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I saw a video of a philosopher (Robert Audi) who said that common sense is the best response we can give to global skepticism. I would agree, but it's not clear to me what the nature of common sense is. Is it a set of intuitive beliefs? No, it is very rational. But in order to see it, we need to take a step back out of the epistemological haze; and maybe ...


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I haven't read Audi, but I'll put this extended comment on 'common sense' out for consideration... All of philosophy begins at prima facie experience. We have prima facie experiences we attribute to the external world, usually derived from our physical senses; we have prima facie experiences we attribute to an internal, subjective world, such as thoughts, ...


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GE Moore, Moorean facts. “Here is one hand”. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand. There is a paper there in “External Links” you may want to read by Thomas Kelly.


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The bottom line is that, like knowledge [commonly defined as "warranted or justified true belief"], to be "interesting" [sticking to your lecturer's postmodern argot], skepticism must also be justified, be warranted [using the non-postmodern argot]. That is, my claim to know, or doubt [be skeptical about] claim C is justified/warranted, ...


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It is advisable to distinguish two types of scepticism towards our knowledge, viz. the theory with which we describe the world: the world could be principally different (or not even exist) to any of our theories that ever describe it and thus we could be doomed to know nothing our (human) sensory and notional access to the world is so limited that it must ...


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The problem here is ignorance. We don’t know the proofs of some proofs at some point. Also in some cases the axiomatic response is correct. For example, there is no point in proving the equivalence of two identical things, as in them being fundamentally the same entity. A perfect example of the former case is the proofs of the various theories upon the ...


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The trilemma has a fundamental premise, namely that all justifications are deductive in nature. This is problematic since the trilemma and its purported conclusion (the impossibility of proving any truth) is not itself deductively derived from any other statements. Albert himself claimed that the trilemma affected inductive, causal, transcendental and ...


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