ...


1

Given that Peirce’s naturalism is more anthropocentric than Hegel’s, he sought to revise the Kantian powers of feeling, knowing, and willing whereas Hegel just circumvented them. These translate for Peirce into the spheres of value and experience that are aesthetic, scientific, and moral. These are the cultural instantiations of consciousness as Peirce ...


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