New answers tagged

3

Keeping things reasonably simple at the cost of some generality, Godel's (first) incompleteness theorem says the following: There is no complete consistent computably axiomatizable theory in the language of (say) arithmetic extending (say) Robinson arithmetic, Q. Since there are only countably many sentences in the language of arithmetic at all, there are ...


0

In the translation by Hill & Scarpitti: It is unworthy for a philosopher to say that the good and the beautiful are one; if he goes so far as to add 'and also the trye', we should thrash him. Truth is ugly: we have art lest we perish from the truth (465). The best gloss I'm aware of on this is Philip J. Kain's: The truth is not good for human beings - ...


0

I reckon he's saying that the truth in art is not bivalent, so it is beyond the antinomy of man and superman, and so no-one need perish or go under within its logic. The greatest of artists are tyrants, but they have art to quell that, to make it "new" - as all art must be - rather than dominative. So a bit like Marxism promises a future state in ...


2

The answer to this turns on your views on propositional granularity. You say a proposition is, or can be defined as, an equivalence class of propositions. This sounds right but is underinformative, since to know when two propositions are identical we need to know what equivalence relation over propositions you have in mind. Some kind of translatability ...


-2

I will go for Intuition if we talk about a specific truth but at an ontological level it depends on whether you believe there is truth or not. If you do then your belief is faith and if you don't then you are a nihilist. To sum it up it all depends on truth and what it means to us or you.


0

No, I don't think so. Suppose A, B, C are three true propositions. Nevertheless, we might have a situation where A&B is true, whereas A&C is false. Therefore, B and C can't mean the same thing. ___ E d i t / E x a m p l e   R e l a t i n g   t o   C o m m e n t s ___ Are you guys aware of "resource awareness" (e.g., as in linear logic)? The ...


0

Modern physicalists generally do not argue any more that physicalism is actually monisitc. Here are three references published in the last two decades, that all agree that there are non-physical things in our universe: https://www.amazon.com/Physicalism-Problems-Philosophy-Daniel-Stoljar/dp/0415452627/ref=sr_1_1?crid=32B84H7IR1HAM&keywords=physicalism+...


3

The first question was answered in the comments. The short answer to the second is that they assume that the reader can figure out how the truth about there being many incompatible maximal consistent ways to extend PA with T-bivalences follows once it has been pointed out that PA proves that for every φ in L_T, there is an equivalent T-bivalence_φ, plus they ...


Top 50 recent answers are included