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13 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

This illustrates how removed the concept of 'philosophical zombie' is from reality. The mirror image does not have a brain; it is a trick of light. It is no more a 'zombie' than a photo, a drawing, ...
Ask About Monica's user avatar
11 votes

Is it possible to imagine a color one has never seen before?

The answer is controversial. Hume, 18th century British philosopher, famously argued that such a possibility is conceivable, that if we are presented with a spectrum of color where some intermediate ...
Conifold's user avatar
  • 43.4k
8 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

Approach 1 - (4) is false. One line of reasoning has already been presented. (4). The person in the mirror looks and behaves like a conscious, qualia possessing human: you. This is false, because ...
MichaelS's user avatar
  • 258
5 votes
Accepted

What are convincing examples of "mistaken" qualia?

I think the sticking point here is, as you point out, the immediateness of qualia. But that's not actually taken for granted in the literature. In the physicalism vs. anti-materialism debate in ...
commando's user avatar
  • 7,399
5 votes

What do philosophers mean when they say qualia do not exist?

The position is that of eliminative materialism, or of delusionism, relative to consciousness. The two are somewhat different. Qualia are often cited by non-physicalists as direct evidence against ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.6k
5 votes
Accepted

What is the difference between properties and sets?

I suppose you are looking for reasons not to identify properties to sets. (1) A set is a particular ( an abstract particular) , but properies are often considered as universals . (2) A property is ...
Floridus Floridi's user avatar
5 votes

Illusionists about qualia: how?

There is an important difference between qualia and Father Christmas which Dennett foolishly overlooks: viz, there is a convincing and vastly more plausible alternative explanation for why presents ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 24.5k
5 votes

Location of Soul

What you are articulating is a dualist model of mind. Dualism is currently an unpopular POV among philosophers, but there are a number of major philosophers and scientists of the last half century ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.6k
5 votes

Are there any philosophers who clearly define the word "consciousness" in their arguments?

One of the weaknesses of Western (and in particular empiricist) philosophy is that it can take a bizarrely objectivist perspective. In essence, it demands that things be seen 'from the outside' to ...
Ted Wrigley's user avatar
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4 votes

Is the person in the mirror an example of a philosophical zombie?

Your argument has a very straight forward resolution: statements 4 and 5 together are sufficient to prove that "the person in the mirror is a p-zombie." Those two statements form the definition of a ...
Cort Ammon's user avatar
  • 18.2k
4 votes

Can mind-body dualism be modelled by computer programs and their corresponding logic gates at the physical level?

To make this a mind-body model, we need the representations for the mind and the body to be accessible to the observers. So we have to assume that the computers have both the logic gate descriptions, ...
Conifold's user avatar
  • 43.4k
4 votes

According to Chalmers, can neuroscience resolve the "hard problem of consciousness"?

Q: What exactly is referred to by the "hard problem". A: The hard problem of consciousness, according to Chalmers and the majority of philosophers that use this term, is the problem of how ...
user287279's user avatar
4 votes

Can behaviourism account for qualia?

It seems answer is no. In fact, qualia is one of argument against Behaviourism. For example, some zoombie can behaves exactly as Praying to God and chanting God's name but without any 'feelings' of ...
Hare Krishna's user avatar
4 votes

Can a Philosophical Zombie realize that itself has no Qualia?

Why are we discussing qualia right now? If we discuss qualia because we experience it, a philosophical zombie would not. They would thus be distinguishable from conscious people. (Under this ...
wizzwizz4's user avatar
  • 2,202
4 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

You say that the first para of the SEP article include the words "[Zombies] are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences". Clearly the 'but' implies that we ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 24.5k
3 votes

Is it possible to imagine a color one has never seen before?

It seems trivial to imagine something that is almost like blue, but different. Some can even imagine a super-intelligent shade of the colour blue. It does, however, bring up the challenge of ...
Cort Ammon's user avatar
  • 18.2k
3 votes

Is it possible to imagine a color one has never seen before?

Yes, you can imagine new "colors", and there are physically meaningful complex colors that humans don't really see. Short version We see with our eyes, and those signals go back to our ...
Nat's user avatar
  • 1,995
3 votes

If consciousness was an illusion, would it be less real?

So if someone managed to fully explain the illusion of consciousness, would it start to be considered a standard "physical" phenomenon? That is the idea and precisely why Dennet's hermeneutic ...
MmmHmm's user avatar
  • 2,417
3 votes

Are the experiences of the "flow of time" and of "cause and effect" qualia?

When looking at an ambiguous image of a cube (the Necker cube), there is something it is like to interpret it as a cube that you're looking down on, and there is something it is like to interpret it ...
present's user avatar
  • 2,510
3 votes

Are thoughts qualia?

Michael Tye provides a survey of qualia. He has a section examining which mental states have qualia. He lists these four: (1) Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved ...
Frank Hubeny's user avatar
  • 19.5k
3 votes

Is consciousness considered a resolved/able problem?

Purely philosophically, consciousness is stuck between two schools of thought (generally, since each idea also have different sub-theories). See more on the wikipedia article on consciousness, ...
Lexipaichnidi's user avatar
3 votes

According to Chalmers, can neuroscience resolve the "hard problem of consciousness"?

Short Answer In his paper, Chalmers answers you directly himself, p.10: We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for ...
J D's user avatar
  • 29.2k
3 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

So my question is, does the philosophical zombies question/idea contain a hidden assumption and why (if/because it does) is this assumption (that normal humans are conscious and have qualia) not ...
J D's user avatar
  • 29.2k
3 votes

How serious are believers in the private language argument?

(Cf., in the article you link to, subsection 1.2.) You seem to be mistaken; the PLA is not an argument about whether private languages (PLs) exist/are possible, or not, but rather that the concept (...
abatjour's user avatar
3 votes
Accepted

How do we know if our interpretation of our raw conscious experiences is accurate?

Perhaps a useful notion here is calibration. With other types of sensors, such as thermometers, ammeters, odometers, and so on, a degree of confidence in their readings can be obtained by comparison ...
Marco Ocram's user avatar
  • 24.5k
3 votes

Are there philosophers who argue that mental states are in a many-to-one relationship to physical states?

All dualists and neutral monists who hold by causal closure of the physical are susceptible to the sort of qualia multiplicity you postulate. And if any of them hold by the Many World Interpretation ...
Dcleve's user avatar
  • 14.6k

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