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-1

Given that in your comments you reject "nesting issues" like those discussed in two of the above answers as being relevant to your question (although you didn't not mention this in your initial question), I suppose your whole point is what is sometimes observed in intro classes to logic, e.g. by Dona Warren: Conditionals are important to logic ...


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Given your other comments on this page, you identify the conditional with the consequence relation (at least in this context of deductive reasoning). This is fine in classical logic because it has a/the deduction theorem and is also structurally complete (meaning every admissible rule is also derivable in classical logic). So, sure in classical logic A, B |- ...


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This is only partial answer, but interestingly enough a sort-of-conjunction that would make "true and false" be "neutral" has been considered on 3-valued tables (and in fact [finite] multi-valued/fuzzy logics in general). It's however (obviously) not compatible with the Boolean one. From "A map of dependencies among three-valued ...


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One way to go besides Humberstone's approach might start from truth-maker semantics as developed by Kit Fine and other. Let's fix some language of standard propsitional logic and let's take models to be complete join semi-lattices induced by a partial order ≤. Then we can define a relation of exact verification and a relation of exact falsification analagous ...


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There's no propositional abstruse here at all and the author is trying to show by adding true or false propositional statement to compatible proposition about a same subject, it's relevant to add truth or falsity. But by doing same with incompatible proposition about a same subject, then it's just like some common kind of irrelevance fallacy (red herring). ...


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I think you are simply mistaking Yablo's nomenclature here. He is using the arrow symbol → to denote a counterfactual conditional, or perhaps some general conditional, not material implication. For example, note that in footnote 22, p. 176, he says "I assume that π → S is false iff π → ~S is true." This would not be true of material implication, ...


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Your question is not entirely clear to me. Yablo claims that the truth conditions of simple sentences s containing definite descriptions may change depending on whether or not the presuppositions triggered by the descriptions are satisfied or not. If they are not satisfied, then the sentence s is true iff the counterfactual p > s is true, where p is the ...


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A statement is an assertion that its content is true, and so the first statement is self-contradictory, although not quite explicitly so. The second statement is explicitly self-contradictory. To clarify the context, if one were to say ‘the sky is blue’ then that is an assertion that the sky is blue and nothing else. So yes, they do express the same ...


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From philosophical logic perspective, your question may be worth further studied in fuzzy logic which I'm not versed in and cannot say much. From philosophical ethics point of view, it depends on your intentions. Since you're already aware of only half of the dish is red, if you want to share this info for others to identify this dish, you should describe as ...


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Most language about the natural world is a bit vague. When we say things like "I'm sitting in a chair," what exactly, precisely, is the meaning of these words "sitting" and "chair"? Imagine one perches on the edge of the seat and ever so gradually slides off the chair and lowers oneself towards the floor. At what exact moment ...


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For me meaning can only be searched within the realm of philosophy (religion included), it's really a question about ethics. Even in other fields, when you're asking this kind of question, it cannot be answered there alone. In essence, meaning is nothing but the understanding of confused definition. There may be numerously possibly infinite number of ...


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Devitt summarizes and defends his claims here. He makes the following distinctions: Distinguish the theory of a [linguistic] competence from the theory of its outputs/products or inputs. Distinguish the structure rules governing the outputs of a [linguistic] competence from the processing rules governing the exercise of the competence. Distinguish the ...


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The most influential philosophical theory of definitions probably still is Russell's On Denoting. A few years ago there was a special issue of the journal Mind, dedicated to the centenary of that paper. I would check that out.


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