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This issue is addressed in Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, especially 145 and 148, and there is some disagreement as to what the nature of his argument is. Some take it to be an argument by analogy: we see bodies and behaviors similar to our own out there, and infer that there is a mind behind it. Others point out that the ...


8

Are there some rational arguments to disprove this as explanation to everything? It is an explanation, but it is not a sophisticated/predictive one. An early quote from the cited work says, However, if you believed in subjective reality, you have to reject the question entirely. You’d say that there’s no such thing as a tree outside your awareness. ...


7

Idealism does not necessarily assert mind as a fundamental entity, but it does assert the metaphysical priority of the ideal over the material. The view of reality as derivative from the mind is associated with a particular strain, so-called subjective idealism, the extreme form of which is solipsism, asserting that only a single mind exists, the subject's ...


7

The simple answer is: a) You can't and b) It doesn't matter if we are. I think, therefore I am. Note that this statement doesn't include you, or him over there, it's a statement about me. Beyond that it doesn't matter whether it's all an illusion, a simulation, or the matrix. The simple fact is that this is who I am, whatever the "truth" behind it is, ...


6

We're biologically incapable of ignoring our senses. I imagine a computer would have complete control of its sensory input and how it can be viewed. Whereas I can imagine a human being as an orangutan, but not physically see one as such, a computer should be able to see it exactly as that, if it so chose. This strikes me as profoundly wrong. First of all, ...


5

I think there are ways to question solipsism, but it can always be tweaked in one way or another to remain untouchable. My favorite way to question it is this: solipsism says that everything that exists is actually a subjective experience of some "I" - you can define that "I" anyway you want. The problem is that in order to do that, you need to have a ...


4

It is logically possible that you can in fact calculate that fast but you need the ritual of submitting the problem to a computer in order to be able to consciously access the answer. You can take this to ridiculous extremes by having mathematics formulas generated from block-codes from Bitcoin mining, with the calculation done without you observing, and ...


4

See Jabberwocky; it is a "well written" nonsense poem, full of suggestive rhymes and words, like : All mimsy were the borogoves. It is readable and enjoyable, and it has beeen translated multiple times. So what ? From a solipsistic point of view, how it is possible that your own mind can 'write up' a poem that makes no sense, yet built on syntactical ...


4

"Criterial" approach stems from Wittgenstein's view of meaning as use, and irreducibility of language to propositional knowledge and logic. Roughly speaking, according to Wittgenstein there are types of knowledge, such as skills, that fall under "know how" rather than "know what", and can not be expressed in propositions, truth conditions and inferences ...


4

There are philosophers suggesting exactly that. To quote the promotion text of the recent book What Do Philosophers Do?: Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy by Penelope Maddy (Oxford, New York: Oxford UP, 2017): How do you know the world around you isn't just an elaborate dream, or the creation of an evil neuroscientist? If all you have to go on are ...


3

They are different concepts. Plato in the Theaetetus interprets Protagoras’ doctrine. Plato attributes the doctrine called subjective relativism to Protagoras, that what anyone believes is true for that person, ‘true’ is replaced by ‘true for’. On that interpretation, the way things seem to an individual is the way they are in fact for that individual. ...


3

That is, a brain in a vat would never be thinking about real brains or real vats, but rather about images sent into it that resemble real brains or real vats. This is the problematic part of the argument. Because, of course, all our actual brain gets is neural firing patterns sent into it. So there is no particular distinction between a brain in a vat ...


3

Having those assumptions it's easy to arrange arguments to explain everything about how reality works, as is done here. Are there some rational arguments to disprove this as explanation to everything? To answer your actual question: It's not an explanation to everything. For something to be an explanation it has to have explanatory power - that is, ...


3

Extreme solipsism isn't a valid interpretation because you can do experiments where you're not the one observing. Observers don't have to be conscious; they just have to be entangled with the observable. Required reading: Lubos Motl's blog. Whether you're a solipsist or not, you have to define "observer" to mean something other than you.


3

If you are a solipsist, from your point of view you would only be talking to yourself anyway. So you could say whatever you wanted. If you are a (presumably external) interlocutor trying to catch a solipsist in an implicit contradiction, there will probably be plenty of opportunities. Even if the solipsist has no actual belief in the existence of others, ...


3

If solipsism is the thesis that only I exist, then Berkeley was certainly not a solipsist since a major burden of his argument in the Principles is that all that exist are his and other minds or spirits and their ideas. Spirits crucially include God; and while Berkeley was a Bishop I don't believe he credited himself with divinity. I don't think 'Idealism' ...


3

Given Allegranzas excellent answer, this is solely a clarification on Virmaiors comment on confusing realism and solipsism in the following statement: In a realist or solipsistic view, reality is either generated by your own mind or illusory altogether. This is somewhat confused; there are two basic positions on reality - realism or idealism. Realism, ...


3

While this falls short of resolving the paradox, the following references may be helpful. JJ Valberg in his Dream, Death, and the Self explores similar paradoxes -- what he calls "extraphilosophical puzzles." Particularly closely related is this one [page 20]: The first [puzzle] is the "solipsistic puzzle of death": the prospect of my death looms as the ...


2

But that avatar is no more you than any other character in the dream world. This I know isn't true, if there is an avatar providing a point of view in a dream world for me, it is more me than the rest of the dream world. I know this feeling can be escaped somewhat with the use of drugs or perhaps some exercises (meditation or whatever), but there's a ...


2

My clone's character in the virtual reality should experience the same impact of fundamental interactions. Someone might argue that if there is no empirical evidence to appeal to in order to establish whether brains in a computer model of the world that can simulate human conscience, then the hypothesis is metaphysical. Many philosophers would maintain ...


2

There are weak and strong forms of Solipsism. Historically Solipsistic arguments have fallen along a spectrum between the two forms along a spectrum. The most common form is the weak form, the original and simply asserts that the only axiom anyone can know for certain is that their own mind exist. That's Decartes. The rest of perceived existence may or may ...


2

Solipsism can be more subtle than that, Berkeley's for example, although there is a linguistic disagreement on whether to classify his philosophy as solipsism, and Berkeley denied the label. Basically he contends that "to be is to be perceived" (esse est percipi), there is no material or physical substrate to that, and each soul has a whole perceived world ...


2

I like Mauro's analogy, and Mozibur makes a good point about the nature of realism. I'm not sure this is entirely what you have in mind, but it may be of interest nonetheless. You ask : "How, then, can you 'think up' an equation or be presented one illusorily, that makes no sense to one's self, yet build on rules that you had previously known (or, ...


2

The answer is sensitive to what is meant by "external" and "denial". For instance, one could say that the expression "external world" is incomprehensible (since we can not get out of ourselves to understand what it means), and that can be called "denying it". Kant's position can be read in this way, and also positions of many anti-realists (Husserl, ...


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