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Are two persons equally rational in choosing different dogmatic stopping points in their chains of justification as per the Münchhausen trilemma?

The Manchhausen "trilemma" states that circular arguments are unsatisfying: The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition presupposes the truth of that very proposition... ......
Alistair Riddoch's user avatar
1 vote

Are two persons equally rational in choosing different dogmatic stopping points in their chains of justification as per the Münchhausen trilemma?

Are X and Y equally rational, no matter what dogmatic assumptions they adopt as their stopping points? What if X, for example, decides to adopt theistic dogmatic assumptions, whereas Y decides to ...
Max Maxman's user avatar
1 vote

Are two persons equally rational in choosing different dogmatic stopping points in their chains of justification as per the Münchhausen trilemma?

Munchausen's trilemma explains that if you are trying to justify your ideas, show they are or good or whatever, then you have a choice between (1) infinite regress of justifications (2) dogmatism ...
alanf's user avatar
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1 vote

Defending Pereboom's deliberation-compatibilism from Widerker's objections, conceptualizing "agents" as Turing machines

There is an interesting distinction in the maths of your phrasing here between Choice and Computation! Deliberation, as you’ve phrased it, is about identifying a possible element from a set of ...
Paul Ross's user avatar
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1 vote

Are two persons equally rational in choosing different dogmatic stopping points in their chains of justification as per the Münchhausen trilemma?

If, "There is an epistemological trilemma, with its horns being these inferential sequences of these relatively specific kinds, such that..." is used as a premise in an argument, then is not ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
4 votes

A contradiction in Feldman's rule for suspension of judgment?

The contradiction is false because the meta-issue's proposed resolutions are not mutually exclusive. It may well be the case that it's not possible to reach a firm conclusion on the moral issue as of ...
minnmass's user avatar
  • 401
2 votes

A contradiction in Feldman's rule for suspension of judgment?

In many cases, only one disputant wants to contend and the other does not. Both must fight if one side starts to fight. The answer is to consider the results of Game Theory, that Cooperation works out ...
Scott Rowe's user avatar
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