9

I don't think this is in essence any different from various ontological arguments; I don't think it bears much relation to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. (Plantinga does have a version of an ontological argument.) Plantinga's ontological argument, and your argument, manifest a confusion about the difference between what one can ...


8

In general, what makes it properly basic is that it is justified. The word "properly," in this context, means "justified." A properly basic belief is a belief that has two properties: (1) it is justified and (2) it is not justified by inferences from more basic propositional beliefs (a "propositional belief" is a belief whose content is a proposition rather ...


8

The basic thrust of Plantinga's argument is that God is not all-powerful (omnipotent); He cannot create a world where free will exists and not allow them to choose between evil or good. He doesn't specifically address the conflict between foreknowledge and free will, but it is implied that God lacks such foreknowledge (he is not omnipotent) because otherwise ...


7

Preliminaries Priest's presentation of variable domain modal logic in An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic does utilize a free logic base. Check out ch. 15 if you can get your hands on a copy. You ask if there is a flaw in your reasoning: Then I suppose you can use Existential Instantiation at that world such that there is some constant a such that □...


7

This looks like a "lame terms" redux of Plantinga's "victorious" ontological argument from The Nature of Necessity. Here is Plantinga's explanation of why if a maximally great being exists in some possible world it exists in every possible world. He attributes the idea to Findlay (p. 214): "Those who worship God do not think of him ...


6

Plantinga uses the concept of non-trivial properties in his transworld depravity defense of God's benevolence, see How does free will defense of God's benevolence work? Ciprotti in Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties discusses Plantinga's trivial and non-trivial properties with PDO (power to do otherwise, a.k.a. free will) as central ...


5

Geirsson and Losonsky, in Plantinga and the Problem of Evil (from your "P.S." statement) fail at least two ways in attempting to address Plantinga's argument: Counter-Factuals (CFs) are possible actions. But all possible actions are not guaranteed to be actualizable actions. They miss a piece of Plantinga's argument which they even quote: ".. he will take ...


4

It may help to think about this topic by eliminating the concept of time. What we want to ask is something like the following: Can an omniscient, omnipotent being 'turn the knobs' on a universe simulator containing free-willed creatures, such that none ever commits moral evil? If so, could he then just actualize such a universe? It seems easy to ...


4

This argument appears to be a variation on one raised by Descartes in the Meditations. His argument is (proceeding from memory) as follows: We have adventitious, innate, and aggregated ideas. Adventitious ideas are only as great as their sources. Aggregated ideas are merely adventitious ideas that I collect from multiple sources. We have an idea of God as ...


4

Kripke (naming and necessity) is often held responsible for reintroducing metaphysical necessity in contemporary philosophy. You'll find some examples from ordinary language in Naming and Necessity, that he uses to make his case. Some philosophers are or were sceptical about metaphysical necessity. This includes notably classical empiricists (Hume), logical ...


3

The end point of Plantinga's defense is that without evil, there is no good. And by extension of his argument, without free will, there are no real relationships and no real love. Given that, the logic of applying ethical responsibility/conduct to someone in a position of authority doesn't really apply here, or at least it applies only in an all-or-nothing ...


3

There are two formulations of the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). The one outlined in the cited notes (NOTES) uses the earlier, pre-2008, version where naturalism is described through the relationship between belief and behavior. The more recent formulation in Where the Conflict Really Lies (WTCFL) describes naturalism with materialism "...


3

Our cognitive faculties - alike to our bodily organs - have developed in adaption to our ecological niche. We know the basic mechanisms of evolution like mutation and selection. We know that the gene pool of the species as well as the individual living being adapts due to the feedback we get from our surrounding. Due to this feedback - our experiences - we ...


3

It is true that human reason reaches vastly beyond what is needed for hunting a mammoth, or even for handling more complex situations arising from social behavior and language. Sure, a lot in nature feels counter-intuitive, but this doesn't preclude us to tread on such ground. The grasp of the structure of space by Euclid, for example, was so firm that he ...


3

I am puzzled by Plantinga's reservation to call naturalism a religion. What is this vagueness he refers to? Plantinga's implications of placing naturalism -- and, perhaps, atheism -- with other religions are marred with minute but important logical lapses. Allow me to take you through them one by one. But naturalism does serve one of the main functions ...


2

I think I had already seen this formulation before and worked a little bit on it. If I remember correctly: px=[∃y(y=x) ∧ Mx] Seems to me, avoding the converse Barcan should not be an issue ( I think Plantinga accepts it ), but, when worked by natural deduction, it would seem it allows the Buridan Formula ( which Plantinga rejects and for good reasons), as ...


2

But then every free creature is necessarily transworld depraved, in other words transworld depravity is a logical consequence of being a free creature. This doesn't work even under the libertarianist concept of free will. Indeed, it would mean that creatures in a possible world that would always happen to choose "good" if it were created, can not be ...


2

Shane's answer is exactly right -- many late Medievals and early Moderns believed in what is called voluntarism. The view is that what God wills decides what is to such a strong extent that rules of morality just go through. The view has resurfaced with a new title as "divine command theory" -- but it turns out that this is not the divine command theory ...


2

I have seen the version of Plantinga's argument that includes your premises 1–3 above, doesn't adopt premise 4, and concludes that since beliefs held by organisms produced by organic evolution aren't necessarily true, naturalism isn't necessarily true. (Note that I don't think any epistemologist would say that beliefs are “generated by natural selection,” ...


2

i don't see Plantinga's argument the same way as LightCC does. i believe that Plantinga is a Christian apologist. most Christians believe in the concept of Heaven where there is no evil and there is good. Plantinga is instead saying, if someone's will is free then their will is truly free, no strings attached. God can create free creatures, but He can'...


2

There's nothing in the laws of physics that prevents miracles from actually happening; they are a record of observations, closely compacted. Even physicists modify their own laws - Einstein-Cartan theory which adds torsion to gravity, speculate on particles that don't exist - the Klien-Gordan field, or dimensions that haven't been observed - superstring ...


2

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) is an argument against naturalism not atheism in general nor any specific evolution theory. Evolution viewed theistically includes the add-on that evolution is guided. Evolution viewed naturalistically includes the add-on that evolution is unguided. Plantinga needs to describe naturalism in such a way ...


2

Plantinga is playing a semantic trick in his last step by switching R (reliability) with N (naturalism) which destroys his reliance on Bayes' theorem. He concludes that our belief forming mechanisms are unreliable and therefore our belief in naturalism is unreliable, so it is unlikely to be true under naturalism, if we assume naturalism. This is false. If we ...


2

It's because it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently. To exist in every possible world means to exist necessarily, and to exist only in some possible world means to exist contingently. Since it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently, a maximally great being must exist necessarily.


2

For clarity let’s assume the word “rational” means the ability to construct a reason for something regardless of whether it is true or false. That is we have cognitive faculties that allow us to come up with reasons. Then “irrational” would be the opposite or the inability to construct a reason perhaps due to the lack of cognitive faculties. The point of ...


2

To some degree it simply comes down to a definition of terms. In atheist media, whether a debate, book, or podcast much time is dedicated to defining religion in a certain way. Two ways in particular help create the resistant to declare naturalism as a religion. First, popular atheist speakers argue that religion is ignorance, and science is knowledge. ...


2

This one is right in the WP article on Alvin Plantinga: Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, ...


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