10

Your position would be reasonable against the kind of absolute relativists and radical skeptics that you describe. Unfortunately, those are only convenient straw men that are easy to refute, which is good sport for didactic purposes. Philosophers who actually hold positions so caricatured are savvy enough to nuance them so as to make them immune to self-...


10

I believe the Nietzsche's passage referred to is this one: "Socrates' decadence is suggested not only by the admitted wantonness and anarchy of his instincts, but also by the hypertrophy of the logical faculty and that barbed malice which distinguishes him. Nor should we forget those auditory hallucinations which, as "the daimonion of Socrates," have been ...


8

That is what positivists and Popper would (and did) say. But in his own view Feyerabend is not confusing them, he is dissolving the distinction. And he was standing on the shoulders of giants. The context of justification/context of discovery distinction, just like "relativized a priori", was coined by Reichenbach, a founding father of logical positivism ...


8

This question arises in the context of the traditional philosophical enquiry into the nature of knowledge. We might summarise that enquiry as: under what conditions is it correct to say that a person X knows that a proposition P is true? To emphasise the point: the analysis is not concerned with the conditions under which P is true or accurate, but the ...


5

I admittedly lack a solid grounding in philosophy and likely some problems with postmodernist thought escape me. I am however one of those leftists who has no huge, general problem with all of postmodernists thought so I'll try to answer. The way I see it, postmodernism is at it's core not the ideology that "anything goes" (though I'm sure you can point me ...


4

Science assumes the real world in the same sense we assume that the Sun goes around the Earth in our everyday lives, or mathematics assumes an ideal realm populated with numbers and structures. It is a practical attitude of a working scientist (farmer, mathematician,...) that saves time and effort on complications irrelevant to the task at hand. Upon ...


4

I don't see a path all the way out, but there's a lot more to do to define which bits of what we call ethics can be put on solid objective footing and which bits are matters of style (where anything may work, or where any of a number of different schemes may work). Studies of innate morality and evolution of morality are particularly interesting in this ...


4

I do not think that Searle will agree on labelling with "Social constructivism" his theory about Social relaity. According to Ian Hacking, Searle's book The Construction of Social Reality (1995), is not a social construction book at all. For sure, Searle is not a relativist. You can see: Barry Smith (editor), John Searle, Cambridge UP (2003), page 18: ...


3

I'd like to discuss a couple of points here: 1st, we've got to define with more clarity what moral relativism is, and 2nd, we've got to understand the cause of your dislike for it and earning for the ethical gurus able to shed the light on one and only true ethics. In order to understand what moral relativism is let's switch for a moment to poli sci and ...


3

Let's take quantum gravity as an example; this is the research programme that looks at unifying two classical theories - Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity; despite immense effort there is still no satisfactory unified theory that has broad consensual agreement in the physics community. Either we have all the elements for such a theory, and it is a ...


3

I think not. The "methodological anarchist" approach adopted by Feyerabend into Against Method is that, pace Popper and Lakatos, there is no "absolute" and uncontroversial rational method to justify the adoption of a scientific (and not only) theory in spite of a competing one. Against Method explicitly drew the “epistemological anarchist” conclusion ...


3

For Buddhists, one of the meanings of the word Dharma or Dhamma is 'universal law' (analogous to for example the Law of Gravity). Dhamma might be equated with "things the Buddha said". aren't they admitting that reality itself is an absolute and that at least one thing is absolutely knowable I think "they" argue that descriptions of reality are ...


3

You can find Popper's most scathing critiques in his The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945, 2 vol.) and The Poverty of Historicism (1957).


3

Protagoras's famous statement that "man is the measure of all things" has been variously related to relativism, Perspectivism, subjectivism, phenomenalism, anti-realism and skepticism. But not, as far as I know, to anything like the Turing Test (which is, to my mind, just a piece of common sense, hardly philosophical). Here is Plato's Socrates, ...


3

Reason, not logic; logic can be a type of positivism that ignores the concrete reality which is the life of the people. Logic can be a place to hide from the real. It is all so simple, the principle of non-contradiction, just like math; but try to apply to it to people! Capitalism is full of contradictions, and so the life of the people is full of ...


3

Are you thinking of a case where : S that not-p but intends to bring it about that s/he acquires the assumed [or known] to be] false belief that p           ? In your example, S believes [or knows] that God does not exist but intends to bring it about that s/he acquires the assumed [or known] to be false belief that God exists. ...


3

Moral realism can handle all three examples. Moral realism I take to be the view that moral judgements can be true or false and that some are known to be true. So a moral realist can say : It is true that he was a murderous monster. (This is a matter of moral truth or fact.) It is true that he did some bad things, but he also did some good things (e.g. ...


3

If the position taken by the relativist is that there are no objective truths, then the relativist must first claim an exception: P1. There are no objective truths (except this one). By dint of special pleading, it has a way of limiting the legitimacy of the claimant.


3

First of all, epistemic relativism is much less dangerous to science than it appears. Based on my (cursory) interactions with them, I would say that most historians of science are epistemic relativists…but this doesn't keep them from believing that science exists and is (broadly) accurate! So how do they square this circle? The usual way one accepts ...


2

The argument that you mention certainly seems to change the notion of subjectivity, if it attributes subjectivity to, say, shoes... But I also think that it is not supposed to change the notion of subjectivity so much as to make it unrecognizable. We are still supposed to try and understand the life experiences of, say, shoes, as similar (however dimly) to ...


2

The truth is ... there is no ultimate truth. Our truth is momentary, incidental and at best, an agreement of relative sources. It is not finite and it is not rigid. There are many who argue against Relativism as some middle of the road sidestep from the truth. Relativism takes into account all 'truths', and, the basic relative judgement (experience) on ...


2

The question is: how do we get the philosophical speaking to stay connected with reality? Torturing people might be the wrong way to achieve that :) And your "torture chamber with a button" example would make most philosophers itchy, philosophically speaking. (I will restrain myself this time around!) The root of the problem is that philosophy actually ...


2

The first step is to agree (or realize) that there are three levels/types of reality. 1) local(individual), 2) global(group), and 3) absolute reality. This realization is key so that the different sides/groups can understand each other. The relativistic group is correct when the "reality" they refer to is the local type (each individual can have his/her ...


2

I'm one of those people who makes arguments like that, so I can at least give you some of the points of view I am sometimes using (when they suit me). One easy thing to point out is that "the belief everything is relative" is only self-refuting if you believe as such. Consider that someone who could say such a thing must surely suggest that language itself ...


2

I agree entirely with **@Conifold.* First, you are using "relativism" where you probably mean skepticism. To say something is "relative" is to say that its relational values are in fact related to some fixed "general equivalent," as in the "speed of light." It doesn't mean anything goes or nothing is true. Obviously, in any system or conceptual scheme ...


2

As your quandary is framed, your conclusions cannot be faulted. However, the real issue in the area is whether there exist unique descriptions that “accurately” describe various aspects of the world/reality, or whether the accuracy/truth of any description is “relative to” a host of variables. Though the world may impact your nerve endings in certain ...


2

Both the terms you use, 'humanism' and 'moral relativism', have several meanings but a manageable discussion is still possible - and useful. You interpret 'humanism' as a view that excludes the existence of God or, if God exists, excludes any role for God in moral discourse. 'Moral relativism' I take to be a view about the meaning or more usually the ...


2

Most contemporary philosophers accept that relativism is self-refuting. By "relativism," in this sense, I mean what I take Plato to being arguing against in the dialogues Theaetetus and Sophist. It is committed to two views: There are no objective truths. By "objective truth" I mean a truth which one must believe, or else be rightly considered irrational....


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