Hot answers tagged

5

Conifold is right - we need to look further back than the Enlightenment. No historical phenomenon can be given a fixed date of origin but the Enlightenment as Popper would have understood it was predominantly an 18th-century movement. Popper speaks of 'three hundred years', which takes us back (from 1945) to the 17th, not the 18th, century. Also if Popper ...


5

Here is a longer quote from the preface to Open Society and its Enemies: I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous — from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral ...


4

Stephen Thornton describes Popper's position on scientific theories as follows: As such it [a scientific theory] can be tested and falsified, but never logically verified. Thus Popper stresses that it should not be inferred from the fact that a theory has withstood the most rigorous testing, for however long a period of time, that it has been verified; ...


3

You cannot know in any given experiment that something was not determined, only that it was not determined by the set of rules proposed. So to run your experiment you would need a perfect set of rules. This set of predictive rules would correctly predict all outcomes that can be predicted. But then the set of rules already decided whether there is or is ...


3

It is quite simple. The "general law" we have assumed as an hypothesis is : "Every swan is white" that, according to the language of predicate logic, is : (1) "for every x, if x is a Swan, then x is White" [in symbols : ∀x(S(x) → W(x))]. Yoy are travelling in Australia and you find a black swan, that is : (2) "there is an x such that, x is a ...


2

Popper tends to criticize, with Bacon, our tendency to demand regularity from nature. Therefore, he might have thought that induction by probability works only because we think that the laws of nature stays the same over time. This is not a correct account of Popper's views. Popper's position is that induction is impossible ("The Logic of Scientific ...


2

For Popper, either a theory reflects 'reality' (scare quotes to note how ill-defined that word is), or it does not. There is no sense talking about whether a theory is probably true; either the theory performs as expected (in which case it it true as far as we know), or the theory fails to perform as expected (in which case it is false, and we have to revise ...


1

One place to look for arguments similar to the paradox of tolerance is "slippery slope" arguments. Douglas Walton offers four identifying characteristics of slippery slope arguments: One is a first step, an action or policy being considered. A second is a sequence in which this action leads to other actions. A third is a so-called gray zone or area of ...


1

Induction Inferring present and the future states or events from past states and events - the kind of activity you appear to have in mind in your opening sentences - is a form of induction. Popper on induction is a tangled topic but, to express a standard interpretation, Popper finds no proper use for induction in science : [As an empiricist he] ...


1

I want to understand why a theory doesn't get more probably true when it is tested and succeed. I recommend that you read Colin Howson, Hume's problem: Induction and the justification of belief (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000). Howson focuses on David Hume and induction, but discusses Karl Popper in many places. I have lost the source of this abstract, but ...


1

Popper launches a complex barrage of objections at Marx in 'The Open Society' and 'The Poverty of Historicism'. His objections separate into two sorts. He objects to Marxism as pseudo-science and he sees Marxism as totalitarian, dictatorial and inimical to freedom. Pseudo-science Popper attacks Marx for what Popper calls his 'historicism'. This is not a ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible