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If philosophy is mathematics and mathematics is computation, can I conclude that philosophy is computation? Yes. So is philosophy merely computation? No because philosophy isn't mathematics and mathematics isn't computation. Can we axiomatize philosophy? If you want. Getting philosophers to agree on a set of axioms should be amusing. Can a ...


9

Apparently, "grounding" is a new word of choice in metaphysical debates, there was a philosophical Conference on Grounding and Emergence held in Glasgow last May. This is a reaction to fading hopes of reducing sciences to more fundamental ones and ultimately to physics, which was the original programme of scientific realism, known as reductionism or ...


6

In his "Lecture on Ethics" Wittgenstein makes some similar points about wonder and miracles, first defining miracles: Let me first consider, again, our first experience of wondering at the existence of the world and let me describe it in a slightly different way; we all know what in ordinary life would be called a miracle. It obviously is simply an event ...


3

You are talking not about science but the faith of determinism. In the deterministic mindset, everything is made up merely of the physical interaction of objects, which can be subjected to experiments, which will definitively show how they behave and why. The true statement should be, the physical world can be approximated to rules that consistently are ...


3

According to Chalmers the answer is no, CTD does not entail reductionism; he believes both that the brain is computable and that consciousness is emergent. in Strong and Weak Emergence he writes: I think there is exactly one clear case of a strongly emergent phenomenon, and that is the phenomenon of consciousness. and in A Computational Foundation for ...


3

SCIENCE AND THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE ARE DIFFERENT ... In aesthetic contemplation one considers an object - a natural object or an artefact - in detachment from all practical or explanatory motivations or attitudes. The object may be regarded purely as a presentation or an exercise in symbolism, or as embodying certain techniques. The response may be an ...


2

The Complete Works of William Shakespeare is reducible to the same set of letters, spaces and punctuation marks as The Complete Tweets of Paris Hilton. No understanding of those fundamental letters explains the difference between the two. The meaning emerges at a higher level of organization, it is embodied at the lowest level but not explained by it. Is ...


2

There are chemical processes in the fruit, a bit crudely it's just atoms “moving around” If you really want to keep a strict separation of Being and Non-Being, movement is also contradictory. For the movement of an object from point A to B involves a transition from Being to Non-Being at point A, and from Non-Being to Being at B. If we focus at point A, we ...


2

The key question here is “Can a computer think for us?” This can be reformulated as “Will strong AI ever be realized?” Or, “Can human understanding be reduced to a program running on a Turing machine?” There are two answers: Yes or No. If Yes, then a program can produce human understanding. Since philosophy is the result of human understanding, ...


2

The mistake is to see explantory layers as incompatible or competing. In evolution theory, it has been understood for a long time that the gene is the fundamental level of selection, and kin-selection theories and of group selection coming to dominate over individual selection have been dismissed. But what is now increasingly accepted, is that evolution ...


2

It depends how much goes into the emergent properties as regards the kind of causal power (if any) they possess. I'm going to take part of an argument from J. Kim. It doesn't represent his full view but the premises are relevant, I think, to what you are asking. (1) Emergent mental properties are real properties (the thesis of emergent realism). (...


2

Those who deny consciousness, generally do so in the name of a science/empirical epistemological framework. This is a self-contradictory view. In science, and it parent methodological naturalism, evidence is king. Evidence takes precedence over theory, and theories which conflict with evidence are to be tossed, not the evidence. The most clear-cut of the ...


2

There are multiple approaches to emergence, and I consider this to be the most valid, also agrees with my personal research regarding systems and interaction: emergence is just a subjective appreciation granted by reason. To start, systems (the formal approach to things and objects) are just mental concepts. A constellation does not exist, the sky has only ...


2

The short answer is a resounding no, because rules do not encompass the values of the agents that use the rules. A theory, as often conceived, can be abstracted to a set of set-theoretic, logical, and arithmetic principles represented by a syntax. For instance, in math, foundationalists claim they can reduce the axioms of arithmetic to set-theory expressed ...


2

Quasicrystals seem to be a good example, even if that might need some technical details. In a nutshell: crystals were defined as materials producing sharp diffraction spots; it was thought that translational symmetry does the trick. However sharp diffraction spots arranged in a fivefold pattern were discovered and this type of symmetry does not allow for ...


1

I think that some people would prefer if antireductionism was a scientific position. Then they could account for irreducible things without denying materialism. Others (including Stephen Jay Gould and his "non-overlapping magesteria" and Karl Popper) are perfectly happy to think that science is reductionistic, because they acknowledge the irreducible things ...


1

A couple points: It's not clear what a scientific position is. So let's replace 'position' with 'theory' so that the discussion is clearer. Requiring that a scientific theory not contradict any other scientific theory is definitely not a criterion of science. If it were, we would be in really bad shape. New theories always contradict those they replace. ...


1

It depends on whether you are a realist about mental objects. If you believe that only the physical is real, then the purely mental is not, by definition. But mental realism is not unheard of --many mathematicians, for instance, still hew to the Platonic idea that things like numbers have a real existence as mental entities independent of human observers.


1

If one is looking at physically emergent properties, then it should be reasonable to assume that that property can be defined by looking at the state of an object. We may not be able to specify a formal string defining that property, but we can accept that there is one or else we have to revisit what a physical property means. This definition explicitly ...


1

Non-reductionist supervenience is often called "emergentism," although that's a controversial term, and one has been deployed in sometimes contradictory ways (some "emergentists" would consider themselves reductionist, and some would not). Much of it comes down to disagreements over what constitutes reductionism. Is it reductionist to ...


1

I can't write a comment, due to the reputation system, but it is important to make a distinction between strong and weak emergence. Look at the following for details. In short, there are two versions of emergence, the first (weak emergence) says that new properties can arise from systems due to the interactions of their parts and can be explained in ...


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