Podcast #128: We chat with Kent C Dodds about why he loves React and discuss what life was like in the dark days before Git. Listen now.

Hot answers tagged

12

Moral Realism isn't a clear term. The way the survey is set up, some constructivists could label themselves under it. (I've also heard of terminology that puts Moral Relativism under Moral Realism, so then things get really strange.) But it'd probably still be popular without that. So why's that? I'd argue it's because the literature on it is vast and, also, ...


11

Dummett, the founder of modern analytic anti-realism, emphasizes that unlike realism, anti-realism is not a unified doctrine, one can be an anti-realist about some specific domain (mathematics, physics, ethics, past, future, etc.), and a realist about the rest. The motive behind it is that for statements to have meanings they must be understandable, and ...


11

We can not carry the argument past the first step because if our physical laws are simulated then we know nothing about the "physics" of the world that does the simulating. In particular, it may make no sense to say that one computer is "bigger" than another if they function by completely different principles, space or time as we know them may not apply to ...


10

The short answer is that Quine is not a mathematical realist as intended in the question (on my reading of it). Why does he call himself a realist? Because he practices what he preaches. Indeterminacy of translation, and hence meaning, implies that words only mean as relata in a scheme, not as individual references to raw reality or mental content. Holism of ...


8

Your view is similar to that of late Wittgenstein, after the so-called "linguistic turn". In Philosophical Investigations published in 1953 he writes “For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language”. He describes linguistic activity as a ...


7

Both Plato and Gödel were mathematical platonists. Both held that mathematical objects existed abstractly and outside of spacetime. This is what we would call mathematical realism. This position is different from just the Forms because even Plato in The Republic and other dialogues distinguishes between the type of being exhibited by the Forms and by the ...


7

If (from a religious perspective) god supposedly created all the religious rules, Not all religions subscribe to this. Buddhism for example doesn't really talk about who created the rules, and instead arrives at the rules empirically (See the 4 noble truths). then why does every religion follow different rules? Different religions have different ...


6

In the relevant sense the answer is "no", the appearance of a "yes" is created by projecting classical intuitions about locality onto quantum objects. This is confusing because the definition of locality adopted in classical physics becomes misleading when transplanted into quantum physics. "Quantum non-locality" of entanglement is a misnomer, rather than ...


5

Yes, a nominalist logician can do so, and even preserve classical logic and while denying existence of both abstract objects and universals. What gives? A nominalist changes the standard semantics instead, how truth values are assigned to predicates and quantifiers. Traditional assignment formalized by Tarski in 1936 requires a universe of objects with ...


5

You are right that Bell's inequalities do not rule out "superdeterminism" (Bell's term), as he himself acknowledged:"...if our measurements are not independently variable as we supposed...even if chosen by apparently free-willed physicists... then Einstein local causality can survive. But apparently separate parts of the world become deeply entangled, and ...


5

The main thing happening here is a shift in the meaning of terms. Specifically, the word "realist" has had many many different uses over time. The basic idea is that a realist believes something is real, i.e. that such entities do in fact exist, that they are metaphysical objects in their own right (rather than existing as modalities on the mind). Realism ...


5

Euclid was mocked for demonstrating existence of triangles, and Peano for proving that 1 is a number (by Poincaré, no less), but both contributed to clarifying foundations of mathematics. Considering that skeptics dispute Moore's conclusion "the thing" may not be as trivial as it seems (as is often the case in mathematics and philosophy). Even some non-...


5

Moral realism I take to be broadly the view that moral judgements can be true or false, that some are true and are known to be true. There has been an upsurge of interest in and sympathy with moral realism among philosophers since roughly the mid-1970s. I account for this on three grounds : ▻ the decline of empiricism ▻ the phenomenology of the moral life ▻...


4

Perhaps you must "unzip" a little bit your question, because it is very wide in scope. You are alluding at least at three different and very interesting issues : historical interpretation of scientific theories and controversies current philosophy of science debates historical (meta-)interpretation of the interpretation of history of science by a ...


4

They would not in so far as idealists are not realists. The no miracle argument is an argument for realism: it says that realism is the only (or best) explanation, so the argument works against any anti-realist position, including idealism. The idealist and the empiricist are in the same position and can use the same arguments to respond, such as the one you ...


4

Underdetermination of theory by evidence, explored in great detail by Quine, means that from finitely many observations and measurements, that we are able to make by any point in time, even combined with perfect methodology, we are unable to determine a unique theory consistent with them. In other words, even if there were such a thing as the correct theory ...


4

Science assumes the real world in the same sense we assume that the Sun goes around the Earth in our everyday lives, or mathematics assumes an ideal realm populated with numbers and structures. It is a practical attitude of a working scientist (farmer, mathematician,...) that saves time and effort on complications irrelevant to the task at hand. Upon ...


4

I think here the difference in certainty is the difference in purpose. We put much more certainty into everyday realism because all we are using it for is practical action. And that indeed requires it, for getting enmeshed in fine points of metaphysical commitments will quickly leave one hungry, injured, and then dead. It is not that there is something "...


4

Mature Husserl is usually seen as a mild anti-realist, but this is largely due to the maxim that phenomenology should be neutral (agnostic) on metaphysical matters because it is the data it produces that is to be used to adjudicate them later. This means that Husserl's observations are typically easy to adapt to a realist perspective, after all even a ...


3

They are related in the same way as for idealism, epistemology provides a necessary foundation for ontology, if not strictly logically then morally. It is logically possible to be ontological realist while maintaining epistemological idealism, in fact it is attractive for its subtlety, Kant and Quine are famous examples. But they confirm the rule: if one ...


3

Realism is a term with thousands of definitions. In this case, this is political realism. The meaning is that politics is based on power -- ultimately physical might. This view is often called Realpolitik. Specifically, Bismarck engaged in several measured trades rather than imagining he could get everything at once.


3

Yes there is. Maddy takes this position in Perception and Mathematical Intuition, and so do recent mathematical Aristotelians. The alternative of believing it all real usually comes with full blown Platonism (forms in a separate realm), and is not very popular, see however Brown's Platonism, Naturalism, and Mathematical Knowledge for a modern defense. Let me ...


3

"The sun rises every morning". That is a fact about reality. But it is a string of letters unless one understands what "sun", "rises", "every" and "morning" mean. What they mean has to be established and learned prior to producing the fact, and does not belong to reality alone, it depends on human categorizations of it, to which alternatives are possible. It ...


3

This question seems to have been resurrected; I trust no-one minds if I answer it. If a philosopher accepts semantic externalism and accepts that possible worlds are the correct form of semantics for modal statements, is she then forced to commit to a belief in modal realism? No, at least not the extreme modal realism of the sort Lewis endorses. Here's ...


3

Körner is referring to the Refutation of Idealism argument (B274–279), directed against the skepticism about the external world attributed to Descartes and Berkeley. The idealism in question is the "dogmatic" idealism concerning the empirical, hence the "empirical realism". The choice of words is unfortunate, however, since "empirical realism" is also one of ...


3

I must extend some sympathy to Charlton because Aristotle's remarks at the start of Physics I are compressed and gnomic. ▻ SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHYSICS The subject-matter of Aristotelian physics is, Carlton tells us, 'things which are subject to change, things which are not without matter, and things which have in themselves the source of their changing or ...


3

I assume your question is about scientific realism. The debate can be framed as a question concerning what science aims to achieve, and what it's successful at: is it at discovering the fundamental nature of reality, or merely building efficient theories to make predictions and develop technologies? Or something in between? This matters for understanding ...


3

Well, first of all, Platonic Idealism is often called Platonic Realism. This is because Plato believed that pure ideas exist outside of mind, and that they are in fact only true reality, while world we perceive represents only temporary and fleeting shadows of these eternal ideas. For example, every tree we could see is just a shadow of real idealistic tree. ...


3

Welcome, shawnru. There is no essence of idealism; there is no common and distinctive nature which all 'idealist' theories share. (The same is true of 'realism'.) There is merit in the following characterisation despite its age: idealism historically contains four main propositions: (1) Plato's (value is objective - its meaning and origin lie beyond ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible