12

"Distrust your senses" is a very long tradition. Recall Plato's "cave" analogy from the early dawn of philosophy, ~400 BC. Plato postulated that there is a reality outside of what humans experience. He compared the human "experience through the senses" to the experience of a caveman looking at a shadow play on the cave wall: The caveman can only see the ...


11

Husserl is perhaps the last truly classical figure in epistemology, he still believed in objective content of knowledge, the same for "angels and centaurs" as for humans, and the possibility of "apodictic certainty" at the end of eidetic and phenomenological investigations. He believed that by suspending ("bracketing out") stereotypes and presuppositions, ...


8

Touch is just another form of sensory input subject to imperfect reading of the world like any other sense. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactile_illusion The whole phantom limb phenomenon involves massive deception, not sure whether this fits in your categorization of "tact". (Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind - fascinating and ...


7

Various branches of cognitive science (psychophysics especially, but not only) have demonstrated that we can be profoundly misled in our subjective interpretation of an experience. One of the most profound: when you look around, it seems as though you're seeing things the whole time. You're not. The visual stream is effectively blanked during a saccade ...


7

The basic response to this question (whether you listen to ancient philosophy, early/late modern philosophy, or pretty much anybody who's thought much about it) is that "you could always be missing something". Carneades: It's basically impossible to KNOW anything with certainty, because you can never know how much you don't know. But you have to live life, ...


7

Edmund Husserl is one of the founders of phenomenology. Husserl has even studied mathematics, but afterwards switched to philosophy. Husserl has published Philosophy as Rigorous Science besides many essays like Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy with phenomenology already in the title. It is up to you, to decide ...


7

I recommend Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. About third way into the book he starts to deal more and more with phenomenology — he approaches the topic through our use of language and mixes in mathematics as well. He is considered one of the greatest philosophers (of the 20th century if not ever) and yet contemporary philosophers of mind seem ...


7

Phenomenology has a narrow meaning in contemporary philosophy as a style of philosophical inquiry originated by Husserl, and I do think that it is particularly congenial to a mathematician. Husserl worked as Weierstrass's assistant in his youth, and later personally knew and corresponded with Cantor, Hilbert, Courant, Minkowski, and other major ...


7

There is a kind of epistemological ‘duality’ to our thinking about consciousness. In 'The Puzzle of Conscious Experience', the philosopher David Chalmers describes the 'Easy Problem of Consciousness' as the question of how a cognitive agent is able to perceive things and be aware of things. This would also include awareness of self: self-awareness. This '...


6

"Being and Time is a long and complex book." We may say that Heidegger's aim in his work is to discover what is common (more fundamental) to various different questions (inquiries) about the existence of objects/entities: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does God exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? All ...


5

I think Shane aptly describes the concept on a basic level, so I'm just going to supplement that by trying to address how the concept is supposed to benefit us and the value it is supposed to add. Even though Gadamer is the big name for hermeneutics, "horizons" is a concept that we can trace back to at least Heidegger but perhaps further to Hegel and Kant. ...


5

Well, as with almost everything in philosophy, it depends on the definition you use, in this case of "science". Meditation is open to falsification. If you do it and experience something that leads you to a hypothesis, I may do it and experience something that falsify your hypothesis. Notice that the fact that a phenomenological method is ontologically ...


5

They don't; that is not all do; for example the natural philosophers; most, of whom are now called scientists, and in antiquity physilogoi took their sense on trust; if you are going to physics as Galileo or even as Einstein did - you'd better be able to trust your measurements. It was Descarte that popularised the view that one shouldn't trust one sense; ...


5

Absolutely not. Heidegger's "essence of Dasein" is really a misnomer to make a point, by stating that Dasein's essence is existence he upends the traditional use of "essence" as form, idea, the opposite of existence. Heidegger questioned that essences can be the kinds of universal invariants that Husserl wanted them to be, and therefore that his "eidetic ...


5

There is something to it, but things are more complicated. Sellars was not arguing against Husserl specifically, it is unlikely that he was even familiar with his phenomenology. He does draw on the continental tradition, unusually for an analytic philosopher, but mostly on Kant and Hegel. And his primary target were sense data theorists like his father, ...


4

Temperature may be a good example. If you give someone a metal bar and a book, which both have the same temperature, say 15°C, people will say the metal bar feels colder than the book. It's different from an optical illusion in the sense that there is a real, physical explanation, namely that (a) the temperature we feel is the temperature of our hand, not of ...


4

I think the methodology of consciousness studying is the same of cognitive science methodology. The difficulty in considering for example the theories of meditation in Hinduism or Buddhism as scientific theories of consciousness is the same difficulty that is in the origin of the scientific methodology of the double-blind trial: How to eliminate subjective, ...


4

The opening section of Being and Time tells us that being is not a concept, which means it will not admit of the same sort of definition that a concept like triangle might. Nonetheless, being is that on the basis of which beings are understood as such, that is, always and everywhere when we deal with beings in any way we necessarily approach them on the ...


4

Regarding the connection between Idealism and Phenomenology The Phenomenology of Mind (sic!) by Hegel is considered to be the climax of German Idealism (and probably idealism as a whole) and uses many phenomenological examples, e.g. in Chapter II "salt" as white, having a cubic shape and tartness (etc.).: This salt is a simple "here" and ...


4

Merleau-Ponty is a phenomenologist so his received view is "essence" in a Husserlian sense, as the ideal core of an intentional object, see What does Husserl mean by essences? However, he is also an existentialist, so Husserl's essentialism is revised along the lines of "existence precedes essence", see Bauer's Phenomenology of the Essence and Appearance in ...


4

According to Wikipedia this being "for whom Being is a question for Heidegger" would be ourselves: Dasein ... is a German word that means "being there" or "presence" (German: da "there"; sein "being"), and is often translated into English with the word "existence". It is a fundamental concept in the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger, particularly ...


4

"Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences." – Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §3. Heidegger is an ontologist. To define or translate "Being" as "you" or "an entity" is sloppy and incomplete. Heidegger is not talking about the person, the literal ...


3

I know that this question has since been answered, but I think that some parts of the terminology have not been addressed. Transcendental phenomenology is that which is possible as a consequence of transcendental phenomenological reduction. Now of course, the question changes to what is meant by this. Phenomenological, roughly speaking is a shifting of the ...


3

I'm not an hegelian scholar, and I'm perfectly conscious of the tentative nature of my considerations... It's know that Hegel had some "complaints" with newtonian's physics (like Goethe did) : see by Thomas Posch : Hegel's Criticism of Newton's Physics. Assuming that my "reading" of the above quotation as connected with some sense of "absolute" is ...


3

Scruton analyses Kant's writings as providing different accounts of the relationship between what Kant characterises as the empirical and the transcendental worlds. Scruton's points are clearly expressed and his analysis is accurate. His characterisation of Kant's views is thus both helpful and correct. Kant's own views are not consistent. That is because ...


3

There are broadly two issues. The first is that our senses are accurate in some respects and correlated with the world in those respects. But our senses also have flaws as illustrated by optical illusions. In addition there is a lot of stuff that we don't sense except in an indirect way, e.g. - neutrinos and some kinds of electromagnetic radiation. So sense ...


3

"Absolute" skepticism is no philosophy at all. If we want to produce an argument showing that (e.g.) : there is no truth there is no knowledge there is no science there is no philosophy ... in every case we have to "assemble" a rational discourse trying to prove/support/... the thesis. This argument needs : assumptions, rules of reasoning, etc. i.e. some ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible