From our western perspective, it certainly is an "Appeal to Law" fallacy and @jo1storm's answer deserves all the upvotes.
In the West, with the notable partial exceptions of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the thoughtful kids have pretty much assumed―at least since Euthyphro came out―that true morality must be prior and superior to any lawgiver up to and including ...
It seems that this is too varied a position to pin a single label on.
One label would be "conventional" or "Law and order" morality, as used in Kohlberg's stages of moral development. It's worth noting that this is not a prescriptive theory by an ethicist about how people should think or behave, but a descriptivist theory by a psychologist about how they ...
In a democracy, I don't think this is an appeal to authority anymore, nor is it entirely circular.
It is clear that laws are based upon the shared moral sentiments of the population, if we are electing our legislators and even our judges. They have authority, but it is our authority.
We may not feel represented by the composite, here, in the same way that ...
As earlier posters have said, it can be interpreted as an appeal to authority (the law). Fundamentally, it is a form of circular reasoning based on the premise that all laws are moral:
The law is moral
The law allows for X
X is moral
We are talking about "Appeal to law" fallacy.
When following the law is assumed to be the morally correct thing to
do, without justification, or when breaking the law is assumed to be
the morally wrong thing to do, without justification.
It could also be taken as special form of appeal to authority or argumentum ad verecundiam fallacy, in which the ...
I think what you are looking for is called Legal Interpretivism, which, unlike Legal Positivism (which asserts that laws are distinct from morality), asserts that laws are based on morality, and that there is no separation between law and morality, so there must be an interpretation for why such and such is legal or illegal.
In which case, the statement if ...
The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises :
Premise 1: If A then B ( is equivalent to A implies B)
Premise 2: If B then A (is equivalent to B implies A).
Conclusion : therefore A
It does not make sense, it is a non-sequitur fallacy. You need a premise 3 (B or A).
A suggested Correction :
A implies B and B implies A can be written ...
The basic problem with the argument is that the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion. Irving Copi divides informal fallacies into those of relevance and those of ambiguity. This argument is not ambiguous. It is all too clear that the conclusion doesn't follow.
Reification does not fit because in reification one is not concluding that something exists ...
The two terms are very distinct from each other.
Even "common sense" has two distinct meanings:
"[T]he common sense (sensus communis, κοινὴ αἴσθησις) apprehends the things sensed by all the proper senses." (Summa contra Gentiles II cap. 74 [10.]).
For example, when one sees and hears a person singing, his common sense ...
Does theism imply worship?
Worship is an act of religious devotion usually directed towards a deity. An act of worship may be performed individually, in an informal or formal group, or by a designated leader.
So it means a religious worship.
A religion and SPIRITUALITY are different.
The purpose of any religion is to show direction ...
Contrary to your hope, I don't think this will inspire a large number of divergent answers (I suppose for researchers on the topic of explanation there is a lot of room to disagree about the nitty-gritty, but for most philosophers they haven't put that much thought into what "account" means -- we just use the term).
"account" is a term of art in contemporary ...
'Common sense' in a philosophical context has often been used contrastively. For instance, Claude Buffier (1661-1737), oppposed common sense to Cartesian scepticism, or what passed for such since Descartes was not a sceptic.
Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753) opposed common sense to the manifest nonsense, as he saw it, of material substance.