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One cannot get around Quine's objection to analyticity simply by appeal to stipulated definitions. For one thing, the vast majority of words in a natural language such as English don't have stipulated definitions. Carnap is not a deity who hands down definitions on tablets of stone that we are obliged to use. Lexicographers do not stipulate definitions when ...


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I think it is fair to say that Quine retreated from his earlier position in regard to the revisability of logic, at least to some degree. Probably the most important reference here would be the chapter called Deviant Logics in his book Philosophy of Logic. Quine argues that there cannot truly be deviant logics, because anyone who claims to use different ...


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To Carnap being a realist is no more than opting for the vocabulary/language of realism. According to Carnap's principle of tolerance there are no truth-relevant arguments in favour of realism and against a form of anti-realism. From his empiricist stance, whether one chooses a realist or an anti-realist vocabulary/language does not make any difference to ...


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