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If we interpret 'following logic' in the mathematical sense, i.e reasoning correctly step-by-step beginning with axioms and arriving at conclusions, then it is still possible to be biased: The bias may be built into the axioms. This is particularly pernicious as of course it is not possible to fix the axioms by purely logical reasoning (where would one ...


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Wikipedia provides an initial place to look for a definition of psychopathy: Psychopathy is traditionally a personality disorder characterized by persistent antisocial behavior, impaired empathy and remorse, and bold, disinhibited, and egotistical traits. It is sometimes considered synonymous with sociopathy. Different conceptions of psychopathy have been ...


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This is a little tricky, philosophically speaking. Kierkegaard would be inclined to say that almost no one is their 'true self'. For instance, if we have a bricklayer who wants to be an emperor, then that desire to be an emperor — which I'll note derives from a value imposed externally — risks denying the fact that he actually is a bricklayer. But by that ...


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Interpreting Kierkegaard is made problematic by Kierkegaard's strategic use of a pseudonyms as a rhetorical strategy. The book under consideration here, The Sickness Unto Death, was written by Anti-Climacus. Unsurprisingly, Anti-Climacus can be contrasted with Johannes Climacus. Johannes Climacus's main work is Philosophical Fragments. So if we're reading ...


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Freud does suggest to use the latent to understand the manifest, just as it sounds. It sounds counterintuitive because the "latent" and the "manifest" are not used in the usual sense, they are not the latent and the manifest of the same material. The "latent" is the content that comes from Freud's technique of free association. It is assumed that it reveals ...


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A cognitive bias is a psychological predisposition to error, where as formal and informal fallacies are logical errors arising from structural flaws in reasoning and generally arise from formal deficiencies or violations of principles, though they overlap to a certain extent. Informal fallacies usually rely on cognitive bias (think appeal to emotion, for ...


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First point: the term 'psychopath' isn't a clinical diagnosis. In the best case it is a loose term for any mental disorder that features destructive, antisocial behavior; in the worst case it's mere pop-psychology meant to explain away social and cultural ills as psychological aberrations. We should keep in mind that almost every psychological diagnosis ...


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The general and blurry line between folk psychology and scientifically rigorous psychology is one, first and foremost, about representations in a presumed (mostly) realist metaphysical position about the world. What the behavioral sciences purport to give is more accurate, more confident propositions about the world than the back-of-the-envelope calculations ...


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The psychological experience of time has all its keys in the human memory. We percieve things in our memory like we percieve things from reality through senses (by the way, in an equally or even more approximate manner, subject to many false perceptions, "hallucinations" or false memories). We simply believe past second was what it was because we percieve ...


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Welcome johnsmiththelird I read your question with interest. It does have philosophical dimensions, which I've tried to show below. I'm not sure how much we gain when we conceptualise hyocrisy (and the 'hypocrat') and demagoguery since they seem independent of each other. But you've made a start and I look forward to further contributions. Hypocrisy ...


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Conjectures are often stated without any knowledge that there might be a proof, and with no intuition about a proof. Conjectures are often wrong. There are many, many conjectures that didn't require any intuition at all. Just a bit of statistics, or heuristics. "It's unlikely to be wrong" is often a good reason to state a conjecture.


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I'm not sure that one can in any direct way voluntarily change one's beliefs. I can't decide to believe that my front door is green rather than black; and I can't decide to believe in Papal Infallibility as I might choose to light a cigarette. There are elements of voluntarinesss in belief (as e.g. in self deception) but not, I think, elements that reinforce ...


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I just wish to add a few thoughts and conceptualizations that came to my mind: As others have highlighted, there is a long debate (a) about determinism, and (b) about the definition of free will, and (c) if free will is compatible with determinism (this position being called 'compatibilism'). (a): Some answers here mentioned that at the micro-level ...


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The body without organs is neither an image of the potentialities of a given organization of an empirical body, nor a phase space per se; it is rather the condition of openness that subtends every phase space endowing the self-organization of virtual structure with pliability, or plasticity (thus linking it with the eternal return as the global structure of ...


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This is not a merely linguistic question since desire and motivation fulfil logically different roles in the explanation of action. Desire connects with motivation at least in this way: If I did an intentional action, say I bought a packet of cigarettes without coercion or constraint, then it makes sense to ask what my motivation was in buying the ...


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I find the above answers to your question unsatisfying in one way or another. (Not that I have a more conclusive answer hiding up my sleeve for you.) Nonetheless, contrary to some earlier responses, it seems a very pertinent philosophical question to me. (Of course, if you know that you already know all that there is to know about philosophy, then you ...


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