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Why not? What would (relevantly) distinguish a "conscious computer" from a "conscious person"? Why would a silicon-based consciousness escape Thrownness where a carbon-based consciousness cannot? It would seem to me that absent a strong argument to the contrary, any consciousness would be subject to the burdens of consciousness, by definition.


8

To suggest a different perspective, Whitehead writes the following: (page 8-9) The Reformation and the scientific movement were two aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. The appeal to the origins of Christianity, and Francis Bacon's appeal to efficient causes as against final causes, were ...


7

Kant does not refute empiricism - he rescues it. It is Hume that philosophically undermined the standing of empiricism by using its analytical equipment against itself. First, he showed that causality is logically not possible, all one can maintain is that coincidences happen. Hence empirical physics is not possible. Second, he showed that one cannot draw ...


7

The notion of a priori changed a lot since Kant, see Did Kant consider Newtonian mechanics a priori? Today they are seen as potentially fallible, even if not empirical. The Austrian school, including Brentano’s pupils Stumpf, Husserl and Reinach, and more recently "Manchester three" Mulligan, Simons, and Barry Smith, focused on more immediate and ...


6

I have seen this quote in multiple books by the Turkish poet, Ahmet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who actually was a student of Henri Bergson. However, I am not aware if this quote appears in one of Bergson's works. The book, Mümin - Kâfir (The Believer and Disbeliever) has following dialogue: Believer - As a matter of fact, a Western philosopher who has ...


6

From a purely epistemological point of view, no, philosophy is not really helpful. If anything, philosophy makes things worse. See this post and this post and the responses to it. From a social point of view, Habermas' idea of "colonization of the life world" helps shed light on the problem and how to potentially solve it, but doesn't offer a full solution. ...


5

I believe you're referring to the fallacy of inferring the “sum” (or “I am”) part from the “cogito” (or “I think”) part, right? The “ergo” (or “therefore”) makes it sound like Descartes is expressing an argument which has as its premise that he thinks, and the conclusion that he exists. The potential fallacy in this representation of the Cogito statement ...


5

The SEP has an article on these sorts of proofs. I think it's fair to say that even people who endorse some sort of ontological argument don't find Spinoza convincing, for the reason you say. However, since you wanted criticism I will point out that any proof like this is a "tautology", so I don't really think that's a valid objection. The question is ...


5

Spinoza is not in any straightforward way a follower of Descartes. Descartes, for instance, believes that there are two substances, mind and body. For Spinoza, by contrast, there is only one substance; thought (mind) and extension (body) are attributes of it. That's quite a contrasting picture ! It is certainly nothing like Cartesian dualism. Freedom for ...


4

Speculation is used differently from the everyday use in philosophy. See a wiktionary definition: speculative Philosophy: Philosophy, especially traditional metaphysical philosophy, which makes claims that cannot be verified by everyday experience of the physical world or by a scientific method. I suppose that already answers your question. It's no ...


4

Critical rationalism is the view propagated by Popper. Popper does not give up truth. His first point is, that we cannot prove general theorems in science, because we always have only finitely many observations. The next observation could refute the statement. Hence Popper gives up proving general theorems in science. According to Popper our scientific ...


4

An objective, "mind-independent", view is a staple of physics, but so is the possibility of observation. The information lost in burning is not entirely unrecoverable, it is recoverable in theory, and some futuristic nanotech may be able to recover it, with a lot of effort, even in practice. If we do not go to extremes then it is well-known that information ...


4

First, there's an article on measurement in science in the Stanford Encyclopedia. The sociologist Harry Collins dubbed this problem "the experimenter's regress" in the 1980s. There's a brief discussion in this Stanford Encyclopedia article; for more detail, see his book Changing Order, especially chapters 4 and 5. More recently, the historian and ...


4

Here are the questions regarding the extreme partisanship of politics today: Is there any philosophical thinking which might help resolve these disputes and allow the political discussion to move forward? Or is the gulf between the rational and empirical simply too great to bridge? One thing philosophy could do is clarify why the dispute is occurring. If ...


3

See : Gaston Bachelard, Le rationalisme appliqué (1949 - 3rd ed : 1966) page 3-4. He tries a "mediation" between rationalism and empirism : It is precisely in the central position that the dialectic of reason and technique finds its efficacity. We will try to place us in this central position where occur both an applied rationalism and an educated ...


3

Critical rationalism holds that there is objective truth and it is possible for people to learn about it. You learn about how the world works by making guesses and then criticising the guesses. You never have any guarantee that you have reached the truth although you may make progress toward it through critical discussion. Most epistemologists make a lot of ...


3

Empiricism in its most general form is the claim that all we can possibly know about the world and the laws which govern it are those things which we can directly apprehend by our senses. Hence, the very idea that objects continue to exist, unchanging, when no one's observing them, or that it is a law of nature that any event must precede and cause another, ...


3

That being said, did Descartes ever state why one even has the ability to doubt? I assume we can all agree that we indubitably have the ability to doubt; it is impossible to doubt that one can doubt. So, we have to take the presence of this ability as a given. But why we have this ability? To ask this question assumes the Principle of Sufficient Reason (...


3

Maybe this quote from A. J. Ayer in "Language, Truth and Logic" is helpful: To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology. And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us in our emprical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact.


2

The style of Spinoza Ethics, demonstrated in geometrical order is a tribute to Euclids Elements as the subtitle itself points out. The Elements is written in using Definitions, Axioms, Propositions & Corollaries. Definitions explain the meaning of a term, as in the first definition of Ethics which defines the term causa sui, or cause of itself (in the ...


2

Maybe I'm not understanding the question correctly, but if by "problem" you mean that the computer would not "like" being conscious, then I think that might have to depend on whether it were also programmed with a self-preservation instinct. Even something conscious, if it doesn't value self-preservation, probably wouldn't care to be. We can know this to ...


2

Speculative Realism as a movement has no unique ideas and is parasitic on a host of previous and contemporaneous thinkers that it forgets, misrepresents, or actively ignores. See: FROM OCCUPY TO MULTIPLY: speculative realism is noone’s property, http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2015/01/01/from-occupy-to-multiply-speculative-realism-is-noones-property/


2

Kants Copenican gesture was to assume that objects conform to the subject, this meant in particular that space & time was the conditions for experience. He also distinguised between noumena, an underlying reality which itself is not directly available to experience; and to phenomena the representation of noumena to the subject. One could say that ...


2

I fundamentally agree with @Christopher - the cogito argument is an argument, but not an inference. There is no inference of the form : "if p, then q". On all the complex issue, it is worth reading in SEP the entry on Descartes' Epistemology and in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed.John Cottingham (1992), at least : Louis Loeb, “The Cartesian Circle”...


2

Centuries before Descartes made up that (maybe perceived) fallacy, Avicenna the persian muslim philosopher had already explained why it is a logical fallacy to argue from an issue of the self (in this case thinking) for the existence of the self. Because in any such argument the existence of the self is already presumed as it is impossible to experience any ...


2

My answer is tangential to your question because it adresses Weber's key concept of rationalization rather than his views of rationality in general. So see for yourself if it is helpful. But, to my best knowledge, rationalization for Weber is a more or less global process, increasingly taking hold of all social relations. And if so, then there is only one ...


2

Spinoza, Descartes's and Leibniz's contemporary, has often been identified as a rationalist materialist, at least historically, modern scholarship is more skeptical of the label, see Zammito's Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment. His explanation of the access to reality beyond senses is the prototype of such an explanation for materialists, idealists and ...


2

"Blue + Yellow = Green." It's basically a reformulation of 7+5=12, but it helps get the point across for beginners. There's by definition nothing "green" about "blue," nor anything by definition "green" about "yellow," so there's no way to logically deduce this (i.e., it's not a tautology). However, when you add them together you get green, and you get it ...


2

Leibniz's theory of monads is complex and quite obscure : Leibniz's [...] celebrated theory of monads, in which the only beings that will count as genuine substances and hence be considered real are mind-like simple substances endowed with perception and appetite. Thus, monads perceive. See also Leibniz's letter to De Volder: “considering the matter ...


2

I don't think Descartes has a special idea of what it means for something to exist. I think you may be confused when you write: Is the only criterion to exist to be able to think? Descartes' argument in Meditation 2 is quite different from what a simple reading of "I think, therefore I am" would mean. Specifically, we need to grasp a few things that ...


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