New answers tagged philosophy-of-mind
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As the other answers have indicated, aporia and beginner's mind are not equivalent concepts. However, I don't think it would be a grossly implausible stretch to make a connection, perhaps, between the pedagogical force of Plato's aporetic dialogues and the pedagogical force of the beginner's mind concept. For Socrates the worst epistemic state was thinking ...
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[I]s there some discipline in philosophy that tries to express the content of the each concept in some basic notions, is there discipline of the philosophy that tries to uncover such basic notions and types (be they the already known mathematical notions and types or something other)? What are the names of such disciplines of philosophy? What are common ...
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Welcome, Sam Wheel.
In philosophy aporia retains, at least standardly, its Aristotelian sense. This has no commonality with zen so far as I can see if by 'beginner's mind' we mean what Suzuki does:
So the most difficult thing is always to keep your beginner's mind... Even though
you read much Zen literature, you must read each sentence with a ...
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I have to oppose a couple points made by the OP.
Firstly, I believe Grothendieck was, as the OP said, using images or visions to create maths, but he was not a strong algebraist. That would be Weil. Grothendieck's strengths, from what I gather, is extreme abstraction to the point where one could think mathematics has nothing to do with numbers.
He ...
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The two things are unconnected. A dictionary will make this clear. Beginner's mind is an attitude and approach, a recognition of our own ignorance and an opening of our mind. It has nothing to do with aporia, defined as 'an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument, or theory.'
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'I am curious about lines of thinking which look at epistemology through ontological lenses specifically.'
Proposition 5 from Spinoza's "Ethics" Part 2, (below) needs a bit of transliterating, but does predate by over 300 years your assumption that your 'list' includes every ponderable concerning the origin and nature of epistemology in ontology.
Spinoza's ...
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My question is: If we know that our senses are all mediated through the mechanism of their operation, does that not refute Searle's direct realism?
Short answer? No, it does not.
First, perceptual intentionality is not advocating Cartesian duality, but trying to resolve it. What Searle is doing in this article is arguing against the skeptical Argument from ...
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1) "all we can ever be aware of is the conscious experience" is a False Dichotomy. We can be aware of the real objects but only in a mediated fashion, "through a glass darkly" as it were.
I don't see where what Searle says is incompatible with that. In the background here is Searle's theory of intentionality, which is what he is ultimately defending. In his ...
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It is quite possible that connections between Hegel's Absolute Idealism and (some sense of) realism can be drawn out. But there is a fundamental divide between the two in the or a standard sense of 'realism'. It develops as follows.
Realism in most forms assumes the existence of a mind-independent world of which we can have knowledge. So for realism, mind ...
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The question is Does a philosophical zombie have mental states?
One can answer that if one can clarify what it means to be a zombie and what mental states are. Although these terms may be fluid, let's use how Wikipedia defines them as a baseline. My emphasis is in bold.
Wikipedia describes a mental state as follows:
A mental state is a state of mind ...
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According to WP, Hegel is a proponent of absolute idealism. To wit:
It is Hegel's account of how being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an identity of ...
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Self-awareness is necessary for self-change; it constitutes the distinction between a 'subject' and an 'object'. Objects — things that lack self-awareness — are incapable of change except as acted on by some process or force. They are subject to inertia (in the expanded Newtonian sense) and do nothing except by the dictates of natural laws. *Subjects° — ...
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Is "space" directly accessible to the senses?
It is not because it is the absence of sensation. Much as one can sense small quantity through subitizing, one can also be keenly aware that nothing is present, so too can one see motion and length or feel force, but be keenly aware that none occurs or exists. Is it true to say that the property of lacking ...
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Your scepticism of Dennett is well-grounded. Claims similar to Dennetts were given by Skinner under the rubric of behavioral psychology where one supposed thinking things (res cogitans) were merely things, that is automatons, and one was not supposed to ask a man about his inner self, his telos or his intentions, or indeed how things were going with him, as ...
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When I run across problematic statements of this sort, I always prefer to follow Wittgenstein and look for the error in language that lies behind it. This is precisely the kind of 'philosophy' he thought needed therapy more than analysis.
The first step in that Wittgensteinian therapy is to step back and consider what purpose this claim has in Dennett's ...
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From Google:
il·lu·sion
noun
a thing that is or is likely to be wrongly perceived or interpreted by the senses
a deceptive appearance or impression
a false idea or belief.
Daniel Dennett in Consciousness Explained lays out his argument for how consciousness is illusory by starting with debunking Cartesian duality and concluding ...
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I think that to some degree, the focus on self-anything is overstated in our philosophical tradition. So I would avoid using self-awareness as a sort of definition of human-like thought.
Daniel Dennet (in Consciousness, Explained, and elsewhere before that) points out that since the brain is 'multithreaded', we are always concurrently many selves. We may ...
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Is space experienced or is it an imposed framework of experience?
Space is experienced. And our eye is the sense that creates its experience. You wouldn't be aware of even the space right in front of you if you close your eyes. Sometimes it will be your skin, nose or ears that makes you aware of the distance from a familiar object. When you realize the ...
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The mathematician and physicist Hermann Weyl would answer that space-time is not experienced as extended. The 'arithmetical' continuum of mathematics and mathematical physics would be a fiction and a paradoxical one, while the 'intuitive' or 'empirical' continuum of experience would be unextended. This view accords with our experience.
If we could ...
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There is a vast literature on the topic. You mention Sam Harris but he is not a trustworthy source for this topic and seems to misunderstand it. The crucial piece of information you would need in order to relate nondualism to academic philosophy and onwards to physics is that it endorses a neutral metaphysical position. Once you 'grok' this then you will see ...
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Swami Sarvapriyananda. That is the man you're looking for.
He talked about topics like Hard problem of consciousness and many atheistic questions.
He may not be secular in a Christian sense, but I haven't seen him outsource any question to some kind of miracle or to God (again in Christian sense. In Advaita, you're god. kind of.)
He is also very much ...
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