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Here are some quotes from Max Tegmark's "The Multiverse Hierarchy" hopefully answering the OP's question: What exactly does he mean by self-aware substructure? Tegmark assumes that "all aspects" of reality are isomorphic to a mathematical structure. Let us now digest the idea that physical world (specifically, the Level III multiverse) is a mathematical ...


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The answers to both "some kind of platonism" and "infinitely many universes instantiating mathematical structures" is no. Born is closer to Hegel than to Plato, and even further from Tegmark than from Plato. His views are described more systematically in the book Physics in My Generation (1966), the chapter Symbol and Reality: "In every field of ...


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Most physicists don't care about the interpretation of probability. Nor do they care about the controversy over the "interpretation" of quantum mechanics. The philosophy of probability is not in a good state. It is mostly divided between frequentists who think that probability is defined by long run frequency and Bayesians who think that probability has ...


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Jimit, let me say first you have my condolences. Here I will provide another way to look at unlikely tragedies. In my previous career I had to deal with finding the root causes of catastrophes in our factories. Fortunately, none of these involved loss of life, but they had huge consequences for our business. What I discovered was that these disasters were ...


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Frisch's Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics pt. 1, ch. 2, §3 "The Inconsistency Proof" appears to amount to a criticism of the field concept (pp. 32-3): The Maxwell–Lorentz equations allow us to treat two types of problems (see Jackson 1975, 1999). We can use the Maxwell equations to ...


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I will interpret the question as suggested by Philip: whether an argument to this effect has been discussed in philosophy. It was. A philosophizing mathematician/computer scientist/physicist David Wolpert formalized just such an argument in Physical limits of inference. Wolpert formalizes measurement, observation of a phenomenon, memory of past information ...


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Philosophical galvanism (as opposed to the empirical study of electricity in animal tissues) was a peculiar form of vitalism. While vitalism in general was quite popular and influential in the late 18th-19th century, this particular variation was not. Galvani himself soon abandoned references to élan vital, and after Volta's pile vitalists mostly did not ...


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The general approach to Quantum Mechanics is that one first takes a classical system and then quantise to obtain a quantum mechanical system. Quantisation is not an algorithm. It consists of applying principles of quantum theory to coming up with a theory whose equations bear some faint resemblance to the equations of a classical theory and that gives ...


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You're correct, a Boltzmann brain would be unlikely to perceive the true laws of physics (presumably their experiences would be as disordered as possible in a way that's consistent with being conscious, based on the assumption that there'd be vastly more possible arrangements of particles corresponding to a brain-like system experiencing a highly disordered ...


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What you're talking about is metaphysics. Has there been pre-quantum philosophy of physics which was able to deal with the implications of QM? Yes. It is not 'philosophy of physics' but simply philosophy. It may be called the Perennial philosophy or non-dualism. It endorses a neutral metaphysical theory. This easily deals with QM as is explained by ...


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We always have to keep in mind that science makes models of the universe. It does not 'prove' truths or facts or do anything of that nature. This is the case with mathematics as well, though it's harder to see because the things mathematics models are far more abstract; I'd even go so far as to say that modeling is the basic activity of reason. Science is ...


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If we go back to the roots of mathematics — operations on natural sets (e.g. counting) and basic geometry — we can see that mathematics is based in the measurement of physical experience. Of course, the focus of study for mathematics quickly shifted to the more formal question of how we can systematically compare, relate, and transform measurements: thus the ...


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Max Tegmark references Eugene Wigner's "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences" from a collection of Wigner's essays, Symmetries and Reflections in "The Multiverse Hierarchy" (page 12): In a famous essay, Wigner (1967) argued that “the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something bordering on the ...


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If Max Tegmark is using the words "self-aware substructure of the universe", then he is referring to agency and the beings who possess it, for example us. If the universe is perceived as a mathematical structure, than not all of the structure possess the capacity for perception, hence the delineation of a sub-structure which by definition means a smaller ...


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What's missing from the picture is entropy; the tendency toward greater entropy establishes an effective 'direction of time' that correlates with our perceived sense of time passing. We see eggs break rather than spontaneously forming from broken pieces. We can conceive of physical trajectories that would 'reform an egg' due to reversibility, but in ...


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Afaik the theories of physics have no need to decide ERH. It is a metaphysical hypothesis of no concern in physics. I'm unable to think of a scientific theory that depends on ERH being true or false. This may be why no examples are given in the paper. ERH is not testable in physics so a theory dependent on it would not normally be considered scientific. ...


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Why didn't you just ask "Do forces exist?" Asking if they "really exist" obscures the question. What kind of distinction is there between something "existing" and "really existing"? Existence is already a metaphysical concept and so is outside the realm of science. When "existence" is used in science it refers to patterns of experience. That is all we have ...


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I wouldn't say that physical phenomena universe is differentiable, rather differentiability is a property of functions which are abstract objects (unlike rocks, trees, concrete stuff we do physics on). Note that momentum, forces and the like are abstract objects that we use to get information about concrete things. When we do physics, we take a phenomenon, ...


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Classical physics as well as quantum mechanics (QM) and the theory of general relativity use as basic equation differential equations. A differential equation assumes that the law in question can be expressed by differentiable functions. This assumption has proven fruitful since the times of Newton. And QM shows: Even when the basic differential equations ...


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In short, propensities are, precisely, the quantum mechanical probabilities. In a classical, deterministic, world we set up approximations to the ideal of a repeatable experiment being understood that each experimental run differs from the others in small mechanical variations. In a classical context propensities are thus extracted from the deterministic ...


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And speaking of quantum mechanics, it's fairly widely known (without going into detail) that many quantum-mechanical measurements depend on the observation itself being carried out. The so-called double-slit experiment, for example, or Einstein's "spooky action at a distance" referring to the quantum-state entanglement of distant particles, both of which "...


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@ Mozibur Ullah- One simple way to approach this question may not resolve whether what has been observed as what appear to be 'laws' of nature are such, is to point up that no matter what the physical activity under observation, whether in a fishbowl, an ocean, a person's body, the moon, distant stars, black holes, or even the Big Bang, at each and every ...


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Drop a rock in a hole through a planet with gravity and no lava and it would go to the middle and act like a yo yo until it finally stops. It would stay in the middle. Now being its suspended, either way then would be up if it was lifted from either end. The hole would be bottomless being its open on both ends of the planet.


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We can't scientifically determine causality's dependence on time until we can measure the smallest amount of time (if it exists). However, some quantum physicists believe quantum entangled particles interact instantaneously over large distances. Implying causality independent of time. According to some interpretations of quantum mechanics, the effect of ...


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