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6

Popper followed logical positivists (despite arguing with them on other issues) in separating “statements of empirical science from non-empirical statements”, the so-called demarcation. Therefore values, being non-empirical, do not enter the science proper, and after Kuhn Popper fiercely resisted all postmodernistic claims to the contrary. But positivists ...


6

This is currently a major topic in academic philosophy of science. Among people who specialize in this topic — including myself — a strong majority now think that ethical values do and should play a role in evaluating scientific claims. One major argument for this claim is the argument from inductive risk. Inductive risk simply refers to the risk of ...


4

First of all, there are many forms of equality: Racial equality, gender equality, equal opportunity, economic equality, etc...you seem to be mostly concerned with economic equality. Second, based on your wording, you are conflating equality and fairness, which are not the same. In fact many would argue that fairness and equality can be contradictory: Is ...


4

The English word value form translates the German Wertform. It appears for the first time in Marx, Karl: Das Kapital, Band 1, Abschnitt 1, Kapitel 1, Paragraph 3, entitled "Die Wertform oder der Tauschwert". Marx states that goods can be viewed from two different aspects: 1) Their natural form - they are made from iron, linen cloth, wheat, and 2) their ...


4

First off, why does Mill make this claim? Historically, Mill makes this claim to avoid an objection to Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. Bentham views all pleasures as equal so if you get more pleasure from drinking yourself silly and passing out on the street than from reading philosophy, then on Bentham's view, the former action adds more pleasure and winds ...


4

First, keep in mind that the question of whether life as a professor affords a higher kind of pleasure than life as a programmer or a pornographer is one question. A different one is to ask which is better for the world at large -- and thus which you ought to do as a utilitarian. The more I read your question the less sure I am which you are asking about. ...


4

Yes, Nietzsche would be against it. The crux of Nietzsche attitude towards utilitarianism/hedonism/"English psychology" in general is the problem of suffering. Nietzsche thinks it makes sense to endure serious suffering (he himself had a congenital tumor near his eyes and during the periods when it would grow, he was in incredible pain) if you can "achieve ...


3

My $0.02. Has anyone given a more formal analysis of the relationship between the fact/ value dichotomy and qualia? If you think there are qualia, then you probably think there are facts such as "I am being appeared to redly" or "I am in pain". It isn't clear to me that you would have to endorse an account of qualia on which those facts are "value free" ...


3

Yes, it can Your headline question is: Can philosophy say that these precepts are wrong? Philosophy has the ability to do that, yes, by pointing to ambiguities, unclear definitions, and contradictions/counter-examples. Especially in the case of "Thou shalt not kill"; there are plenty of counter-examples where it is justified to kill and therefore ...


3

I am a little concerned that you see 'philosophy' as a world view, or even a set of beliefs. Especially your question: Does philosophy show that these precepts are wrong? almost seems to be asking: Jesus said killing is wrong ... but what does 'Philosophy' say? The problem with this is that philosophy is not a set of beliefs, but the pursuit of ...


3

I think you answered the question in the last paragraph: "we are assigning value that isn't necessarily there", but it is there because we assigned it. Value is conditioned by preconscious investments as a child develops, all the way up through the identity formation of adolescence, so it can't exactly be said to be all conscious choice of what to value. ...


2

Pirsig and his adherents would disagree, but it seems to me that 'Quality' (I capitalize it, because it seems to me at least to be something very different from what we normally think of as quality) in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is not quite the same thing as 'Quality' in Lila (where static and dynamic Quality are discussed). In fact he seems ...


2

The egalitarian intuition, put in general terms by GA Cohen is that there is something that justice requires people to have equal amounts of, no matter what, but to whatever extent is allowed by other values that compete with distributive justice According to Allan Marx, egalitarians hold that equality should be valued for its own sake, or to promote ...


2

People don't magically disappear from our imaginations when they die. If we valued their thoughts, beliefs, attitudes while they were alive (and even when not immediately present), we will still tend to do so even when they are deceased. We don't need them literally present for them to re-iterate their wisdom; we can remember it, or imagine what they would ...


2

You might compare cultural diversity with genetic diversity, the latter being valuable because, as the environment changes, some individuals will be better-adapted to survive in the new environment. Then if culture~behavior, i.e., individuals from different cultures exhibit different characteristic behaviors, some cultures will be better-suited to different ...


2

This got really long. The TL;DR summary is 'there is no such thing as a little bit of postmodernism'. If qualia are anything like values, then experience is as socially constructed like consequentialist ethics, and you go down that rabbit hole. Has anyone given a more formal analysis of the relationship between the fact value/dichotomy and qualia? ...


2

I think I take your point, Alex— what's the justification for maintaining a cultural identity at the expense of a cosmopolitan sense of inclusion in a "global" community? Will Kymlicka's book Multiculturalism offers a lot in the way of prescribing when tolerance is appropriate, but although I may simply have missed it, he didn't give a rousing defense of ...


2

I suppose that not only Aristotle, the Epicureans, and Nietzsche, considered some "pursuits to be better or nobler than other" pursuits - but that most people in full hold of their senses (read: everybody except Bentham) can see that there is more merit in winning a game of chess, or soccer, than in winning a spitting championship or a drinking contest - ...


2

This question has some similarities with another about absolute truth on this forum. The answer is similar: We value biological life because our essential goal is to exist. Biological life is valuable because it increases our probabilities of survival. A healthy ecosystem represents more probabilities for our group survival. There is a human problem in ...


2

I think you're right in a sense that "lives are valuable" is generally a working assumption in ethics rather than a claim which is argued for. I'm familiar with four honest arguments for it and one semi-honest one. First, one can raise a theological argument that human lives are valuable because they are created by God or in the image of God (two variations ...


2

▻ INTRINSIC You refer to intrinsic value but if this is a property (X has intrinsic value) then 'intrinsic' needs separate consideration. And since you don't ask about the sense or meaning of 'value', I take it that your inquiry really just centres on intrinsicality whether of value or any other property. I mention this only because your Question, which is ...


2

Jesus taught people to help their neighbors ( Mark 12:33 ), to support their enemies ( Matthew 5:44 ), and to come to visit prisoners ( Matthew 25:36 ). Jesus believed that people need help ( Matthew 9:36 ), not condemnation ( John 3:17 ). In a religious environment that excluded people because of their race ( Mark 7:24-30 ), Jesus invited people to ...


2

There is not one standard for good in Nietsche, if there were, he would be proposing a single morality. Instead he is proposing that a single standard of value is impossible. He calls out in one case the approach of "Perspectivism" -- that each person has a unique part of the truth, and should pursue that. At another, he suggests that to be oneself one ...


2

Box is a mistranslation. Pithos is an Ancient vase not a box. However vase is a metaphore. Its shape and use as container refers to pregnancy. Pandora’s name is also not understood, but as she was interpreted by the church to be equal to Eve, her name can be understood as to come fro. από άνθρωπο (from man) which has a similar meaning as the Biblical story ...


2

In my and others philosophical view hope is for the weak, so yes, overall it's something not really helpful. We have various hope-related situations. In one situation, you did everything you could and still some things did not get the way they suppose to. In this case hope can indirectly have good effects because it can help maintain a positive attitude. ...


2

Welcome to PSE. Left to myself I should say that non-contextually hope is neither good nor evil. Let's get hope into conceptual focus. (1) If I hope for something then I must, under some description, desire it. I can't hope for something I don't in any respect want. (2) To hope for something, rather than merely to wish for it or day dream about it, I ...


1

Kuhn and Popper are clearly built upon Polanyi. This is part of what makes pure rationalizations of Popper, or reductions of Kuhn to a simple post-modernism disingenuous. For Kuhn, in particular, tacit knowledge is what validates candidates for paradigms, and what allows definitions to coalesce. The stated forms of these things are incommensurable, but we ...


1

Further to Conifold's excellent Nietsche quote: "It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself" (The Will to Power) It is in organising that small portion of the world, by power of ...


1

The best way I can answer your question is to give an analogy. The "stable arrangement of particles in a rock" equates to a stable arrangement of computer parts (a computer). Conscious existence equates to computer program(s). So now the question is, is a computer running a given set of programs "more" than a stable arrangement of computer parts? I would ...


1

Values typically make sense only in a group context, but in a pluralist society --a society with many competing systems of values --the personal choice of which values to follow becomes individually important. Many of the significant issues in society today revolve around clashes in values between groups, between individuals, or between individuals and ...


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